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INTRODUCTION 
The Equal Protection Clause generates as much law today as any 
other constitutional provision, yet the history of its evolution from 
"'the usual last resort of constitutional arguments' ... [to] the Court's 
chief instrument for invalidating state laws" remains to be written. 1 
The absence of such an account represents a significant gap in the con-
stitutional literature, for it inhibits understanding of the dramatic 
changes that equal protection thought has undergone in the last half 
century. I note just two examples here, though this article contains 
many. First, we today are so accustomed to thinking in terms of an 
almost absolute constitutional bar on racial classifications (at least 
those disadvantaging racial minorities) that it may cause some surprise 
to discover that the Supreme Court failed genuinely to apply such a 
notion until 1964.2 Prior to that date, the Court struggled to reconcile 
competing concerns: on the one hand, the Justices continued to un-
derstand equal protection as a simple rationality test and to abide by 
the intentions of the Fourteenth Amendment's drafters, which gener-
ally had not been to proscribe all racial classifications; on the other 
hand, their decisions manifested an intermittent intuition that racial 
classifications were objectionable even when not irrational. Second, a 
failure to think historically obfuscates the most dramatic development 
in equal protection thought over the last two decades: the Burger 
Court's resurrection of the traditional notion of equal protection rights 
1. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 395 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Buck v. 
Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927)). 
2. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
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as restrictions on deliberate governmental disadvantaging rather than 
- as the Warren Court was increasingly suggesting in a variety of 
contexts - as entitlements to particular substantive outcomes. 
My enterprise here is to write a limited history of modem equal 
protection - one that will facilitate understanding of the important 
conceptual shifts that have occurred over time. By "modem" I mean 
the period following the switch-in-time in 1937 that signaled the de-
mise of the Lochner era. By "limited" I mean an account that falls 
substantially short of a full-scale history of equal protection, which 
would, for example, necessarily encompass a good deal of political and 
social history.3 My aim here, rather, is to tell a story about the evolu-
tion of equal protection as a legal concept; I shall, for lack of a better 
term, label this enterprise "conceptual" history. 
I do not wish to claim that conceptual history is more valuable 
than its social, political, or economic counterparts in advancing our 
understanding of modem equal protection. Indeed, this sort of history 
cannot possibly account for many important developments. Thus, for 
example, even after the Supreme Court in the 1960s came to under-
stand equal protection as a presumptive bar upon certain (i.e., racial) 
classifications, that conceptual shift permitted, but in no sense re-
quired, the inclusion of gender on the list of impermissible categories. 
Political and social history, not the sort of conceptual history that I 
have written here, explain why the liberal Warren Court never con-
strued the Equal Protection Clause to provide significant protection 
against gender discrimination, while the more conservative Burger 
Court did, often with only minimal dissent. 
I have chosen in this article, then, to undertake only one part of 
what would, in its entirety, constitute a massive project - the produc-
tion of a full-scale history of modem equal protection. In emphasizing 
the limited focus of my project, though, I do not wish to minimize the 
explanatory force of the conceptual approach. While political and so-
cial history explain the extension of heightened scrutiny to gender 
classifications in the 1970s (rather than in the 1960s), conceptual his-
tory, I shall argue, generates a persuasive account of the apparently 
random outcomes in the Burger Court's early gender discrimination 
cases. Similarly, while my brand of history cannot fully explain the 
Court's failure until the 1960s to hold racial classifications presump-
tively unconstitutional, I believe it does account for the focus in Brown 
3. For examples of such political history, see Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War 
Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REv. 61 (1988); Irving F. Lelberg, Chief Justice Vinson and the Politics 
of Desegregation, 24 EMORY L.J. 243, 297-302 (1975) (explaining Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954), and its predecessor antisegregation decisions in terms of the national gov-
ernment's Cold War effort to project a better image abroad). 
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v. Board of Education upon the importance of education, rather than 
the impermissibility of race-conscious governmental decisionmaking. 
Finally, to take a third example, I shall argue that conceptual history 
plausibly reconciles the Burger Court's aggressive expansion of indi-
vidual rights protections both under due process and more specific Bill 
of Rights' provisions with its concomitant stultification of the funda-
mental rights strand of equal protection. 
The Supreme Court's understanding of equal protection has, as al-
ready suggested, evolved significantly during the modern era. Prior to 
1937, the Equal Protection Clause, construed solely as a rationality 
test, was invoked sporadically to strike down economic regulation. 
Part I of this article explores the tension inherent in the reconstituted 
Court's early efforts to reconcile a general rationality approach to 
equal protection with an intuition that racial classifications were objec-
tionable regardless of their rationality. My argument is that, notwith-
standing appealing rhetoric to the contrary in cases such as 
Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the Court at this time did not espouse a 
presumptive prohibition on racial classifications. Indeed I shall argue 
that this Court continued to abide by the dominant intention of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's drafters, which had been to protect blacks 
only in the exercise of certain fundamental rights, rather than wholly 
to proscribe race-conscious governmental decisionmaking (or even 
more narrowly, to forbid purposeful racial discrimination).4 For the 
Justices to embrace a constitutional ban on racial classifications would 
have required them to transcend (or ignore, if one prefers) the framers' 
intentions; yet the Court had at its disposal a constitutional theory 
justifying precisely that move - the Carolene Products political pro-
cess rationale. 5 One of my principal objectives in Part I is to explain 
why the Court, which was aggressively applying the insights of 
Carolene Products footnote four in other areas of constitutional law, 
failed to invoke that theory in support of a presumptive ban on racial 
classifications. Finally, Part I explores the ramifications of the Jus-
tices' failure to incorporate the insights of political process theory into 
their equal protection thought. 
Part II considers what I have somewhat arbitrarily classified as the 
middle period of modern equal protection - from the momentous de-
cision in Brown v. Board of Education to the end of the Warren era. 
This period witnessed, though not in Brown, the Court's first espousal 
4. The difference between "race-conscious decisionmaking" and "purposeful racial discrimi-
nation" is explored infra text accompanying notes 55-58. On the original understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, see infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
5. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
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of the notion that racial classifications disadvantaging minorities are 
presumptively unconstitutional. The Court during these years also ex-
panded equal protection to prohibit certain forms of wealth discrimi-
nation and infringements upon the franchise. Yet the most striking 
phenomenon of this era was the Court's incipient transformation of 
equal protection from a check against deliberate governmental dis-
advantaging into an entitlement to particular government-guaranteed 
outcomes. This fundamental shift in equal protection thought was 
manifested across a variety of doctrinal settings, the most notable of 
which were the equation of disparate wealth effects with purposeful 
wealth discrimination, the evisceration of the state 'action requirement 
in race discrimination cases, and (somewhat more tentatively) the 
transformation of Brown from a prohibition on deliberate governmen-
tal segregation into a mandate for racially integrated schools. 
Part III takes to the present the story of modern equal protection. 
There I account for most of the principal equal protection develop-
ments of the last two decades - the emasculation of the fundamental 
rights strand of equal protection; the rejection of suspect classification 
status for wealth; the contraction of the concept of discrimination in 
Washington v. Davis and progeny; the confusion underlying the Burger 
Court gender discrimination cases; and, finally, the recent doctrinal 
assimilation of affirmative action to malign racial discrimination. Sev-
eral of these developments, I think, are best understood as manifesta-
tions of the Burger Court's commitment to an understanding of equal 
protection rights as checks upon deliberate governmental disadvantag-
ing rather than entitlements to particular substantive outcomes. This 
traditional conceptualization of equal protection rights, often carrying 
the more familiar appellation, "process theory,"6 explains both the 
Burger Court's hostility towards fundamental rights equal protection 
and its epochal decision in Washington v. Davis. The rejection of sus-
pect classification status for wealth can be understood as a judicial 
overreaction to what many regarded as the dangerously open-ended 
potential of the fundamental rights strand of equal protection. The 
Burger Court's seemingly chaotic gender discrimination cases, more-
over, fall into a tidy pattern when considered in terms of the Justices' 
gradual sophistication in process theory. Finally, as to affirmative ac-
tion, I shall argue that this vexing issue has required the Court for the 
6. It is crucial for my purposes to distinguish between "political process" and "process" 
theory. The former identifies particular subject matter areas as appropriate for judicial interven-
tion owing to the likelihood of distortions in the political process. The latter, independently of 
subject matter area, focuses judicial review upon purging legislative decisionmaking of certain 
considerations rather than protecting against particular outcomes. For further discussion of this 
distinction, see infra text following note 327. 
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first time to choose between competing theories of equal protection, 
and that the Court apparently has rejected the political process model 
as its guide. 
It bears emphasis that this article aims to "interpret" the develop-
ment of modern equal protection. I, like anyone inhabiting the consti-
tutional law field, have acquired normative views as to the legitimacy 
of particular exercises of the judicial review power. 7 Yet I choose here 
to offer a purely descriptive, though interpretive, account of modern 
equal protection. And while most historians readily would concede 
that interpretation is not an objective enterprise, this is a far cry from 
equating it with prescription. 8 
My final preliminary point is methodological. I, like the vast ma-
jority of constitutional law scholars, take as my primary data base de-
cisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. Yet because this project is a 
version of intellectual history, I thought it worthwhile to consult the 
Justices' court papers for additional illumination of their equal protec-
tion thought.9 These archival materials have been, both surprisingly 
and lamentably, ignored by most constitutional law scholars and his-
torians; one rarely finds a reference to internal Court documents in the 
law review literature.10 This artificial limitation on the source materi-
als of constitutional law scholarship is puzzling given that one might 
reasonably have predicted considerable interest among scholars in any 
of the following little-known facts: that the Roe v. Wade opinion writ-
ten after the initial argument was styled in vagueness rather than pri-
vacy terms; that Griswold v. Connecticut was first drafted as a freedom-
7. Those views are expressed in Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political 
Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747 (1991). 
8. See, e.g., Carl N. Degler, What Crisis, Jon?, 16 J. AM. HIST. 467, 469 (1989) (comment on 
Jonathan M. Wiener, Radical Historians and the Crisis in American History, 1959-1980); James 
T. Kloppenberg, Objectivity and Historicism: A Century of American Historical Writing, 94 AM. 
HIST. REv. 1011, 1018, 1030 (1989); G. Edward White, Truth and Interpretation in Legal His-
tory, 79 MICH. L. REV. 594, 603, 614 (1981). 
9. For purposes of this article I have extensively consulted the following Justices' collections, 
all housed at the Library of Congress: Black, Brennan, Douglas, Jackson, Stone, and Warren. I 
have also selectively consulted the Frankfurter papers, now available on microfilm, as well as, 
with the assistance of helpful librarians, the Harlan and Clark papers, located respectively at 
Princeton University and the University of Texas Law Library. 
Readers may notice that my archival references are weighted towards the Douglas Papers. 
This collection, available for public use only since 1986, is by far the most valuable among those 
of recently sitting Justices. Most significantly, Justice Douglas maintained and preserved a com-
plete set of detailed conference notes, which appear (judging both from their tone and from 
comparisons with other Justices' notes that I have consulted whenever available) to have been 
verbatim rather than interpretive, and thus constitute a reliable source for the legal historian. 
10. Among the best exceptions are Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: 
Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1 (1979); Mark V. Tushnet, 
Brown v. Board of Education and the Origins of Modem Judicial Review, 92 CoLUM. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 1991). 
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of-association rather than a "penumbra!" decision; that Baker v. Carr 
was put over a term for reargument because Justice Stewart could not 
decide which way to push a Court evenly divided on the justiciability 
of equal protection challenges to malapportionment; and that Terry v. 
Adams, the last of the "white primary" cases, evolved from an initial 
five-to-four decision rejecting an equal protection challenge to a local 
political organization's exclusion of blacks from its candidate selection 
process to an eventual eight-to-one ruling in favor of the constitutional 
claim. 11 I believe, in sum, that my archival findings not only have 
enriched this history of modem equal protection, but also may prove 
of general interest to constitutional historians. 
I. THE BIRTH OF MODERN EQUAL PROTECTION, 1937-1954 
The Lochner 12 era abruptly ended in the late 1930s; the Court's 
dramatic volte-face in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish 13 and NLRB v. 
Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp. 14 was soon followed by a rapid succes-
sion of Roosevelt appointments. Lochner's immediate legacy was the 
uncertain future of judicial review .. The "Nine Old Men" had been 
subjected to a barrage of criticism - internal, academic, and political 
- for their systematic second-guessing of legislative policy judgments 
(mostly economic) without cleaf constitutional warrant. Judicial re-
view in the future would require an underlying constitutional theory of 
greater justificatory force than had informed substantive due process. 
From this constitutional crisis emerged Justice Stone's famous 
Carolene Products footnote four, 15 which found normative justification 
for judicial review in the failure of legislative process. The normal 
presumption of constitutionality to which legislation was entitled pos-
sibly was inappropriate, Justice Stone postulated, not only when spe-
cific provisions of the Bill of Rights were plainly contravened, but also 
in situations where the ordinary operations of majoritarian institutions 
were distorted by artificial constraints on full political participation. 
This "political process" theory of constitutional interpretation was 
quickly invoked by the Court in a wide array of contexts, ranging from 
11. See Blackmun draft opinion, Roe v. Wade (May 18, 1972) (Library of Congress [hereinaf-
ter LOC], Douglas Papers, Box 1588, case file nos. 70-18, 70-40); Douglas draft opinion, Gris-
wold v. Connecticut (Apr. 23, 1965) (LOC, Douglas Papers, Box 1346, case file no. 496); infra 
note 209 and accompanying text (Baker); infra notes 266-68 and accompanying text (Terry). 
12. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
13. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (sustaining minimum wage law for women against substantive due 
process challenge). 
14. 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (sustaining National Labor Relations Act against Commerce Clause 
challenge). 
15. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
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First Amendment decisions striking down laws restricting solicitations 
and pamphleteering by Jehovah's Witnesses, to Justice Stone's power-
ful dissent in the first flag salute case, 16 to Dormant Commerce Clause 
and intergovernmental tax immunity rulings. Perhaps the most inter-
esting feature of the first phase of modem equal protection was the 
somewhat mystifying failure of the Supreme Court to invoke the 
Carolene Products rationale in a single equal protection case. This fail-
ure to link equal protection with political process theory, I shall argue, 
disabled the Court from recognizing what we today take for granted 
- t1}.e presumptive invalidity of racial classifications. 
Part I unfolds as follows: first, I shall briefly trace the demise of 
substantive due process in the late 1930s and the ensuing triumph of 
Justice Stone's Carolene Products theory of judicial review. I then 
shall seek to establish that the Court throughout the pre-Brown 17 era 
(and indeed until the mid-1960s) never espoused the notion that racial 
classifications were presumptively unconstitutional (hereinafter, a "ra-
cial classification rule"). This contention challenges the conventional 
wisdom that the World War II Japanese curfew and exclusion cases 
(Hirabayashi v. United States 18 and Korematsu v. United States, 19 re-
spectively) adopted such an approach. I shall argue, to the contrary, 
that the Court's pre-Brown decisions generally adhered to the domi-
nant intention of the Fourteenth Amendment's drafters, which had 
been to protect blacks in the exercise of certain fundamental rights, 
rather than to proscribe all racial classifications. Had the Court incor- · 
porated the insights of political process theory into its ;;!qual protection 
jurisprudence, one result might well have been a racial classification 
rule, for blacks at this time suffered both from extensive formal polit-
ical disfranchisement and from deep-seated prejudice that inhibited 
proper functioning of the legislative process. 
I next shall proffer three explanations for the Court's failure to 
embrace a racial classification rule. The first is wholly pragmatic; the 
Justices could not adopt such a rule until prepared to accept its logical 
implications, including invalidation of school segregation and miscege-
nation laws. The Court simply was not prepared to take such contro-
versial steps until 1954 and 1967, respectively. Second, a racial 
classification rule, as already noted, would require significant depar-
tures from both Court precedent and the intentions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's framers; Justices at that time were far more hesitant to 
16. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 568, 601 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting). 
17. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
18. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
19. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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take such steps than were their successors, for whom Brown v. Board 
of Education represented a watershed in constitutional decisionmak-
ing. Finally, espousal of a special rule for race would require bifur-
cating the Equal Protection Clause in a manner without parallel in 
constitutional history; a single constitutional provision would acquire 
entirely different meaning depending on the nature of the statute 
under attack. 
Part I concludes with a discussion of two ramifications of the 
Court's failure during this period to link equal protection with polit-
ical process theory, and thus to embrace a racial classification rule. 
First, the Court in Brown selected a rationale too narrow to justify 
invalidating segregation in areas of public life other than education. 
Second, an equal protection jurisprudence divorced from political pro-
cess considerations risked spinning out of control, possibly even repli-
cating Lochner-style abuses under a companion clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
A. The Demise of Lochner and the Triumph of Carolene Products 
Footnote Four 
The Lochner era, especially in its waning years, witnessed a 
Supreme Court run amok, striking down approximately 200 regula-
tory statutes on no apparent ground but the Justices' own policy pref-
erences. 20 The most popular doctrinal vehicle for perpetrating this 
broad-scale assault upon democratic governance was the Due Process 
Clause.21 Yet, it was not uncommon, Justice Holmes' famous dictum 
in Buck v. Bell22 to the contrary notwithstanding, for the Court to 
employ the Equal Protection Clause to similar effect. 23 Indeed the 
20. Recent studies have suggested that the Court during the Lochner period was not as re-
gressive as the conventional wisdom would have it. See, e.g., JOHN E. SEMONCHE, CHARTING 
THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT REsPONDS TO A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890-1920, at llS-
16, 167-68 (1978); Melvin I. Urofsky, Myth and Reality: The Supreme Court and Protective 
Legislation in the Progressive Era, 1983 Y.B. OF THE SUP. CT. HIST. SOCY. S3, SS, 62, 69. There 
is no denying, though, that after 1920 the Court went on a rampage against economic regulation. 
See generally PAULL. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES, 1918-1969, at 41-67 
(1972); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 739-41 (1986); BENJAMIN F. 
WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1S3-94 (1942). 
21. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 28S U.S. 262 (1932); Adkins v. Children's 
Hosp., 261 U.S. S2S (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (191S). 
22. See 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (calling underinclusiveness equal protection challenge "the 
usual last resort of constitutional arguments"). 
23. See, e.g., Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 4S9, 463 
(1937); Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266, 274 (1936). See generally CHARLES 
A. LoFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 89 (1987) ("[t]he 
line between due process and equal protection was indistinct"); Richard S. Kay, The Equal Pro-
tection Clause in the Supreme Court, 1873-1903, 29 BUFF. L. REv. 667, 668-69, 701 (1980) 
(same). 
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first such use of equal protection was attributable to the most impor-
tant figure in the genesis of substantive due process, Justice Stephen J. 
Field; while performing circuit duty in the early 1880s, Field invoked 
equal protection to strike down differential taxation of individuals and 
corporations. 24 
The Lochner era abruptly ended in 1937 with the Court's dramatic 
turnabout on substantive due process and Commerce Clause issues, 
and the rapidly ensuing influx of Roosevelt appointees. No longer 
would economic regulation have to run the gauntlet of Supreme Court 
Justices regarding themselves as the last bulwark of laissez-faire. Af-
ter 1937 the Court refused seriously to consider due process or equal 
protection challenges to economic regulation.25 The new Justices, 
many of whom had participated in the assault on the old Court, suc-
cessfully internalized the criticism to which their predecessors had 
been subjected for undermining legislative supremacy.26 Once the 
Roosevelt appointees were ensconced on the Court, their opinions sus-
taining economic regulation from constitutional challenge exuded def-
erence to legislative authority and trumpeted the Court's limited 
constitutional competence.27 While Lochner was laid to rest doctri-
nally, however, its ghost has lived on, haunting the Court's constitu-
tional conscience for the next fifty years. Most debatable instances of 
judicial review since 1937 have had to endure the criticism of rein-
carnating Lochner in a different guise.2s 
Edwards v. California 29 provides a nice illustration of the new 
Court's sensitivity to the charge of "Lochnerizing." Involved in Ed-
wards was a California statute criminalizing the knowing importation 
of indigents into the state. At conference the Justices voted to strike 
down the law under the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Im-
24. County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385, 398-99 (1883); Railroad Tax 
Cases, 13 F. 722, 733 (1882). 
25. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 20, at 221-27; Louis Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public 
Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 1, 11 (1942). 
26. On the new Justices' prior participation in the Court-packing plan, see, e.g., LIVA 
BAKER, FELIX FRANKFURTER 183-86 (1969); HUGO L. BLACK & ELIZABETH BLACK, MR. JUS· 
TICE AND MRS. BLACK 69 (1986); J. WOODFORD HOWARD, MR. JUSTICE MURPHY 231 (1968). 
For political and scholarly criticism of the New Deal Court, see, e.g., 2 Louis B. BOUDIN, GOV-
ERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 316-551 (1932); FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: A 
RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY 162-63 (1990) (quoting from Roosevelt press conference); Walton 
H. Hamilton, Affectation with a Public Interest, 39 YALE L.J. 1089 (1930). 
27. See generally Walton H. Hamilton & George D. Braden, The Special Competence of the 
Supreme Court, SO YALE L.J. 1319, 1340-41 & n.82 (1941) (collecting cases). 
28. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511-16 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 
660, 689 (1962) (White, J., dissenting); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. 
L. REv. 873, 873 (1987). 
29. 314 U.S. 160 (1941). 
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munities Clause. 30 Yet that Clause had been functionally interred in 
the Slaughter-House Cases owing to concern that any broader con-
struction would, as Justice Miller warned, "constitute this court a per-
petual censor upon all legislation of the States .... " 31 In other words, 
the Edwards conference selected a doctrinal rationale that threatened 
to revive Lochner under a companion clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Quick to appreciate the problem, Justices Frankfurter 
and Stone apparently dissuaded Byrnes, to whom the majority opinion 
had been assigned, from relying on that ground.32 Invoking the ghost 
of substantive due process, Stone told Byrnes that 
[t]o bring such rights within the protection of the privileges and immuni-
ties clause ... requires an extension of the clause in a way which, in the 
future, and with a changed complexion of the Court, might well expose 
our constitutional system to dangers to which it has been exposed in the 
last fifty years through the over-expansion and refinement of the due pro-
cess and equal protection clauses. 33 
Edwards ultimately was decided on a much more limited Dormant 
Commerce Clause rationale. 
Having consciously chosen to abandon aggressive review of eco-
nomic regulation, then, the Justices were faced with the question of 
how far to extend their new-found deference to legislatures; the fate of 
judicial review hung in the balance. 34 From this rethinking of the 
Court's constitutional competence emerged Justice Stone's famous 
footnote four in Caro/ene Products. Stone quite consciously sought to 
fashion a theory of constitutional interpretation that would preserve 
judicial review while disavowing the grosser abuses of the Lochner 
era.35 According to Stone's nascent formulation, the ordinary pre-
30. Douglas conference notes, Edwards v. California (Oct. 25, 1941) (LOC, Douglas Papers, 
Box 66, case file no. 17). 
31. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78 (1873). 
32. See Letter from Justice Stone to Justice Byrnes (Nov. l, 1941) (LOC, Stone Papers, Box 
74, 1941-42 correspondence with Justice Byrnes); Letter from Justice Frankfurter to Justice 
Jackson (Oct. 28, 1941) (LOC, Jackson Papers, Box 122, case file no. 17: Edwards v. California). 
33. Letter from Justice Stone to Justice Byrnes, supra note 32, at 1-2. 
34. See, e.g., Al.PHEUS T. MAsoN, THE SUPREME COURT: PALLADIUM OF FREEDOM 151 
(1962); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713, 714 (1985); 
Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 
1094-95 (1982). 
35. See Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 
YALE L.J. 1287, 1307 (1982). That Stone and his colleagues took seriously the footnote is con-
firmed by internal Court correspondence. Letter from Chief Justice Hughes to Justice Stone 
(Apr. 18, 1938) (LOC, Stone Papers, Box 63, case file no. 640: United States v. Carolene Prod-
ucts) ("somewhat disturbed by your Note 4"); Letter from Justice Roberts to Justice Stone 1 
(Apr. 19, 1938), id. ("should much prefer that the case be put on narrower ground"). I do not 
mean to suggest that Stone regarded footnote four as articulating a fully developed constitutional 
theory; he plainly saw it only as a provisional first step. See Lusky, supra note 34, at 1098-99; 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (1982). 
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sumption of constitutionality possibly was inappropriate where the 
law at issue "restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be 
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation," or involves 
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities ... which tends seri-
ously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to 
be relied upon to protect minorities .... "36 
Applying Stone's insight, the Court boldly intervened on behalf of 
freedom of expression just as it was abandoning the field of economic 
regulation. A series of decisions involving subject matters as diverse 
as labor picketing, sidewalk and door-to-door pamphleteering and so-
licitation, sound-truck speechmaking, and newspaper commentary 
upon pending judicial proceedings, illustrated the Court's enthusiasm 
for its new role; Carolene Products, or reasoning derived from its in-
sights, frequently was invoked in justification of heightened judicial 
scrutiny for speech restrictions. 37 Underlying judicial solicitude for 
free expression was the notion that legislatures cannot be trusted to 
afford adequate scope to political speech owing to their vested interest 
in stifling criticism of the prevailing regime. 38 The Court implemented 
this insight doctrinally by according the First Amendment a "pre-
ferred position" and by withholding the ordinary presumption of con-
stitutionality from laws impinging upon free expression. 39 
The flag salute cases provided another important occasion for elab-
oration of Stone's political process rationale. The issue in Minersville 
School District v. Gobitis4-0 and West Virginia State Board of Education 
v. Barnette41 was the constitutionality of compelling young Jehovah's 
Witnesses, upon threat of expulsion from school, to participate in the 
flag salute ceremony despite their religious objections. While the free 
36. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
37. E.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (prior restraint on use of sound amplification 
device); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (ban on door-to-door leaflet distribution); 
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (contempt convictions for newspaper commentary on 
pending court proceedings); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (ban on picketing); 
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (ban on leaflet distribution). 
38. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 106 (1980); Klarman, supra note 7, at 
753-54; cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940) ("Abridgement of freedom of speech 
and of the press •.. impairs those opportunities for public education that are essential to effective 
exercise of the power of correcting error through the processes of popular government."); 
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The maintenance of the opportunity for free 
political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and 
that changes may be obtained by lawful means ... is a fundamental principle of our constitu-
tional system."). 
39. E.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95-96 (1940); Schneider 
v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). 
40. 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
41. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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speech cases just mentioned involved application of the second para-
graph of footnote four - restrictions on the political process - the 
flag salute cases were presented to the Court at least partially in terms 
of paragraph three - prejudice against discrete and insular minori-
ties. 42 Justice Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion in the first case, 
Gobitis, rejecting the constitutional challenge. In a letter to Justice 
Stone, who had indicated he would dissent, Frankfurter explained that 
he endorsed paragraph two of the Carolene Products footnote, but that 
here the channels of free expression remained unobstructed. To strike 
down legislation under such circumstances, Frankfurter cautioned, 
would risk repeating "the mistake ... made by those whom we criti-
cized when dealing with the control of property."43 Unpersuaded by 
Frankfurter's importuning, Stone filed a solitary dissent in Gobitis, cit-
ing footnote four and arguing that Jehovah's Witnesses constituted a 
discrete and insular minority in need of judicial protection from hos-
tile legislatures.44 The other noted liberals then on the Court - Jus-
tices Black, Douglas, and Murphy - joined Frankfurter, not Stone, 
probably overcompensating in their determination to avoid revisiting 
the abuses of the Lochner era.45 Within two years, however, they too 
came to understand the free exercise guarantee as a political process 
protection for unpopular religious groups. 46 
One should note, moreover, that Stone's political process rationale 
also saw use outside of the "civil liberties" area. In South Carolina 
Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 47 one of the era's lead-
ing Dormant Cc;>mmerce Clause decisions, Justice Stone relied upon 
Carolene Products to explain "that when the regulation is of such a 
character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state, 
legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political re-
straints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects ad-
42. See DAVID R. MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR: THE FLAG-SALUTE CONTRO-
VERSY 128, 220-21, 223 (1962). 
43. Letter from Justice Frankfurter to Justice Stone 2 (May 27, 1940) (LOC, Stone Papers, 
Box 65, case file no. 690: Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis); see also Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 600 
("Where all the effective means of inducing political changes are left free from interference, edu-
cation in the abandonment of foolish legislation is itself a training in liberty."). 
44. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 606-07; see also Lusky, supra note 25, at 32-36 (discussing Gobitis in 
political process terms). 
45. See Leon D. Epstein, Justice Douglas and Civil Liberties, 1951 WIS. L. REV. 125, 126 
(1951); cf. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939-1975, at 44-45 (1980) (Douglas 
attributing his vote in Gobitis to being overly impressed initially with Felix Frankfurter). 
46. See Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 623-24 (1942) (Black, J., with Douglas and Murphy, 
JJ., dissenting) (recanting their Gobitis votes, and describing the Free Exercise Clause as a safe-
guard for unpopular minorities). 
47. 303 U.S. 177, 184-85 n.2 (1938); accord McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 
309 U.S. 33, 45-46 n.2 (1940). 
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versely some interests within the state." Similarly, in Helvering v. 
Gerhardt, 48 political process theory was invoked to justify constricting 
state immunity from federal taxation. The people of the states, the 
Court observed, were represented in Congress, and "[t]he very fact 
that when they are exercising [the national taxing power] they are tax-
ing themselves, serves to guard against its abuse through the possibil-
ity of resort to the usual processes of political action .... "49 Finally, 
an internal Court memorandum by Justice Jackson with regard to 
Wickard v. Filburn, so a decision taking substantial strides towards in-
terring the Commerce Clause as a restraint on national power, evi-
dences a strong commitment to political process theory. The Court, 
Jackson argued, should cease enforcing federalism restrictions upon 
Congress because "the people" elect both state and federal officers, 
and thus can ensure through the political process that the national 
government respects federalism limitations on its power.st Given the 
broad range of constitutional uses to which Carolene Products was put, 
then, its complete omission from equal protection decisions of the pe-
riod poses something of a mystery. 
B. Early Equal Protection: The Failure To Adopt a Racial 
Classification Rule 
As the preceding section demonstrates, by 1940 the Court pos-
sessed a theory capable of justifying a presumptive rule against racial 
classifications. Blacks at that time qualified for special judicial protec-
tion not only under paragraph three of the Carolene Products footnote 
owing to their "discrete and insular" status, but also under paragraph 
two because of broad-scale disfranchisement, particularly in the 
South.s2 Indeed Justice Stone plainly had in mind protection for 
blacks, among others, when he penned footnote four. Not only did he 
cite the "white primary" cases there, but also the very next day Stone 
wrote to a judicial colleague of his concern "about the increasing ra-
cial and religious intolerance which seems to bedevil the world, and 
48. 304 U.S. 405 (1938). 
49. 304 U.S. at 416. 
50. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
51. Jackson memorandum 6-7, Wickard v. Filburn (June 6, 1942) (LOC, Jackson Papers, 
Box 125, case file no. 59). 
52. See, e.g., PAUL KLEPPNER, WHO VOTED? THE DYNAMICS OF ELECTORAL TURNOUT 
1870-1980, at 116 (1982) (percentage of blacks eligible to vote in southern states was 4.5% in 
1940, 12.5% in 1947, 20.7% in 1952, and 29.1% in 1960); id. at 117 (chart indicating dramatic 
disparities in black and white voter turnout in the South between 1952 and 1960, and smaller, 
though still substantial, racial disparities in the North). 
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which I greatly fear may be augmented in this country."53 
Before attempting to explain the Court's failure during this period 
to link equal protection with political process theory or, relatedly, to 
espouse a racial classification rule, I first must demonstrate, in contra-
vention of the received wisdom,54 that the Court during the 1940s did 
not in fact understand the Equal Protection Clause as presumptively 
invalidating racial classifications. Equal protection cases in the pre-
Brown era can be subdivided into two strands. One of these was com-
prised of racial classifications that facially disadvantaged nobody. 
More specifically, this category included segregation laws, miscegena-
tion prohibitions, and judicial enforcement of racially restrictive cove-
nants; while these instances of state action all embodied racial 
distinctions, none formally disadvantaged a particular racial group vis-
a-vis others. 55 The second category of cases was comprised of racial 
discrimination, rather than segregation or equal application of race-
conscious laws. More specifically, this category included exclusions of 
blacks from the franchise and jury participation, 56 discrimination 
against the Chinese in occupational pursuits, 57 and the World War II 
Japanese curfew and exclusion cases. 58 I shall argue that in neither 
category of cases did the Court adopt a racial classification rule. Be-
cause the issues raised by the two strands are somewhat different, I 
shall consider them separately. 
As to the first category of cases, the Supreme Court's endorsement 
of the "separate-but-equal" rule in its segregation decisions obviously 
belies espousal of a presumptive rule against racial classifications. If 
all racial classifications were prima facie unconstitutional, cases like 
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 59 involving racial segregation in 
higher education, would not have posed serious constitutional ques-
tions. Thus the most one plausibly can claim, given the Court's sane-
53. ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 515 (1956) 
(quoting from Stone letter to Judge Irving Lehman, Apr. 26, 1938). 
54. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Loving 
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Lawrence Gene Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary 
Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 773 (1969). 
55. E.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (racial covenants); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. 
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (law school segregation); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) 
(transportation segregation); Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882) (criminal statute punishing 
more severely cohabitation by interracial, than intraracial, couples). 
56. E.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (exclusion of blacks from Democratic Party 
primary); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (exclusion of blacks from juries). 
57. E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (systematic denial oflaundry permits to 
Chinese). 
58. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 
81 (1943). 
59. 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
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tioning of separate-but-equal, is that this era witnessed endorsement of 
a rule presumptively invalidating racial discrimination, rather than all 
racial classifications. I shall argue below that even this qualified ver-
sion of the received wisdom is mistaken; for now, though, closer exam-
ination of this first category of cases will illuminate the Court's early 
equru protection thinking. 
The Court's pre-Brown graduate school segregation cases, to take 
the most populous subcategory of this strand, make for somewhat pe-
culiar reading. Both Gaines and its successors60 simply assumed that 
racially segregated public facilities, to be constitutional, had to be 
equal. Analysis ended upon discovery of inequality, with the Court 
brusquely invalidating the segregation statute. That result, while per-
haps plausible upon superficial consideration, proves troubling on 
closer scrutiny. The Equal Protection Clause does not, as the Court 
has so often announced, require universally equal treatment.61 Nor 
could any practicable theory of equal protection do so, given that laws, 
by their very nature, seek to differentiate. Thus one reasonably might 
have expected a more sophisticated explanation from the Court in 
these pre-Brown segregation cases than simple identification of ine-
quality in treatment. Missing from these decisions was an account of 
why inequality was conclusively (not even presumptively) objectiona-
ble with regard to racial classifications, when it was not as to any 
others. 
The most appealing answer - that the Fourteenth Amendment 
was intended to prevent all deliberate disadvantaging of blacks - is 
simply wrong. We know that the Fourteenth Amendment's framers 
did not mean to proscribe all racial discrimination since, to take the 
most compelling counterexample, they did not understand exclusion 
of blacks from the franchise to be unconstitutional. Section Two of 
the Fourteenth Amendment plainly assumed the lawfulness of racial 
discrimination in voting;62 it seems implausible that Section One, in 
60. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 
629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948). 
61. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966); Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 
423 (1963); see also Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 
CAL. L. REv. 341, 344 (1949) (equal protection requires only that those who are similarly situ· 
ated generally be treated equally). 
62. Section Two provides that states denying or abridging the right to vote of adult male 
citizens will suffer a corresponding reduction in the number of their congressional representa· 
tives. Underlying this peculiar provision was the Republican wish to pressure southern states 
into enfranchising their former slaves without directly mandating black suffrage, owing to its 
political unpopularity in northern states, only six of which at that time permitted blacks to vote. 
See, e.g., CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88 pt. I, 1261-65 (Paul 
A. Freund ed. 1971); JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND· 
MENT 24, 43 (1984); William W. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" to Vote, 
and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SUP. Cr. REV. 33, 70. 
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which the Equal Protection Clause resides, was intended to prohibit 
what its successor section unambiguously tolerated. 63 The question 
remains, then, why separate-and-unequal was conclusively unconstitu-
tional, rather than subject to justification like any other sort of 
inequality. 
The answer, which probably will surprise most constitutional law-
yers, is that Plessy v. Ferguson, 64 the case first introducing separate-
but-equal to the Supreme Court, apparently contemplated that une-
qual segregated facilities would be subject to justification just like any 
other sort of inequality. While modem c,ourts and commentators gen-
erally have read Plessy as requiring that segregated facilities be equal 
to be constitutional, 65 a close reading suggests that the Justices proba-
bly understood their decision differently. 66 First, one must remember 
that the Louisiana segregation statute at issue in Plessy required, as did 
the common law of common carriers, that equal, though separate, fa-
cilities be supplied to blacks. 67 Thus the Court did not need to decide, 
in sustaining the exclusion of a black man from the white car of a 
train, whether equal facilities were constitutionally required. More im-
portantly, the majority opinion implied that if equality was constitu-
tionally required, it was only because in this context, no rational basis 
existed for inequality. In response to the argument that if a legislature 
constitutionally could segregate trains by race, so could it require that 
a separate car be established for red-haired persons or that blacks and 
whites paint their houses different colors, Justice Brown noted that 
every exercise of the police power must be reasonable. 68 Thus equality 
63. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 594 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); RAOUL 
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 64-68 (1977); see also Alexander M. Bickel, The Original 
Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. I, 12-13, 16-20, 42, 44, 51, 52-
53, 56, 58 (1955) (summarizing evidence and concluding that majority in 39th Congress did not 
intend to confer right to black suffrage through Fourteenth Amendment). But see Van Alstyne, 
supra note 62, at 56-58 (arguing that the express penalty imposed by Section Two upon black 
disfranchisement does not logically require reading Section One as permitting such exclusions). 
64. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
65. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954); J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, 
FROM BROWN TO BAKKE 19 (1979); Alfred H. Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered: 
The Segregation Question, 54 MICH. L. REv. 1049, 1049 (1956). 
66. The most that can be said for the conventional wisdom is that P/essy is ambiguous. Jus· 
tice Brown's majority opinion declared that "[t]he object of the [fourteenth] amendment was 
undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law." 163 U.S. at 544. 
But he also stated that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to "enforce social, as distin-
guished from political, equality." 163 U.S. at 544. Justice Brown might have meant by these 
statements that with regard to social, but not political or civil, rights the Constitution permitted 
unequal legislation; or he might have meant that formal equality was required across-the-board, 
but that substantive equality was not constitutionally mandated, and indeed would be unlikely to 
result so long as "one race be inferior to the other." 163 U.S. at 552. 
67. See LoFGREN, supra note 23, at 200. 
68. 163 U.S. at 550-51. 
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was required in Plessy, if indeed it was required, 69 only because the 
Court could conceive of no rational explanation for a state's refusal to 
provide equal railway facilities for blacks. Racial classifications, in 
other words, were subjected to the same general rationality test which 
had come to govern equal protection review of economic regulation. 70 
This interpretation of Plessy becomes compelling, in my view, 
when considered in light of the Court's decision in Cumming v. Rich-
mond County Board of Education 71 just three years later. Cumming 
involved a Georgia county's decision to conserve funds by closing its 
black high school in order to increase the number of black children 
receiving an elementary school education; white children in the county 
continued to receive a publicly funded high school education. Justice 
Harlan, the lone dissenter in Plessy, wrote for a unanimous Court re-
jecting the equal protection challenge, relying implicitly on the reason-
ableness of the county's decision to deprive older black children of 
secondary schooling in order to increase the number receiving primary 
education. A different case would have been presented, Harlan con-
cluded, had the evidence revealed that racial hostility motivated the 
school board action. 72 The most plausible inference from conjoining 
Plessy and Cumming, then, is that the Constitution requires that sepa-
rate be equal only when unequal would be unreasonable. 
In the twentieth century, however, the separate-but-equal doctrine 
was rapidly detached from the reasonableness requirement that had 
informed its inception. Beginning in 1914 with McCabe v. Atchison, 
Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 73 the Court found constitutional vio-
lations in segregated facilities even where inequalities were quite rea-
sonably justified. 74 Thus, for example, in the graduate school 
education and railway passenger contexts, it was not plainly unreason-
able for the state to refuse to provide for blacks, respectively, a sepa-
69. Benno Schmidt argues that Plessy did not require equality at all because railroad seating 
was deemed to fall within "the domain of social relations rather than political rights," and the 
Court had declared that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to enforce social, as op-
posed to political and civil, equality. Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The 
Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era, Part 1: The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 COLUM. L. 
REV. 444, 468 (1982). 
70. See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGRE-
GATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at 22 (1987); LoFGREN, supra note 23, at 190; Kay, supra note 
23, at 719; Schmidt, supra note 69, at 469-70. 
71. 175 U.S. 528 (1899). 
72. Cumming, 175 U.S. at 544-45; see also Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898) (sug-
gesting that the issue in racial classification cases was whether the legislature had sought to 
oppress a racial minority or to further the common good, not whether unequal treatment was 
involved). 
73. 235 U.S. 151 (1914). 
74. The statement in text operates from the distasteful, though historically required, assump-
tion that the underlying segregation was not itself constitutionally objectionable. 
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rate law school or an equal number of first class seats or dining car 
tables, given the substantially lower per capita black demand for such 
facilities. 75 Beginning with McCabe, though, the Court consistently 
dismissed such arguments with the rhetorically resonant, but analyti-
cally unsatisfying, maxim that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees 
"personal," not group, rights. 76 That unadorned explanation is un-
convincing because the Equal Protection Clause generally does permit 
overbroad generalizations based on group characteristics. Thus, for 
example, the Court never would have invoked the "personal rights" 
notion to strike down a law requiring that persons be twenty-one years 
of age to vote or sit on a jury; yet such laws no more treated twenty-
year-olds as individuals than did Missouri's refusal to establish a sepa-
rate black law school to accommodate a single applicant treat blacks 
as individuals. In both instances, generalizations were based on group 
characteristics - respectively, the relative unsuitability for voting or 
jury service of younger adults and the lower per capita demand for 
professional training among blacks in the late 1930s. The Court began 
rejecting such generalizations in racial segregation cases without prof-
fering any explanation. I would suggest that, by constitutionally re-
quiring racially segregated facilities to provide equal treatment to 
individuals of different races vis-a-vis each other rather than vis-a-vis 
their racial group, the Justices laid the doctrinal groundwork for the 
demise of segregation, without appreciating what they were doing. 77 
If equal protection rights truly are personal, as the Court was sug-
gesting, then blacks should have the right, for example, to attend any 
state law school for which they are academically qualified, not just one 
established solely for blacks but providing equal facilities. In sum, I 
would suggest that the racial segregation cases reveal a Court intuiting 
that racial classifications were different from others, yet unable to ar-
ticulate or fully comprehend why. The racial discrimination cases, to 
which we next tum our attention, illustrate precisely the same 
phenomenon. 
The second strand of equal protection cases during this pre-Brown 
era was comprised, as noted earlier, of governmental action purpose-
75. E.g., Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Henderson v. United States, 
339 U.S. 816 (1950). 
76. McCabe, 235 U.S. at 161; accord Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. l, 22 (1948); Missouri ex 
rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1938); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 80 (1917). 
77. That the Justices did not recognize the ramifications of their rhetoric is confirmed by 
their willingness to sustain segregation long after McCabe first articulated the "personal rights" 
notion. See, e.g., Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1927) (strongly implying support for 
separate-but-equal doctrine in public education). Indeed, as late as Shelley v. Kraemer and the 
graduate school segregation cases, the Justices continued to invoke the rhetoric of personal 
rights, even though they had yet to conclude that segregation was unconstitutional. 
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fully disadvantaging a racial minority, rather than according formally 
equal treatment. Within this category exclusions of blacks from the 
franchise and from jury participation were the two most important 
subclasses. Because of the Fifteenth Amendment's unambiguous pro-
hibition of racially motivated suffrage restrictions, cases raising that 
issue could rely simply upon the framers' intentions without engaging 
in general discussion of racial discrimination.78 Racial exclusions 
from jury service generated similar analysis, though here reference was 
to the seminal decision invalidating such discrimination, Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 79 rather than to the framers' intentions, which were 
quite ambiguous as to whether jury service was one of the rights pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment.80 Not until the World War II 
Japanese curfew and exclusion cases (Hirabayashi and Korematsu, re-
. spectively) did the Supreme Court discourse generally upon the evils 
of racial discrimination. 81 
Hirabayashi and Korematsu undeniably employed language sug-
gesting that racial classifications were presumptively objectionable and 
thus subject to the most rigorous judicial scrutiny. Yet in both cases, 
notwithstanding the grandiose rhetoric, the Court actually applied its 
most deferential brand of rationality review. Thus, for example, in 
Hirabayashl just preceding the famous denunciation of racial classifi-
cations82 appear the utterly deferential statements that "Congress may 
hit at a particular danger where it is seen, without providing for others 
which are not so evident or so urgent," and that the Court was unable 
to "reject as unfounded" the judgment of military authorities and 
Congress that some Japanese Americans were disloyal. s3 
78. See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text. 
79. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
80. See infra note 107 and accompanying text. 
81. Strauder was an early exception, broadly condemning all racial discrimination, regardless 
of the sort of right involved. 100 U.S. at 307-08, 310. 
82. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100 ("Distinctions between citizens solely because of their an· 
cestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the 
doctrine of equality."). 
83. 320 U.S. at 99-100; see also 320 U.S. at 101 ("reasonable basis"); 320 U.S. at 106 (Doug-
las, J., concurring) ("some relation"); 320 U.S. at 112-13 (Murphy, J., concurring) ("reasonably 
concluded"). Similarly, in Korematsu the Court's first articulation of a strict scrutiny approach 
towards racial classifications was effectively negated by its obeisance to the military judgment 
underpinning the exclusion and relocation order. Compare Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) 
("all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately sus-
pect [and] ... courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny") with 323 U.S. at 218 ("we 
cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that there 
were disloyal members of that population") (quoting Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99); see also Letter 
from Justice Stone to Justice Black 1 (Nov. 9, 1944) (LOC, Douglas Papers, Box 112, case file no. 
22: Korematsu v. United States) (asking Black to emphasize in his opinion that the Court would 
defer to the military determination of immediate danger unless there was "no ground" upon 
which it rested). 
November 1991] An Interpretive History of Equal Protection 233 
I do not wish, however, to rely heavily on the disparity between 
word and deed in Hirabayashi and Korematsu, since the Constitution 
frequently has swayed in the winds of war at the expense of civil liber-
ties. 84 Of greater significance are the peacetime cases in which the 
Court, or individual Justices, stated a racial classification rule but im-
mediately thereafter conflated it with the general rationality standard 
of equal protection. This phenomenon, repeated on numerous occa-
sions, suggests that the Court was unable to incorporate into its equal 
protection thought the First Amendment insight that the ordinary 
presumption of a statute's constitutionality was inoperative under 
some circumstances. 85 Since my examples are duplicative, I will rele-
gate all but one to a footnote. 86 
In Oyama v. California 87 the Court struck down a California stat-
ute presuming that transfers of real property from aliens ineligible for 
citizenship (i.e., Japanese) to their United States citizen children were 
attempts to circumvent the state's Alien Land Law rather than legiti-
mate gifts. Justices Murphy and Rutledge, the Court's most vocifer-
ous critics of racial discrimination, concurred separately in the 
invalidation of the statute, preferring to rely on the unconstitutionality 
of the underlying prohibition on alien land ownership. 88 The most 
striking aspect of their concurrence for present purposes is the state-
ment that because loyalty and industry are individual, not group," 
characteristics, California's use of a racial classification as a proxy for 
them was irrational. 89 This is simply wrong. Racial classifications are 
objectionable for a variety of reasons, but they are not invariably irra-
84. For a nice example, compare Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863) (de-
clining during the Civil War to review a constitutional challenge to military tribunal trial of 
civilians owing to lack of statutory jurisdiction) with Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 
(1866) (finding, after the war, a constitutional violation on similar facts); see also PAULL. MUR-
PHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 4 
(1979) (describing widespread civil liberties abuses during World War I which went unchecked 
by the courts). 
85. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
86. For other instances, see, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954); Hernandez 
v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Commrs., 330 U.S. 552, 
556 (1947); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100-01 (1943); see also RICHARD 
KLUGER, SIMPLE JusncE 671-72, 674 (1976) (lawyers for both sides in Brown oral argument 
treated constitutionality of racial classifications as a reasonableness issue). 
87. 332 U.S. 633 (1948). 
88. 332 U.S. at 650 (Murphy, J., concurring). The majority assumed the constitutionality of 
California's prohibition on alien land ownership, yet nonetheless invalidated the property trans-
fer statute on the ground that it discriminated on the basis of racial descent. 332 U.S. at 646-47. 
89. 332 U.S. at 666 (Murphy, J., concurring). Murphy and Rutledge, as well as the majority, 
seemed to assume that the statute's alienage classification was tantamount to a racial one. 332 
U.S. at 646, 666. That assumption was noncontroversial given that the Japanese were virtually 
the only nationality then qualifying as "aliens ineligible for naturalization" - the category of 
aliens covered by the challenged statute - and that California had a long history of virulent 
prejudice against the Japanese. See 332 U.S. at 650-62. 
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tional, in the sense of lacking any logical relationship to legitimate 
governmental objectives. For example, the eviction of Japanese Amer-
icans from their West Coast homes during World War II possibly 
should have been declared unconstitutional,90 but it was not an irra-
tional policy insofar as such persons were at least marginally more 
likely than the average American citizen to evince disloyalty to the 
war effort.91 
At this point I can imagine a critic objecting that I place excessive 
weight on the rationality language employed by the Court in these 
decisions. Focus instead, this critic might suggest, on the actual hold-
ings, which invariably invalidated the racial classification under re-
view. After all, the last two decades of equal protection development 
are replete with instances in which the Court mouthed rationality lan-
guage while surreptitiously substituting a heightened review standard, 
which sometimes was later openly espoused.92 I have two responses to 
this line of criticism - a preliminary one to which I do not ascribe 
great weight, and a more substantial one that warrants further 
elaboration. 
My first response to the charge that I focus unduly upon the 
Court's use of rationality language is that the Justices had at their 
disposal the doctrinal tools with which to accomplish the same results 
but by more convincing means; we should at least pause, then, to ex-
amine their failure to adopt the more compelling approach. Thus, the 
use of rationality language in Justice Murphy's Oyama concurrence is 
especially puzzling given that Justice Rutledge, the same year he 
joined that opinion, boldly inverted the ordinary presumption of con-
stitutionality in a First Amendment case.93 Since the Justices plainly 
were familiar with a more exacting standard of review, their failure to 
apply it to equal protection cannot be casually dismissed as a linguistic 
misstep. 
90. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987); Korematsu v. 
United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (granting coram nobis petitions to expunge 
criminal convictions of Japanese Americans on ground that previously concealed War Depart· 
ment report revealed that World War II curfew and evacuation programs were motivated by 
racial animus rather than military necessity). 
91. See, e.g .. Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. 
L. REv. 1, 6 (1976); Lusky, supra note 25, at 40; cf. ELY, supra note 38, at 31 ("the core case of 
racial discrimination cannot adequately be handled by a rational basis test"). 
92. See, e.g .. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (ostensibly applying rationality test to 
invalidate a gender classification); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968) (same with regard to 
a legitimacy classification); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441-
42 (1985) (striking down discrimination against the mentally retarded despite ostensibly rejecting 
heightened scrutiny); USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533-38 (1973) (invalidating exclusion of 
unrelated households from food stamp program under purported minimum rationality test). 
93. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 140 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring) ("presumption 
.•. is against the legislative intrusion into [First Amendment] domains"). 
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Second, and more substantially, I believe two points confirm that 
the Court in these early equal protection cases was not simply cloaking 
a racial classification rule in rationality language. First, both the lan-
guage and the holding in several of these decisions are inconsistent 
with a presumptive rule against racial classifications. Second, the 
Court at this time still operated almost entirely94 within the structure 
envisioned by most of the Fourteenth Amendment's drafters - that 
is, racial discrimination was impermissible with regard to certain fun-
damental rights, rather than across the board.95 Thus the Court, 
94. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), is not to the contrary if viewed, as many 
modern scholars do, as a substantive due process decision parading in equal protection garb. 
Even if understood instead as the progenitor of the fundamental rights strand of equal protection, 
see infra note 329, Skinner is in tension with the Fourteenth Amendment's original understand-
ing only in that it did not (facially, at least) involve racial discrimination; the Court's emphasis 
on the "fundamental" importance of procreation is consistent with the framers' view that not all 
rights were equally sheltered by the equal protection guarantee. 
95. I recognize that some legal historians reject the view that the Fourteenth Amendment 
was intended to proscribe racial discrimination only with regard to certain fundamental rights -
that is, essentially to constitutionalize the 1866 Civil Rights Act's guarantee to blacks of equal 
rights in property ownership, contract, court access, and legal protection of person and property. 
As with most issues concerning the intentions of the Fourteenth Amendment's drafters - for 
example, the controversies over "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights and over the state action 
requirement - legal historians have bitterly disagreed as to the scope of the antidiscrimination 
principle enshrined in the Equal Protection Clause. Compare Howard J. Graham, Our ''Declara-
tory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REv. 3, 9-10, 17, 23, 37 (1954); Kelly, supra note 65, at 
1054-85; and John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding of ''Equal Protec-
tion of the f,aws," 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 421, 442-43 (all arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment 
was intended to eradicate all racial distinctions) with BERGER, supra note 63, at 18-19, 22-23, 
163-65, 169, 173, 239; MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A CoMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE 170 (1975); and 
Bickel, supra note 63, at 12-13, 16-17, 46-47, 56-58 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment 
was principally intended to constitutionalize the 1866 Civil Rights Act and to prohibit racial 
discrimination with regard only to particular fundamental rights). For a recent summary of the 
existing scholarship, as well as the suggestion that scholars have pursued the wrong questions, 
see WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM PoLmCAL PRINCIPLE TO 
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 2-3, 63, 123 (1988). 
The explanation for these discordant interpretations of the historical record lies in the deci-
sion of different scholars to emphasize different congressional statements. While some of the 
Radical Republicans, most notably Charles Sumner and Thaddeus Stevens, undoubtedly would 
have preferred to eradicate all racial distinctions, at no point did they represent majority opinion 
in the 39th Congress; indeed Stevens conceded that he had lost the battle over this issue. See LES 
BENEDICT, supra, at 14, 27-40, 182; BERGER, supra note 63, at 237-38; Bickel, supra note 63, at 
45-46, 54-55, 56-58. My view, as is evident from the text, is that those espousing the narrower 
interpretation of the framers' intentions have the better of the historical argument. Quite possi-
bly, some of the historians embracing the broader view were inadvertently swayed by their com-
mitment to racial justice. For example, both Jay Graham and Alfred Kelly, strong proponents of 
the broad interpretation, assisted the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in preparing its response to 
the Supreme Court's request in Brown for historical input from the parties. See KLUGER, supra 
note 86, at 625-26; see also Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. 
CT. REV. 119, 144 (conceding that NAACP briefin Brown, on which he worked, "manipulated 
history, in the best tradition of American advocacy, carefully marshaling every possible scrap of 
evidence in favor of the desired interpretation and just as carefully doctoring all the evidence to 
the contrary, either by suppressing it when that seemed plausible, or by distorting it when sup-
pression was not possible"). 
In any event, it bears emphasis that nothing in my argument turns on this historiographical 
debate. I contend only that the Supreme Court during this early phase of modem equal protec-
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while occasionally deploying rhetorical condemnations of all racial 
classifications, had not been called upon actually to depart from the 
more limited goals of the framers; when first presented with an appeal-
ing occasion upon which to do so - in Brown v. Board of Education 
- the Court demurred. For convenience of presentation, I will inte-
grate these two analytically distinct points in the ensuing discussion. 
Virtually all of the Court's pre-Brown race cases involved rights 
that were deemed fundamental by the Reconstruction Congress and 
thus were expressly protected by federal statute: the 1866 Civil Rights 
Act (reenacted in 1870) safeguarding the rights to property, contract, 
court access, and legal protection of person and property; the 1870 
and 1871 Force Acts protecting voting rights; and the 1875 Civil 
Rights Act prohibiting race-based exclusions from jury participa-
tion. 96 Equal rights to property ownership for blacks had been guar-
anteed by the 1866 Civil Rights Act, largely in response to the practice 
enshrined in some post-Civil War southern black codes of restricting 
black property ownership in order to pressure blacks into agricultural 
labor.97 In 1917 the Court struck down a law imposing residential 
segregation on the ground that the Fourteenth Amendment "entitle[d] 
a colored man to acquire property without state legislation discrimi-
nating against him solely because of color," while plainly expressing 
continued approval of segregation in transportation and education.98 
Thirty years later, Hurd v. Hodge, 99 Shelley v. Kraemer's100 compan-
ion case forbidding judicial enforcement of racially restrictive cove-
nants in the District of Columbia, relied specifically on the 1866 Civil 
Rights Act, 101 while Shelley itself placed considerable emphasis on the 
involvement of property rights. 102 Similarly in Oyama, Justices Mur-
phy and Rutledge intimated that equal protection coverage might be 
limited to certain important rights, of which land ownership clearly 
was one. 103 
Early decisions invalidating racial voting exclusions were also con-
tion had not transcended the narrower view of the Fourteenth Amendment's purpose; whether or 
not that view was historically accurate is of no moment. 
96. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted by Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 
16 Stat. 140, 144); Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 
Stat. 13; Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 336. 
97. See, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-77, at 198-200 (1988); THEODORE B. 
WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOU1"H 66, 71, 79-80 (1965). 
98. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 78-79, 81 (1917). 
99. 334 U.S. 24 (1948). 
100. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
101. 334 U.S. at 30-31. 
102. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 10, 21. 
103. 332 U.S. 633, 663 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring). 
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sistent with the original understanding of the Reconstruction amend-
ments. The unambiguous purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment had 
been to forbid racially motivated governmental restrictions upon the 
franchise. Thus the vexing question in the early cases was not whether 
the framers had intended to forbid racial discrimination with regard to 
voting, but whether exclusion of blacks from Democratic Party prima-
ries constituted state action.104 Since race-based voting exclusions at-
tributable to state action plainly contravened the Fifteenth 
Amendment, pronouncement of a broad racial classification rule was 
unnecessary to affording relief in these cases.105. 
Dissents by Justices Black and Douglas in two cases rejecting 
equal protection challenges to vote dilution (unrelated to race) confirm 
that even these liberal Justices were not yet thinking in terms of a 
racial classification rule. In Colegrove v. Green and South v. Peters, 
Justices Black and Douglas, respectively, contended that vote dilution 
through malapportionment and county unit weighting should consti-
tute an equal protection violation; in support of their argument, they 
posited that intentional exclusion or dilution of black votes unques-
tionably would be a constitutional violation.106 To invoke the race 
analogy in the context of nonracial vote dilution suggests (leaving 
aside the possibility of muddled thinking) that Black and Douglas did 
not conceive of racial classifications as presumptively unconstitutional. 
Had they done so, the analogy to racial vote dilution would have been 
singularly unpersuasive since that practice would have been, on their 
understanding, constitutionally objectionable simply because of its ra-
cial aspect. I would suggest, then, that these two Justices intuitively 
understood that racial discrimination was more problematic than 
104. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Grovey 
v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 
U.S. 536 (1927). 
105. However, the first two "white primary" cases problematically relied upon the Four-
teenth Amendment. In Nixon v. Herndon the Court declared that a racial classification with 
regard to the right to vote in primaries was impermissible under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927), while in Nixon v. Condon broad language proscribing racial discrimina-
tion generally was employed. 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932). Once the Court overcame its hesitation 
about holding party primaries to be part of the state electoral process, and began invoking the 
Fifteenth Amendment in these cases, there was no need to venture beyond voting into general 
discussion of the permissibility of racial classifications. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); 
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 614 n.72 (1964) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting); STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RlGHTS IN THE 
SOUTH, 1944-1969, at 26-27 (1976) (noting that the NAACP argument in Herndon focused on 
the Fifteenth Amendment, but that the Court chose instead to rely on the Fourteenth, possibly 
owing to reluctance to overrule its recent holding in Newberry that congressional power to regu-
late federal elections did not extend to party primaries). 
106. South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 277 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Colegrove v. Green, 
328 U.S. 549, 569 (1946) (Black, J., dissenting). 
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other sorts of legislative disadvantaging, but that their stance also was 
influenced by the importance of the franchise. 
The point just made with regard to property and voting cases is 
corroborated by the Court's early jury exclusion decisions. It is un-
clear whether the Reconstruction amendments' drafters intended to 
prohibit racial discrimination in jury service, as they plainly did with 
regard to property ownership and voting; yet blacks' right to serve on 
juries quickly was guaranteed by the Reconstruction Congress and 
then was endorsed resoundingly by the Supreme Court in Strauder v. 
West Virginia. 107 Strauder aside, the jury exclusion cases, like their 
voting and property ownership counterparts, emphasized the right at 
issue rather than stating a broad ban on racial discrimination. 108 
Especially supportive of my thesis is Justice Jackson's majority 
opinion in Fay v. New York, 109 where the Court rejected an equal pro-
tection challenge (not primarily based on racial grounds) to New 
York's "blue ribbon" juries. According to Jackson, Court precedent 
intimated that the Constitution standing alone might not guarantee 
black jury participation; it was the 1875 Civil Rights Act, Jackson 
maintained, that authorized judicial invalidation of racial jury exclu-
sions.110 Thus Jackson's Fay opinion effectively undermines the no-
tion that the Court then understood the Equal Protection Clause as a 
presumptive bar on racial classifications. Also debilitating to the re-
ceived wisdom is Akins v. Texas. 111 There a narrowly divided Court 
refused to invalidate a Texas jury commissioners' practice of limiting 
blacks to one seat per grand jury. Bending over backwards to reject an 
equal protection entitlement to racial proportionality on juries, the 
majority opinion lost sight of the commissioners' unambiguously ra-
cial decisionmaking.112 It is difficult to imagine a Court thinking in 
terms of a racial classification rule producing a decision like Akins. 
Finally, the rationale of Brown v. Board of Education confirms the 
Court's commitment to the limited fundamental rights approach to 
107. 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880); Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 336. For persuasive 
argument that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to guarantee blackjury 
participation, see, e.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 364-68 (1880) (Field, J., dissenting); 
Bickel, supra note 63, at 21-22, 56, 64-65; Frank & Munro, supra note 95, at 447-48. 
108. Strauder, 100 U.S. 313, 319; see, e.g., Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 357 (1939); 
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 446-47 (1900). 
109. 332 U.S. 261 (1947). 
110. 332 U.S. at 282-83 (relying upon Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880)), 
111. 325 U.S. 398 (1945). 
112. All three jury commissioners explicitly testified that they "had no intention of placing 
more than one negro on the panel." 325 U.S. at 406-07. Yet Justice Reed's majority opinion 
astonishingly declared that such testimony "leaves us unconvinced that the commissioners delib-
erately and intentionally limited the number of Negroes on the grand jury list." 325 U.S. at 407. 
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equal protection rather than to the racial classification rule ostensibly 
embraced in Hirabayashi and Korematsu. While the intentions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's drafters regarding a wide array of issues are 
debatable, it is difficult to argue credibly that they sought to abolish 
public school segregation.113 Accordingly, one reasonably might have 
expected a decision invalidating that practice - i.e., Brown - to pro-
pel the Court beyond the fundamental rights understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's drafters towards a racial classification rule. 
Yet Brown took no such step. Chief Justice Warren's opinion chose 
instead to emphasize the importance of education, which, he noted, 
should be judged by contemporary standards rather than by those of 
1868.114 Warren intimated, in other words, that had the framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment foreseen the role that public education 
would one day play in American society, they unhesitatingly would 
have included it on the list of rights deemed too fundamental to permit 
of abridgement by racial discrimination. Indeed, Warren's draft opin-
ion in Bolling v. Sharpe, 115 Brown's companion case in the District of 
Columbia, actually referred to education as a "fundamental" right; he 
ultimately deleted that reference, probably out of deference to Justices 
Black and Frankfurter, neither of whose judicial philosophy easily ac-
commodated a prioritization of unenumerated constitutional rights. 116 
My point, though, is that Brown as written, and Bolling even more 
plainly as initially drafted, relied heavily on the importance of educa-
tion, thus implying that other less fundamental rights could be distrib-
uted unequally according to race without infringing the Constitution. 
Brown thus confirms that the Justices were not yet thinking in terms of 
a racial classification rule. 
All that remains to be established is that I am not being ahistorical 
in dramatizing the Court's failure during this period to apply the in-
sights of Carolene Products in support of a racial classification rule. 
The best confirmation of the plausibility of my posited alternative sce-
nario is the embrace it received from scattered courts and commenta-
tors. Thus in Perez v. Lippold, 117 where the California Supreme Court 
became the first (and until the mid-1960s the only) appellate court to 
113. See infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text. 
114. 347 U.S. at 492-93. 
115. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The issue in Bolling was whether public school segregation vio-
lated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which, unlike the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause, is directly applicable to the federal government. 
. 116. The Warren draft opinion is reproduced in Hutchinson, supra note 10, at 93-94. The 
evidence for the speculation that Frankfurter or Black influenced Warren's decision to delete the 
"fundamental rights" language from Bolling is convincingly marshaled in Hutchinson, id. at 46-
50. 
117. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). 
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invalidate a miscegenation law, the decision conceptualized equal pro-
tection in terms of a racial classification rule linked doctrinally with 
the Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions. The majority opin-
ion, authored by Justice Roger Traynor, denied that the miscegenation 
law met the exacting standard applicable to racial classifications -
that the law be "designed to meet a clear and present peril arising out 
of an emergency."118 A concurring opinion likewise employed a doc-
trinal innovation from the First Amendment context, declaring the 
general presumption of constitutionality inapplicable owing to the 
"suspicion which attaches to cases involving discrimination."119 Law 
review commentary on Perez confirmed that application of the polit-
ical process rationale to race cases provided a plausible, and for many 
an attractive, path towards understanding equal protection as a pre-
sumptive bar on racial classifications. 120 On other occasions as well, a 
handful of commentators suggested that equal protection be construed 
to impose a heavy burden of justification on racial classifications. 121 
I have argued in this section that a salient feature of the first phase 
of modern equal protection was the Supreme Court's failure to apply 
the insights of Carolene Products to equal protection, and its related 
failure to embrace a presumptive rule against racial classifications. 
The two logically subsequent questions are: (1) what explains these 
failures?; and (2) what difference, if any, did they make to the develop-
ment of modern equal protection? These are the questions addressed 
in the following two sections. 
118. 198 P.2d at 20. It is noteworthy that immediately after questioning the validity of all 
racial classifications, the Perez court retreated to this constitutional formulation: absent an emer-
gency, the state "cannot base a law impairing fundamental rights of individuals on general as-
sumptions as to traits of racial groups." 198 P.2d at 20 (emphasis added). Perez thus confirms 
the extent to which equal protection thought during this era remained cabined by the fundamen-
tal rights orientation of the Fourteenth Amendment's drafters. Even a court that had reasoned 
its way to a racial classification rule was sufficiently ambivalent to backtrack quickly to the more 
familiar approach, elevating marriage to the status of a fundamental interest regarding which 
racial classifications were presumptively impermissible. 198 P.2d at 18-19. 
119. 198 P.2d at 33 (Carter, J., concurring). 
120. E.g., Note, Statutory Ban on Interracial Marriage Invalidated by Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 1 STAN. L. REv. 289 (1949); Note, Constitutional Law: Equal Protection of the Laws: 
California Anti-Miscegenation Laws Declared Unconstitutional, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 122, 125-26 
(1949); Recent Cases, 62 HARV. L. REV. 307, 308-09 (1948). 
121. E.g., William G. Fennell, The "Reconstructed Court" and Religious Freedom: The 
Gobitis Case in Retrospect, 24 CONT. L. PAMPHLETS 1, 17 (1942); Tussman & tenBroek, supra 
note 61, at 353-56. 
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C. Explanations for the Court's Failure To Adopt a Racial 
Classification Rule 
1. Political Considerations 
241 
Not until the Justices were prepared to strike down public school 
segregation and miscegenation bans, notwithstanding the outraged 
public response certain to gree'i:: such rulings, 122 could they contem-
plate adopting a presumptive rule against racial classifications. From 
our late twentieth-century vantage point, it is far too easy to regard 
Brown v. Board of Education as an inevitable decision. 123 Yet quite 
plainly it was not. 124 Justice Frankfurter probably spoke for a major-
ity of the Justices when he subsequently recounted that had the school 
segregation challenge been forced upon him in the 1940s he would 
have felt compelled to reject it. 125 Indeed the NAACP's choice prior 
to 1950 to refrain from direct attacks on school segregation, instead 
pursuing an equalization strategy, was largely owing to that organiza-
tion's perception that the sociopolitical environment was not yet con-
ducive to a segregation challenge.126 Nor did Brown ineluctably 
follow from the Court's apparent interment of graduate school segre-
gation in its 1950 decision in Sweatt v. Painter. 127 Justice Clark, for 
122. See, e.g., Douglas conference notes, Briggs v. Elliott (Dec. 12, 1953) (LOC, Douglas 
Papers, Box 1149, case file: segregation cases) (Clark predicting that "violence will follow in 
south"); Jackson conference notes, segregation cases (Dec. 12, 1952) (LOC, Jackson Papers, Box 
184, case file: segregation cases) (Black predicting "some violence"); TusHNET, supra note 70, at 
129, 130 (quoting dire forecasts of southern response to a Supreme Court decision invalidating 
public school segregation). 
123. For the popular, though misconceived, notion that Brown was inevitable, see, e.g .. Ed-
mond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150, 150 (1955); Robert L. Carter, The Wa"en 
Court and Desegregation, 61 MICH. L. REv. 237, 237 (1968); Phil C. Neal, Baker v. Carr: Poli-
tics in Search of Law, 1962 SUP. Cr. REv. 252, 253; William F. Swindler, The Wa"en Court: 
Completion of a Constitutional Revolution, 23 V AND. L. REv. 205, 209 (1970). For a more pow-
erful, though to my mind still unsuccessful, defense of the view that "it was essentially unthink-
able" that the Justices would fail to invalidate segregation when the issue was presented to them, 
see Tushnet, supra note 10. 
124. If nothing else, the zeal with which the Court evaded resolution of race discrimination 
issues before Brown suggests that decision was far from inevitable. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 
332 U.S. 633 (1948) (refusing to decide the constitutionality of state prohibition on alien land 
ownership, despite a majority of the Justices' preference to reach the issue); Morgan v. Virginia, 
328 U.S. 373 (1946) (invalidating state-mandated segregation on motor carriers, as applied to 
interstate transport, on Dormant Commerce Clause rather than equal protection grounds); 
Frankfurter memorandum to conference (May 31, 1950) (LOC, Jackson papers, Box 160, case 
file no. 25: Henderson v. United States) (stating that it is "highly important" that Court's opinion 
in transportation segregation case "resolutely steer clear of implying" that segregation, as op-
posed to separate-and-unequal, is illegal under Interstate Commerce Act). 
125. See Justice Douglas memorandum (Jan. 25, 1960), reprinted in MELVIN I. UROFSKY, 
THE DOUGLAS LETTERS 169 (1987) (noting Frankfurter's statement made at Court conference 
that in the 1940s he would have found "segregation in the schools ... constitutional because 
'public opinion had not then crystallized against it' "). 
126. See TUSHNET, supra note 70, at 105-37. 
127. 339 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1950) (noting that Texas' black law school cannot possibly pro-
vide an education of equal value to that of the University of Texas). 
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example, informed his colleagues in a Sweatt memorandum that he 
was not then prepared to invalidate primary and secondary school seg-
regation.128 Southern resistance to grade school desegregation, Clark 
warned, would be of a different order than to graduate school desegre-
gation.129 Thus it is not altogether surprising that when Brown was 
first argued in 1952, the Justices were closely divided; their own subse-
quent tabulations indicated a vote somewhere between five to four for 
sustaining school segregation and six to three for striking it down. 130 
A racial classification rule would have mandated invalidation of public 
school segregation, and the Court simply was not prepared to render 
such a ruling until Brown. 
A racial classification rule, moreover, would have interred misce-
genation laws, a step the Court proved unwilling to take until 1967.131 
128. Justice Clark memorandum to the conference (Apr. 7, 1950), reprinted in Hutchinson, 
supra note 10, at 89-90 app. A. 
129. Id. at 89; see also Alfred H. Kelly, The School Desegregation Case, in QUARRELS THAT 
HAVE SHAPED THE CoNSTITUTION 307, 318 (rev. ed., 1987) ("Southern officials might be ex-
pected to resist graduate school integration with less emotional conviction than would be the case 
for lower-level schools."); Lefberg, supra note 3, at 279. Moreover, compliance with separate-
but-equal at the grade school level did not pose the virtually insuperable obstacles of equalization 
in graduate school education. See, e.g., Kelly, supra, at 321 (noting that all over the South, 
white-controlled school boards, seeing the writing on the wall after Sweatt and McLaurin, initi-
ated crash building programs for black schools); Justice Frankfurter memorandum to confer-
ence, supra note 124, at 2-3 (noting the unique problems of complying with separate-but-equal in 
graduate education). 
130. For these divergent tabulations, see, e.g., Douglas Memorandum for the files 1 (May 17, 
1954) (LOC, Douglas Papers, Box 1148, case file: segregation cases) (concluding that at original 
Brown conference the vote would have been five to four to sustain public school segregation); 
Douglas conference notes, Brown v. Board of Educ. (Apr. 16, 1955) (misdated as 1954) (LOC, 
Douglas Papers, Box 1149, case file: segregation cases) (Justice Frankfurter noting his "fear that 
the case would [have been] decided the other way under Vinson"); KLUGER, supra note 86, at 
614 (noting that after initial conference Frankfurter thought the vote was five to four to invali-
date school segregation, and Burton believed it was six to three). I have consulted the original 
conference notes of Douglas, Jackson, and Warren (the latter obviously only for the reargument 
conference), as well as the published version of Clark's notes, reproduced in Hutchinson, supra 
note 10, at 91-92 app. B. The various sets of conference notes display impressive internal consis-
tency. The significant divergence in subsequent vote tabulations was attributable not to disagree-
ment about what had been said at conference, but rather as to how particular statements would 
have translated into votes; at both their 1952 and 1953 conferences the Justices agreed not to take 
even a tentative head count on disposition. More specifically, the conference statements of Jus-
tices Jackson and Frankfurter left their bottom line positions very murky indeed. See, e.g .. 
Douglas conference notes, Brown v. Board of Educ. (Dec. 13, 1952) (LOC, Douglas Papers, Box 
1149, case file: segregation cases) (Frankfurter: "has read all of [the Fourteenth Amendment's 
legislative] history and he can't say it meant to abolish segregation - ••• he can't say it's 
unconstitutional to treat a negro differently than a white - but he would put all the cases down 
for reargument"); id. (Jackson: "nothing in the text that says this is unconstitutional - nothing 
in the opinions of the courts that says it's unconstitutional - nothing in the history of the 14th 
amendment; on basis of precedent he would have to say segregation is OK - •.. he won't say it 
is unconstitutional to practice segregation tomorrow - but segregation is nearing an end - we 
should perhaps give them time to get rid of it and he would go along on that basis"). Professor 
Tushnet seeks to reconcile the Justices' split-vote tabulations with his claim that the Brown result 
was inevitable by arguing that "the Justices [at conference] were talking through their concerns 
about the course they knew they were going to follow." Tushnet, supra note 10. 
131. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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After denying certiorari in one miscegenation case the same year as 
Brown, 132 the Court soon found itself backed into a corner when a 
similar case -Nairn v. Nairn 133 - materialized on its appeals docket. 
Review in Nairn could be evaded only if the Justices were prepared to 
announce, disingenuously, that the constitutional challenge to misce-
genation laws raised no substantial federal question.134 Unwilling to 
engage in such blatant dishonesty, the Court, at Justice Frankfurter's 
behest, devised a more subtle avoidance stratagem. For Frankfurter, 
the miscegenation issue raised such "deep feeling" that the Court 
should avoid resolving it unless the need was "compelling."135 To in-
validate miscegenation statutes, Frankfurter warned, would have the 
effect of "thwarting or seriously handicapping the enforcement of 
[our] decision in the segregation cases."136 Yielding to Frankfurter's 
importuning, the Court remanded Nairn to the Virginia Supreme 
Court on the pretext that the parties' domicile stood in need of clarifi-
cation.137 After the state court belligerently refused to cooperate, the 
Justices narrowly voted to deny review, apparently preferring to per-
mit an insolent state court to flout its authority than to stir up another 
hornets' nest in the immediate wake of Brown. 13s 
In sum, the Justices probably resisted adopting a racial classifica-
tion rule in the 1940s or 1950s largely because of its controversial 
political implications. While this article implicitly assumes that equal 
protection conceptualizations have practical import, it would be fool-
ish to deny that political factors shape the universe of feasible concep-
tual alternatives. 
2. The Force of Precedent and Original Intent 
I would deny, though, that political considerations fully account 
for the Court's failure to adopt a racial classification rule; factors such 
as fealty to precedent and original understanding also played a role. 
132. Jackson v. Alabama, 72 So. 2d 114, cen. denied, 348 U.S. 888 (1954). 
133. 350 U.S. 891 (1955). 
134. See Hutchinson, supra note 10, at 63; Memorandum from law clerk, W.A.N. (William 
A. Norris), to Justice Douglas, Nairn v. Nairn 2 (undated) (LOC, Douglas Papers, Box. 1164, case 
file: office memos nos. 350-399, case no. 366) ("Failure to decide the case would blur any distinc-
tion remaining between certiorari and appeal."). 
135. Memorandum of Justice Frankfurter on Nairn v. Nairn (read at conference, Nov. 4, 
1955), reprinted in Hutchinson, supra note 10, at 95-96. 
136. Id. at 96. 
137. 350 U.S. 891 (1955). 
138. Nairn, 350 U.S. 985 (1956). The state court opinion is at 90 S.E.2d 849 (Va. 1956) 
(refusing to remand case to trial court on grounds that record was not in need of clarification and 
that neither state law nor court rules permitted such a disposition). For the Court division, see 
Docket sheet, Nairn v. Nairn (LOC, Douglas Papers, Box. 1162, file: administrative docket book 
201-400, case no. 366) (noting a five-to-four vote against recalling the Court's mandate). 
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The separate-but-equal doctrine had an impressive pedigree which 
some Justices were loath to jettison. Plessy in 1896 had conferred the 
Court's blessing upon separate-but-equal in the transportation context, 
and subsequent decisions strongly implied the doctrine's equal applica-
bility to public education.139 Several Justices expressed hesitation dur-
ing the Court's Brown deliberations at rejecting such a substantial 
accumulation of precedents.140 Justice Jackson, in an unpublished 
concurring opinion, articulated this concern as follows: 
Layman as well as lawyer must query how it is that the Constitution 
this morning forbids what for three-quarters of a century it has tolerated 
or approved. He must further speculate as to [the justification for] ... 
this reversal of its meaning by the branch of the Government supposed 
not to make new law but only to declare existing law and which has 
exactly the same constitutional materials that so far as the states are 
concerned have existed since 1868 and in the case of the District of Co-
lumbia since 1791. Can we honestly say that the states which have 
maintained segregated schools have not, until today, been justified in un-
derstanding their practice to be constitutional?141 
A racial classification rule would have required the Court not only 
to discard substantial precedent but also to transcend the original un-
derstanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.142 Internal evidence con-
firms that this prospect troubled several of the Justices. Frankfurter, 
for example, stated that he had "read all of [the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's] history and ... can't say it meant to abolish segregation," and 
Jackson observed that "nothing in the history of the 14th amendment 
... says this is unconstitutional." 143 To illuminate the historical issue, 
Frankfurter assigned his impressive young law clerk, Alexander 
Bickel, to exhaustively research the congressional debates surrounding 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.144 Yet Bickel and the Jus-
tices were unable to find solace in the original understanding of the 
Thirty-ninth Congress. As Justice Jackson candidly conceded in his 
draft concurrence, "[i]t is hard to find an indication that any inftuen-
139. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 
175 U.S. 528 (1899). 
140. See, e.g., Douglas conference notes, supra note 130 (Justice Clark stating that "we had 
led the states on to think segregation is OK and we should let them work it out"); Jackson 
conference notes, supra note 122 (Chief Justice Vinson: "Body of law [is] back of us on separate 
but equal ..• "). 
141. Jackson draft concurrence, Brown v. Board of Educ. 5 (Mar. 15, 1954) (LOC, Jackson 
Papers, Box 184, case file: segregation cases). 
142. See supra note 95. 
143. Douglas conference notes, supra note 130; see also Jackson conference notes, supra note 
122 (Vinson: "Congress pass[ed] no statute [to the] contrary. [The same] Men [were] there who 
passed [the] amendments. Hard get[ting] away [from] that interpretation of Amendments."). 
144. See Frankfurter memorandum to conference (Dec. 3, 1953) (Frankfurter Papers, Part 
II, reel 4, at 59). Bickel's findings were later published as an article. Bickel, supra note 63. 
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tial body of the movement that carried the Civil War Amendments 
had reached the point of thinking about either segregation or educa-
tion of the Negro as a current problem, and harder still to find that the 
Amendments were designed to be a solution."145 Still unwilling to cut 
loose from the moorings of original intention, however, the Court in 
Brown finessed the problem by intimating that had the framers fore-
seen the crucial role of education in mid-twentieth-century America, 
they would have prohibited public school segregation.146 The Justices, 
then, were sufficiently hesitant about abandoning original intent that 
they adhered to the framers' fundamental rights orientation, even 
while disregarding their views as to the constitutionality of particular 
social practices. 
3. A Bifurcated Equal Protection Clause 
My third proffered explanation for the Court's failure to adopt a 
racial classification rule is more speculative - that such a rule would 
have required bifurcating the Equal Protection Clause into disparate 
standards of review. As we shall see in the next section, the Court by 
this time already had adopted an extremely deferential approach to 
equal protection review of economic and social regulation, thus align-
ing that body of doctrine with its post-Lochner substantive due process 
jurisprudence.147 Such legislation was to be sustained so long as the 
Court could conjure up plausible justifications for it. A racial classifi-
cation rule, however, would have required the government to produce 
compelling justificatory purposes, and to demonstrate the inadequacy 
of race-neutral classifications to accomplish those objectives. Because 
every statute creates some classification, and thus is subject to equal 
protection challenge, 148 the rigorous standard of review that a racial 
classification rule calls for could not feasibly be put to general equal 
protection use. Yet constitutional history, at that point in time, was 
devoid of instances in which a single constitutional provision acquired 
different meaning depending on the sort of legislation under challenge. 
That plainly was not an approach openly embraced in the Lochner 
era's substantive due process decisions, where the Court claimed to be 
145. Jackson draft concurrence, supra note 141, at 7. 
146. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
147. See infra text accompanying notes 168-72. 
148. This distinguishes equal protection (and substantive due process) from most other con-
stitutional provisions, which have a range of applicability far short of the entire universe of laws. 
The First Amendment, for example, is not plausibly implicated by most statutes; the Equal Pro-
tection Clause is. 
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applying a minimum rationality test across the board. 149 
Evidence from a later period confirms that the notion of bifur-
cating the Equal Protection Clause might have troubled the Justices. 
While today's Court obviously has overcome any doubts about subdi-
viding the Equal Protection Clause, having created at least three (and 
arguably more)150 distinct tiers of scrutiny, that compartmentalizing 
approach has generated considerable internal dissent. Justice Stevens, 
for example, has insisted that the Equal Protection Clause, properly 
understood, embodies a single standard of review - reasonableness. 151 
Justice Powell not only publicly has objected to trifurcating equal pro-
tection review to accommodate gender classifications, but privately 
has questioned the need to apply anything but a unitary reasonable-
ness test, including to racial classifications.152 Finally, an analogous 
objection to differential standards of equal protection review has ap-
peared in recent affirmative action cases where Justices have stated 
that minority racial preferences should be subjected to strict scrutiny 
because "[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing 
when applied to one individual and something else when applied to ... 
another. : .. " 153 Apparently the notion of a unitary equal protection 
standard possesses powerful intuitive force for many Justices. Per-
haps, then, the Court during the early years of modern equal protec-
tion, having firmly embraced a deferential approach towards economic 
regulation, considered it anomalous simultaneously to construe the 
equal protection guarantee as presumptively invalidating racial 
classifications. 
D. Ramifications of the Court's Failure To Adopt a Racial 
Classification Rule 
1. Footnote Eleven and the Post-Brown Per Curiam Opinions 
We have seen that Chief Justice Warren carefully crafted Brown to 
149. See, e.g., Adkins v. Childrens Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 556 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 
U.S. 1, 14 (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56-57 (1905). 
150. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202 (1982) (both applying a heightened review standard of uncertain rigor). 
151. E.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 451-52 (1985) (Stevens, J., 
concurring); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
152. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); BERNARD 
SCHWARTZ, THE AsCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER COURT IN ACTION 251 (1990) 
(quoting Powell comments at Cleburne conference) ("I hesitate to go to heightened scrutiny, 
which I've never favored. I'm not sure even race or gender needs more than rational [basis]."); 
see also id. at 231 (Stewart at Rostker v. Goldberg conference stating that "I don't agree with tier 
tests - invidious is the only test"). 
153. Regents of the University of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978) (Powell, J.); accord 
sources cited in note 461 infra. 
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fit within the existing structure of equal protection thought - that is, 
rather than stating a racial classification rule, Brown elevated educa-
tion to the level of other fundamental rights with regard to which the 
Equal Protection Clause forbade racial discrimination.154 Brown did 
not establish the unconstitutionality of racial segregation in any con-
text but grade school education or of racial discrimination with regard 
to any rights but fundamental ones. Rather, it held only that educa-
tion was sufficiently important in modem society to warrant insulating 
it from racial discrimination, and that segregation in education was 
discrimination because "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal." 155 
The narrow rationale of Brown created two distinct problems for 
the Court. First, because Brown failed to embrace a racial classifica-
tion rule, the Justices had to explain why racially segregated public 
school education necessarily constituted discrimination. Enter foot-
note eleven, invoking social science data to establish that racially seg-
regated educational facilities were "inherently unequal."156 Express 
reliance upon controversial sociological and psychological evidence in 
a Supreme Court opinion was virtually unprecedented, and thus cer-
tain to be disparaged as overly subjective, as Justice Jackson himself 
observed.157 Predictably, the Court suffered considerable academic 
criticism on account of footnote eleven.158 Especially in connection 
with a ruling certain to arouse virulent criticism, if not outright defi-
ance, in a large portion of the nation, an intellectually unimpeachable 
opinion was imperative; yet the Court's unwillingness to espouse a ra-
cial classification rule compelled resort to a less persuasive tack. 
Perhaps more importantly, Brown's narrow rationale left un-
resolved the constitutionality of segregation in contexts less fundamen-
tal than education - that is, most areas of life. Thus, the Justices 
scarcely could have been surprised to discover in the wake of Brown 
that lower courts sustained other forms of public segregation, distin-
guishing Brown on the grounds that education was both (1) more im-
portant than, for example, access to public bathhouses, and (2) 
154. See supra text accompanying notes 114-16. 
155. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
156. 347 U.S. at 494-95 n.11. 
157. Jackson draft opinion, Brown v. Board of Educ. 11-12 (Feb. 15, 1954) (LOC, Jackson 
Papers, Box 184, case file: segregation cases) ("I do not think we should import into the concept 
of equal protection of the law these elusive psychological and subjective factors. They are not 
determinable with satisfactory objectivity or measurable with reasonable certainty."); cf Clark 
conference notes, reproduced in Hutchinson, supra note 10, at 92 (Jackson stating that 
"[Thurgood] Marshall's brief starts and ends with sociology"). 
158. E.g., Cahn, supra note 123, at 157-68; Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 32-33 (1959). 
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compulsory, whereas recreation was voluntary.159 Admittedly, these 
lower court decisions enjoyed short lives, as the Supreme Court in a 
series of per curiam opinions over the next several years struck down 
segregation in all public settings.160 Yet an honest reading of Brown, 
given its emphasis on the importance of education, did not support 
invalidation of segregated recreational facilities. Some additional ex-
planation, such as candid avowal of a racial classification rule, was 
required to justify convincingly the results in the post-Brown per 
curiams. Yet the Court provided none. Especially during the hegem-
ony of the "reasoned elaboration" school of jurisprudence, 161 for the 
Court significantly to expand Brown's holding without a word of ex-
planation was deemed wholly indefensible. In consequence, the Court 
endured some vicious academic criticism, much of it emanating from 
commentators sympathetic to the result in Brown. 162 
2. The Danger of Reinventing Lochner Under 
the Equal Protection Clause 
One obvious ramification of the Court's failure to tie equal protec-
tion to the political process rationale, and thus to demand compelling 
justifications for racial decisionmaking, was a decision like Akins v. 
Texas, in which the Court sanctioned blatantly race-conscious jury se-
lection.163 A more subtle, though equally important, implication was 
that the Justices, lacking a theory to inform their equal protection ju-
risprudence, might become too interventionist. One can conceive of 
this happening in either of two ways. First, the Court, continuing to 
mouth minimum rationality review while generating results more con-
sistent with a racial classification rule, might have unwittingly aug-
mented the rigor of rationality review, with attendant ramifications for 
economic regulation cases. 
159. E.g .• Lonesome v. Maxwell, 123 F. Supp. 193 (D. Md. 1954), revd., 220 F.2d 386 (4th 
Cir.), affd. percuriam sub nom. Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Holmes v. 
City of Atlanta, 124 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ga. 1954), affd., 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.), vacated, 350 
U.S. 879 (1955); see also Paul G. Kauper, Segregation in Public Education: The Decline of Plessy 
v. Ferguson, 52 MICH. L. REv. 1137, 1153-55 (1954) (noting that Brown left open the possibility 
of sustaining racial segregation in contexts other than public schooling). 
160. See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (public transportation); Holmes v. City 
of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (public golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 
U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches). 
161. See, e.g .• HENRY M. HART, JR., & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 164-70 (tentative ed. 1958); Wechsler, 
supra note 158, at 11-12, 15-17. 
162. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judi-
cial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3, 4 (1957); Henry M. Hart, The 
Supreme Court, 1958 Term - Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 
98 & n.32 (1959); Wechsler, supra note 158, at 22. 
163. 325 U.S. 398 (1945), discussed supra text accompanying notes 111-12. 
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Second, and probably of greater importance, the Court's practice 
of intuiting the vice of racial classifications without understanding it in 
political process terms posed a threat to certain nonracial classifica-
tions that were unobjectionable under any sensible equal protection 
theory. The most striking example here is Kotch v. Board of River Port 
Pilot Commissioners, 164 involving a Louisiana scheme for distributing 
river boat pilot licenses which privileged the friends and relatives of 
existing pilots - old-fashioned nepotism, in other words. A divided 
Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to Louisiana's 
so-called "blood" classification. Of greatest significance for present 
purposes, however, is Justice Rutledge's dissent, which probably 
would have been the majority opinion had Justice Black not parted 
ways with his liberal cohorts. For the dissenters, the Louisiana law 
was constitutionally suspect because blood, like race, was an imper-
missible basis for classification.165 That view possesses some surface 
plausibility, as blood resembles race in its immutability and its likely 
irrelevance to most legitimate governmental purposes. From a polit-
ical process perspective, though, the analogy is inapt, for those denied 
licenses because unrelated to Mississippi river boat pilots did not con-
stitute a group suffering debilitating historical discrimination and 
political disempowerment, as did blacks.166 Indeed, even more tell-
ingly, to distinguish the nepotism of Kotch from the monopolistic priv-
ileges routinely granted by legislatures to powerful interest groups is 
quite difficult. While one can fashion a constitutional theory under 
which such ostensibly nonpublic-regarding legislation is impermissi-
ble, 167 the Supreme Court during this era unambiguously rejected that 
approach. 
My point, more specifically, is that the constitutional position nar-
rowly failing to secure a majority in Kotch was irreconcilable with 
Railway Express Agency v. New York 168 and Williamson v. Lee Opti-
cal, Inc., 169 two of the Court's seminal minimum rationality cases. 
Railway Express involved a New York City ordinance prohibiting ad-
vertising on vehicles other than those operated by the owner. The dis-
164. 330 U.S. 552 (1947). 
165. 330 U.S. at 566 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
166. The plaintiffs in Kotch were white, and nothing in the Supreme Court briefs or Justice 
Douglas' conference notes suggests that race was an issue in the case. 
167. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 
1689 (1984) (describing current constitutional doctrine in a variety of contexts as forbidding 
unadulterated interest group transfers); Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 61, at 349-50 (arguing 
that any coherent theory of equal protection must require that legislation bear a public interest 
justification). 
168. 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
169. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
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tinction between advertising on owner-operated and other vehicles for 
traffic safety purposes was less than crystalline; indeed this facially bi-
zarre classification probably was attributable primarily to the powerful 
lobbying arm of the city's newspapers. 170 Several Justices were trou-
bled by a classification difficult to justify in tet;'Ills other than raw inter-
est group power. While Railway Express came down unanimous as to 
result, the Court initially was divided five to four, with Justice Reed 
arguing (correctly) in his draft dissent that to sustain a law based on 
such a "whimsical" distinction was essentially to render the Equal 
Protection Clause "useless in state regulation of business practices."171 
Thus at least four members of the Court initially questioned the con-
stitutional validity of a legislative classification serving no apparent 
purpose but satiation of a powerful interest group. That they and their 
brethren overcame such qualms to unanimously dismiss the equal pro-
tection challenge in Railway Express suggests, I submit, considered re-
jection of a constitutional theory forbidding nonpublic-regarding 
legislation. That rejection was reaffirmed six years later in Lee Opti-
cal, where a unanimous Court dismissed an equal protection challenge 
to an equally blatant piece of special interest legislation, privileging 
optometrists and opthamologists over opticians to no apparent public 
purpose.172 The position of the Kotch dissenters seems irreconcilable 
with the unanimous decisions in Railway Express and Lee Optical In 
all three cases the challenged classification was plausibly explicable 
only as an interest group power play, yet in Kotch the Court almost 
invalidated the statute for lack of an equal protection theory distin-
guishing racial classifications from blood ones. 
Kotch serves as my principal illustration of how an equal protec-
tio~ jurisprudence fueled only by unreflective intuitions regarding the 
legitimacy of particular legislative classifications risked spinning out of 
control. For convenience's sake I will limit myself to just one more 
example, though others could be cited. 173 In Moore v. New York 174 
the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to state use of blue 
170. See Railway Express, 336 U.S. at 113 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
171. Reed draft dissent, Railway Express 2 (Jan. 1949) (LOC, Jackson Papers, Box 152, case 
file no. 51). On the conference vote, see id., Jackson conference notes (noting Rutledge, Jackson, 
Reed, and Vinson as dissenting). Internal documents do not reveal what inspired the dissenters 
ultimately to join the majority opinion. 
172. Although at conference Chief Justice Warren referred to the statute as "lousy" and 
Justice Minton was "very doubtful" about sustaining it, at no point was the Court's vote to reject 
the equal protection challenge anything but unanimous. See Douglas conference notes, Lee Opti· 
cal (Mar. 5, 1955) (LOC, Douglas Papers, Box 1160, case file nos. 184, 185). 
173. See, e.g., South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 278-79 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that geographic discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
174. 333 U.S. 565 (1948). 
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ribbon juries which excluded disproportionate numbers of the less well 
educated. While a strong argument can be made that such selectivity 
in jury composition violates the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section 
requirement, the four dissenters in Moore implausibly contended that 
equal protection proscribed use of special jurors "chosen because they 
possessed some trait or characteristic which distinguished them from 
the general panel of jurors."175 To condemn government classifica-
tions based on "some trait or characteristic" without further specifica-
tion simply reinvents Lochner under the Equal Protection Clause, for 
government regulation inevitably classifies people according to 
"some" criterion. If, more specifically, the objectionable classification 
in Moore was the restriction of special juries to "the 'best' or the most 
learned or intelligent" citizens,176 one wonders what general theory of 
equal protection would presumptively prohibit governmental decision-
making based on such ostensibly innocent, indeed laudable, criteria.177 
In sum, these examples suggest that the Court's eschewal of Carolene 
Products as its underlying equal protection theory left it somewhat be-
fuddled as to the criteria rendering a particular legislative classifica-
tion constitutionally objectionable. 
II. GRIFFIN TO SHAPIRO 
The preceding Part presented Brown v. Board of Education as the 
terminus of the initial phase of modem equal protection. This catego-
rization may appear puzzling at first glance, given my argument that 
Brown represented no significant advance in equal protection thought 
- that is, the Court simply added education to the panoply of rights 
that the Fourteenth Amendment insulated from racial discrimination, 
rather than adopting a racial classification rule. I would defend my 
organizational structure, however, on the ground that Brown funda-
mentally altered the course of equal protection jurisprudence by atten-
uating its historical underpinnings. From a doctrinal, as opposed to a 
social, perspective, Brown's principal historical significance may have 
been its cavalier disregard of the original understanding of the Four-
teenth Amendment.178 
175. 333 U.S. at 569 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
176. 333 U.S. at 570 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
177. The charitable interpretation of the dissenters' position is that defeat the preceding year 
in the incorporation debate, see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), forced them to con-
vert what should have been a fair cross-section argument into an equal protection one. Nonethe-
less, the Equal Protection Clause has a general coverage, and it would have required a clever 
contortion for the liberal Justices, had they succeeded in Moore, to explain why classifications 
that were impermissible in one context were unobjectionable in others. 
178. See Philip B. Kurland, Foreword: Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative 
and Executive Branches of the Government, 78 HARV. L. R.Ev. 143, 143 n.1 (1964); cf ROBERT 
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I argued in Part I that all of the Court's pre-Brown race cases in-
volved racially oriented rights restrictions that the Fourteenth 
Amendment's drafters might have agreed were impermissible. Public 
grade school segregation was an entirely different creature. When 
Chief Justice Warren declared in Brown that evidence of the framers' 
views on school segregation was "inconclusive,"179 he was being con-
siderably less than candid. Evidence regarding the original under-
standing of the Fourteenth Amendment is ambiguous as to a wide 
variety of issues, but not school segregation.180 Virtually nothing in 
the congressional debates suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment 
was intended to prohibit school segregation, while contemporaneous 
state practices render such an interpretation fanciful; twenty-four of 
the thirty-seven states then in the union either required or permitted 
racially segregated schools.181 The failure of Senator Charles Sum-
ner's repeated efforts in the early 1870s to secure congressional legisla-
tion prohibiting school segregation further undermines the notion that 
F. NAGEL, CoNSTITUTlONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 4 (1989) ("The tolerance among otherwise sophisticated people for exceedingly implau-
sible interpretive functions is traceable to Brown.") (footnote omitted); Lino A. Graglia, Remarks 
at Roundtable Discussion of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (Feb. 11, 1989), in 14 NOVA L. R.E.v. 269, 
271 (1989) ("As important as Brown was for what it held, it was vastly more important for its 
impact on people's - especially judges' - perception of the possible role of the Court."). 
179. Brown, 347 U.S. at 489. 
180. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 63, at 241-45; KLUGER, supra note 86, at 634; Bickel, 
supra note 63, at 10, 53, 56, 58-59, 64 (all concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment was not 
intended to prohibit school segregation); but cf. NELSON, supra note 95, at 135 (arguing that, 
although most Americans in 1866 favored segregated schools, Congress "never institutionalized 
this judgment in its debates on the Fourteenth Amendment"); Frank & Munro, supra note 95, at 
458, 464-65, 467 (noting "room for substantial difference of opinion concerning the dominant 
intent of the Reconstruction as to mixed schools"). 
Warren's description of the legislative history as "inconclusive" can be traced back to Alex-
ander Bickel's research memorandum, prepared at Justice Frankfurter's behest and then circu-
lated to the entire Court. See Letter from Alexander M. Bickel to Justice Frankfurter 2 (Aug. 
22, 1953) (Frankfurter Papers, microfilm edition, part II, reel 4, at 212). Bickel and Warren 
intended something very different from this similar terminology, however. The plain implication 
of Warren's statement is that congressmen in 1866 were divided over the constitutionality of 
school segregation. Bickel meant nothing of the kind, as evidenced by this summary of his ex-
haustive research findings: "[I]t is impossible to conclude that the 39th Congress intended that 
segregation be abolished; impossible also to conclude that they foresaw it might be, under the 
language they were adopting." Id. When Bickel labeled the Fourteenth Amendment's history 
"inconclusive," he meant not that the framers' views on the constitutionality of school segrega-
tion were mixed, but rather that "the Congress was on notice that it was enacting vague language 
of indeterminate reach." Id. Bickel's argument, in other words, was that the precise intentions 
of the amendment's drafters were irrelevant since they should have been aware that subsequent 
generations of judges might construe expansively the amendment's spacious language. Bickel 
later polished this argument for publication, suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment's broad 
phraseology flowed from a deliberate compromise between moderate and radical Republicans, 
enabling each to claim victory without jeopardizing passage of the amendment. Bickel, supra 
note 63, at 61-63. That argument, while clever, is as lacking in evidentiary support as the more 
direct claim that the framers specifically intended to prohibit public school segregation. For 
potent criticism, see BERGER, supra note 63, at 102-10. 
181. See KLUGER, supra note 86, at 633-34. 
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the Thirty-ninth Congress regarded that practice as constitutionally 
objectionable. 182 
To strike down public school segregation in Brown, therefore, re-
quired the Justices consciously to burst asunder the shackles of origi-
nal intent. That those Justices committed to a constrained judicial 
'role in constitutional adjudication were deeply troubled by this pros-
pect is illustrated by Justice Jackson's posture in Brown. For Jackson 
the historical record demonstrated that invalidation of school segrega-
tion could not be justified "as a judicial act"; he told his colleagues at 
conference, however, that perhaps he could be persuaded to join a rul-
ing against segregation that candidly avowed its "political" nature. 183 
Jackson's tribulations are revealed in a draft concurrence that he never 
published: 
Convenient as it would be to reach an opposite conclusion, I simply can-
not find in the conventional material of constitutional interpretation any 
justification for saying that in maintaining segregated schools any state 
or the District of Columbia can be judicially decreed, up to the date of 
this decision, to have violated the fourteenth amendment. 184 
Yet Jackson ultimately joined the unanimous opinion in Brown, as did 
other Justices who initially had expressed qualms about ignoring the 
framers' intentions. 
This willingness to transcend the historical underpinnings of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, I would suggest, represents Brown's princi-
pal significance for modem equal protection. By the 1960s only one 
Justice, John Marshall Harlan, continued to evince serious concern 
with the Fourteenth Amendment's original understanding, as evi-
denced by his scholarly dissents in the apportionment and poll tax 
cases. 185 On those sporadic occasions where a Warren Court majority 
opinion undertook historical exegesis, the elicited conclusions were 
sufficiently implausible to suggest virtual contempt for the integrity of 
the historical record. 186 By the 1970s, moreover, a markedly more 
182. See Alfred H. Kelly, The Congressional Controversy over School Segregation, 1867-1875, 
64 AM. HIST. REv. 537 (1959); Frank & Munro, supra note 95, at 461-62. 
183. Douglas conference notes, supra note 122 (Jackson: "This is a political question -
education at the time of the 14th amendment was not an issue - precedents and custom are for 
segregation - can't justify elimination of segregation as a judicial act"); see also KLUGER, supra 
note 86, at 608-09 (reporting Justice Burton's conference notes to the same effect). 
184. Jackson draft concurrence, supra note 141, at 10. 
185. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Harper v. Virginia, 
383 U.S. 663, 680 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 201 
(1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (expressing "complete astonishment" at Justice Douglas' state-
ment that original understanding is "irrelevant" to the question of congressional power under 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
186. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 95, at 132 (accusing Warren Court of doing "law-office [his-
tory]" that "fail[s] to stand up under the most superficial scrutiny"). For two examples of espe-
cially egregious history, see Jones v. Alfred Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (construing§ 1982 to 
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conservative set of Justices scarcely batted a collective eyelash at ex-
tending meaningful equal protection review to groups - women, 
aliens, and nonmarital children - plainly not among the contem-
plated beneficiaries of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Disengagement from history permitted, but of course did not re-
quire, any number of equal protection expansions. This Part of the 
article interprets the principal equal protection innovations of the 
Warren era. The first section briefly describes the development repre-
senting the culmination of Part I - the Court's espousal of a pre-
sumptive constitutional bar on racial classifications. Next, I consider 
the Warren Court's voting decisions, with the primary aim of shedding 
new light on the adoption of one person-one vote in Reynolds v. 
Sims. 187 Then this Part examines what I regard as the elemental de-
velopment of this middle phase of modern equal protection - the 
Warren Court's gradual groping across an array of doctrinal niches 
towards an understanding of equal protection rights as entitlements to 
prescribed outcomes, rather than, as more traditionally conceived, as 
checks upon deliberate governmental disadvantaging. More con-
cretely, I shall argue that with regard to the fundamental rights strand 
of equal protection, the state action issue, and the school desegregation 
cases, the Court consistently moved towards constitutionalizing par-
ticular substantive outcomes. 
A. Adoption of a Racial Classification Rule 
Brown, by declining to adopt a presumptive ban on racial classifi-
cations, failed to transform the dominant conceptualization of equal 
protection as a universal rationality test. An important thrust towards 
modifying that understanding was supplied by weighty constitutional 
commentary critiquing Brown's reasoning, though not necessarily its 
result. Probably the most famous example was Herbert Wechsler's 
reach private racial discrimination, and sustaining the constitutionality of the statute, as so inter-
preted, under Congress' Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power), discussed infra text ac-
companying notes 305-11, and Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (interpreting Article I, § 2 
to require one person-one vote in federal congressional elections). Justice Black's use of history 
in Wesberry is demolished in Justice Harlan's dissent. 376 U.S. at 24; see also Kelly, supra note 
95, at 135 (stating that Justice Black's opinion "mangled constitutional history"). For equally 
devastating criticism of Justice Stewart's history in Jones, see 392 U.S. at 450-76 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting); FAIRMAN, supra note 62, at 1207-59; Gerhard Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Be-
mused and Confused Muse, 1968 SUP. Cr. R.Ev. 89, 96-99. For a refusal by the Court to address 
history at all, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); see also 377 U.S. 589, 590 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (chastising majority for its "failure to address itself at all to the •.• legislative history 
of the [Fourteenth] Amendment"). 
To avoid misunderstanding I emphasize that this article takes no normative position on the 
relevance of history to constitutional interpretation. 
187. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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Neutral Principles article.188 What is often forgotten about Wechsler's 
criticism - which was, in essence, that the Brown rationale placed 
undue weight on the minority group's subjective perceptions189-is its 
inapplicability to a presumptive rule against racial classifications. 
Professors Louis Pollak and Charles Black quickly responded to 
Wechsler's criticism by suggesting that Brown was better understood 
as founded upon a racial classification rule.190 Pollak expressly justi-
fied such a rule on Carolene Products grounds, which, as he correctly 
noted, would eliminate the need for debatable social science judgments 
by transferring the burden of justification to the government.191 
While individual Justices may have arrived there earlier, the full 
Court first stated a presumptive rule against racial classifications in 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 192 where it struck down on equal protection 
grounds a state law criminalizing cohabitation by unmarried interra-
cial couples. For the first time the Court in McLaughlin both articu-
lated and applied a more rigorous review standard to racial 
classifications, requiring as justification an "overriding" state purpose 
as well as a showing that the classification was "necessary," rather 
than just rationally related, to the proffered governmental interest.193 
This racial classification rule subsequently was reaffirmed in Loving v. 
Virginia, 194 where the Court finally resolved the miscegenation issue 
that it had so unglamorously ducked in Naim and evaded in 
McLaughlin. 
The racial classification rule's novelty, I would posit, explains the 
result in Swain v. Alabama, 195 decided just one year after McLaughlin. 
At issue in Swain was the constitutionality of racially motivated exer-
cise of peremptory jury challenges by the prosecution in a criminal 
case. A general rule against race-conscious governmental decision-
making would appear to bar such a practice, yet Swain rejected an 
188. Wechsler, supra note 158. 
189. Id. at 32-33. 
190. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 
(1960); Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor 
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959). 
191. Pollak, supra note 190, at 27; see also Owen M. Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public 
Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REv. 564, 595 n.59 (1965) (surmising from 
post-Brown per curiam opinions that the Court refuses to respect the results of a political process 
from which blacks are effectively excluded). 
192. 379 U.S. 184 (1964). On individual Justices arriving there earlier, see Douglas confer-
ence notes, Brown v. Board of Educ. (Dec. 13, 1952), supra note 130 (Justice Douglas: "segrega-
tion is an easy problem - no classification on the basis of race can be made") (Justice Minton: 
"classification on the basis of race does not add up - it's invidious and can't be maintained"). 
193. 379 U.S. at 192-93, 196; see also 379 U.S. at 197 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
194. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
195. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
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equal protection challenge to a consistent prosecutorial practice of 
striking prospective black jurors. Equally noteworthy was the dissent-
ers' concession that only "systematic exclusion," not isolated race-
based challenges, violated the Equal Protection Clause.196 In Swain, 
as in Akins twenty years earlier, the Justices sanctioned racially dis-
criminatory governmental conduct in their eagerness to reject a consti-
tutional entitlement to racial proportionality on juries. That the 
decidedly more conservative Burger Court overruled Swain by a re-
sounding seven-to-two margin probably is due to the influence of two 
additional decades of thinking about equal protection in terms of a 
racial classification rule.191 
While McLaughlin and Loving finally adopted such a rule, they 
failed to produce a convincing justificatory rationale. The most one 
can derive from these and other contemporaneous opinions was the 
centrality to the Fourteenth Amendment's framers of protecting 
blacks.198 That historical justification was scarcely compelling, 
though, given that most of the framers did not intend to constitution-
alize a racial classification rule.199 
Identifying the justification for such a rule has proven critical to 
resolution of the three issues which, in combination, have dominated 
the most recent phase of modern equal protection. First is the ques-
tion of which groups, in addition to racial minorities, qualify for 
heightened equal protection review. A casual nod towards history 
provides some (minimal, in my view) support for a presumptive rule 
against racial classifications, but more is required to shelter other 
groups under the equal protection umbrella. Second, a racial classifi-
cation rule serves two distinct values; it purges the legislative process 
of racial hostility and stereotypes, and it insulates an historically op-
pressed group from additional burdens (whether imposed intentionally 
or not) unless compellingly justified. The Warren Court had no need 
to choose between these processual and impact values, yet that issue 
proved as momentous as any in equal protection during the 1970s in 
the specific guise of constitutional challenges to facially neutral laws 
yielding disparate racial impacts. Finally, McLaughlin and Loving, in 
failing to spell out the justification for a racial classification rule, left 
unresolved the constitutional status of racial classifications designed to 
benefit the minority group - i.e., affirmative action. More specifi-
196. 380 U.S. at 245 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
197. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
198. See, e.g., McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 191-92; 379 U.S. at 197 (Harlan, J., concurring); 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Harper v. Virginia, 383 
U.S. 663, 682 n.3 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
199. See supra note 95. 
November 1991] An Interpretive History of Equal Protection 257 
cally, the Court did not decide whether racial classifications are objec-
tionable primarily because of their unhappy history of oppressing 
racial minorities or because racial decisionmaking is simply anathema 
to good government. 
B. The Voting Rights Revolution 
One principal arena of the Warren Court's "egalitarian revolution" 
was voting rights. Until 1960 the Justices steadfastly declined to enter 
the political thicket, with the sole exception of invalidating several fla-
grant black exclusions from the franchise.200 Through the 1950s the 
Court regularly rejected challenges to legislative malapportionment, 
geographical vote weighting, and the poll tax.201 Indeed, as late as 
1959 a unanimous Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a 
state literacy test.202 
The camel's nose under the voting booth was Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot, 203 where the Court struck down blatant racial gerrymander-
ing of city lines, which excluded nearly every black resident, but not a 
single white. Because this infringement on voting rights was racially 
motivated, the Court was able to rely entirely upon the Fifteenth 
Amendment, thus creating no generally applicable vote dilution prece-
dent. Indeed, Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion went to great 
lengths to distinguish earlier nonracial vote dilution controversies in 
which the Court had refused to intervene.204 
Gomillion in no sense rendered inevitable the Court's ensuing deci-
sion to constitutionalize legislative apportionment rules.205 To the 
contrary, internal evidence reveals the Justices' considerable hesitation 
at embarking upon this novel enterprise. Baker v. Carr, 206 a suit chal-
lenging gross malapportionment in the Tennessee legislature, was first 
argued in the Court's 1960 Term. At conference Justice Frankfurter, 
articulating a view later embellished in his famous dissent, warned 
200. E.g., cases cited supra note 104 ("white primary" cases); Guinn v. United States, 238 
U.S. 347 (1915) (literacy test excluding blacks while grandfathering whites). 
201. See, e.g., South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950) (geographic vote weighting); Colegrove v. 
Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (malapportionment); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937) (poll 
tax). 
202. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
203. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
204. See 364 U.S. at 346 (distinguishing Colegrove on the grounds that it involved a nonracial 
vote dilution resulting from legislative inaction); see also Frankfurter draft opinion, Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot 7-8 (Nov. IO, 1960) (LOC, Warren Papers, Box 471, case file no. 32) (distinguishing 
Colegrove on several additional grounds). 
205. See, e.g., Jo Desha Lucas, Dragon in the Thicket: A Perusal of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 
1961 SUP. Cr. REV. 194, 244 (predicting after Gomillion that the Court would not involve itself 
in the apportionment issue). 
206. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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that the Court would "get into great difficulty and ... rue the results" 
if it intervened.207 Justice Harlan reiterated that position at a subse-
quent conference, observing that the Court's "greatness" was partially 
attributable to its consistent refusal to enter "political contests."208 
The justiciability of legislative apportionment challenges was a suffi-
ciently vexing issue that the Justices proved unable to make up their 
collective mind that Term; more specifically, the Court split four to 
four, with Justice Stewart undecided and thus pressing for 
reargument.209 
The following year, of course, a comfortable majority was assem-
bled behind the relatively narrow proposition that constitutional chal-
lenges to legislative apportionment were justiciable; no substantive 
standards emanated from the Court at this time, however.210 A close 
examination of the various opinions in Baker reveals that on the issues 
of original intent, political history, and judicial precedent, the dissent-
ing Justices scored all of the points.211 Justice Frankfurter accurately 
summarized the situation, stating in dissent that Baker "reverse[d] a 
uniform course of decision established by a dozen cases," as well as 
casting aside the "equally uniform course of our political history re-
garding the relationship between population and legislative representa-
tion. "212 While fully pe~suasive in his reading of the traditional 
materials of constitutional interpretation, however, Frankfurter man-
207. Douglas conference notes, Baker v. Carr (Apr. 20, 1961) (LOC, Douglas Papers, Box 
1266, case file no. 6). 
208. Douglas conference notes, Baker v. Ca" (Oct. 13, 1961), id. Harlan's observation elic· 
ited from Douglas the written remark: "My God - what does he think the Segregation Cases 
were - or the Youngstown Case - or the Tuskegee case [Gomillion}?" 
209. See Douglas conference notes, supra note 207 (Warren, Black, Douglas, and Brennan 
willing to reverse dismissal of the constitutional claim for failure to state a claim; Frankfurter, 
Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker coming out the other way; Stewart noting that "he is not at rest on 
the issue" and that "he has sufficient doubt that he passes"); Douglas conference notes, Baker v. 
Carr (Apr. 28, 1961) (LOC, Douglas Papers, Box 1266, case file no. 6). 
210. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 197-98. 
211. Compare, e.g., 369 U.S. at 218-29 (distinguishing numerous Guarantee Clause cases on 
the unconvincing ground that they arose under a different constitutional provision), 229-31 (rely-
ing on Gomillion for support even though the Court there went to great lengths to distinguish the 
apportionment issue), and 232-37 (distinguishing on tenuous grounds precedents rejecting appor· 
tionment challenges) with 369 U.S. at 277-80 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (discussing apportion· 
ment precedents), 289-302 (discussing Guarantee Clause precedents and concluding that this 
case "is, in effect, a Guarantee Clause claim masquerading under a different label"), and 307-18 
(discussing the nation's political history and the original understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's drafters); see also Carl A. Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, 
One Vote - One Vote, One Value, 1964 SUP. Cr. REv. 1, 85 (agreeing with Justice Frankfurter 
that Baker presents "in effect, a Guarantee Clause claim masquerading under a different label"); 
Paul G. Kauper, Some Comments on the Reapportionment Cases, 63 MICH. L. REV. 243, 244 
(1964) (same); Neal, supra note 123, at 255-56 (noting Baker's distortion of precedent and argu-
ing that the decision was unsupported by constitutional language, original intent, or precedent). 
212. 369 U.S. at 266. 
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aged no response to the simple yet compelling argument, advanced by 
some of the Justices in the majority, that Tennessee legislators pos-
sessed such an abiding interest in maintenance of the apportionment 
scheme under which they held office that they might never budge un-
less judicially ordered to do so.213 Given the Tennessee legislature's 
predictable resistance to remedying malapportionment and the un-
availability of alternative avenues of relief for Tennesseans, Frank-
furter's admonition that "[a]ppeal must be to an informed, civically 
militant electorate" rather than to the courts214 rang quite hollow. 
Political process theory, then, apparently played at least a margi-
nal role in the Court's initial decision to enter the apportionment fray. 
Yet, it explains neither the rapid adoption of one person-one vote as 
the governing constitutional standard, nor the application of that stan-
dard to political contexts in which malapportionment manifestly was 
not attributable simply to legislative self-interest. I shall consider 
these two points in turn. Having decided in Baker to enter the polit-
ical thicket, the Justices had, roughly speaking, three plausible appor-
tionment standards from which to choose. First, and least intrusively, 
the Court inight have reserved intervention for situations evidencing 
"systematic frustration of the will of a majority of the electorate" by a 
self-serving legislature.215 Second, and just slightly more intervention-
ist, would have been to require that any deviation from equal voting 
weights be rationally explicable - that is, a straightforward extension 
of the general equal protection rationality standard to apportionment 
cases.216 Finally, the Court could have embraced, as it ultimately did, 
a strong presumption in favor of one person-one vote, defeasible only 
in a few narrow instances.217 
Interestingly, at the time Baker v. Carr was decided, neither the 
Justices nor the commentators appear to have thought beyond the first 
213. 369 U.S. at 248 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[E]ntrenched political regimes" make ave-
nues of relief other than judicial "illusory."); 369 U.S. at 258-59 (Clark, J., concurring); see also 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 553-54, 570 (1964) (noting the unavailability of political reme-
dies for malapportionment in Alabama owing to lack of initiative mechanism and to state re-
quirement that constitutional amendments originate in the legislature). For academic 
commentary relying upon this justification for judicial intervention in apportionment cases, see 
ELY, supra note 38, at 120; Vince Blasi, A Requiem for the Warren Court, 48 TEX. L. REV. 608, 
614 (1970); Klarman, supra note 7, at 757-58. 
214. 369 U.S. at 270. 
215. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 753-54 (1964) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting); see also Baker, 369 U.S. at 261-62 (Clark, J., concurring); Robert G. McCloskey, 
Foreword: The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54, 71 (1962) (suggesting that prevent-
ing "frustration of majority will" is one direction in which the Court might move after Baker). 
216. See, e.g., Baker, 369 U.S. at 251-52, 254 (Clark, J., concurring); 369 U.S. at 265-66 
(Stewart, J., concurring); McCloskey, supra note 215, at 72-73. 
217. Reynolds rejected all justifications for deviating from equally weighted votes except re-
spect for political subdivision lines. 377 U.S. at 578, 579-80. 
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two options.218 None of the Justices in Baker, either at conference219 
or in their multiple opinions, mentioned anything but the patent irra-
tionality of Tennessee's apportionment "scheme." Thus Justice Bren-
nan's majority opinion, in its only reference to substantive standards, 
noted that it "has been open to courts since the enactment of the four-
teenth amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, 
that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capri-
cious action."220 Similarly, Justices Douglas, Stewart, and Clark all 
wrote separately to emphasize that equal voting weights were not con-
stitutionally required; the latter described Tennessee's apportionment 
as "a crazy quilt without rational basis."221 
The Justices, though plainly not thinking in terms of one person-
one vote at the time of Baker, moved rapidly in that direction over the 
next two years, first requiring equality in statewide elections, then in 
congressional elections, and finally in state legislative districting as 
well. 222 The explanation for this dramatic shift in approach is not 
clear. Justice Douglas' detailed conference notes reveal that the Jus-
tices were speaking equality language in the autumn of 1963, whereas 
two years earlier their emphasis had been on rationality; yet virtually 
no justification was forthcoming.223 One possibility is that the lower 
courts' response to Baker was so aggressive (especially when con-
trasted with their unenthusiastic response to Brown) that the Justices, 
believing they had hit upon "a latent consensus," became markedly 
bolder in their own apportionment posture. 224 
Another hypothesis not inconsistent with the first is that the Jus-
tices selected one person-one vote as their constitutional standard sim-
218. See, e.g., McCloskey, supra note 215, at 71-72; Robert B. McKay, Political Thickets and 
Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 Mice. L. REV. 645, 682 (1963). 
219. See Douglas conference notes, supra note 208 (Warren: "state need not have precise 
equality; ... we come in only where the line of arbitrariness has been crossed") (Black: "does 
this act bear so unequally and arbitrarily as to deny equal protection?") (Stewart: rejects "the 
assumption that Equal Protection requires legislature to apportion votes so there is no 
discrimination"). 
220. 369 U.S. at 226. 
221. 369 U.S. at 253-54 (Clark, J., concurring); accord 369 U.S. at 244-45 (Douglas, J., con-
curring); 369 U.S. at 265 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
222. See Reynolds v. Sims, 3i7 U.S. 533 (1964) (state legislative districting); Wesberry v. 
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (congressional elections); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (state-
wide elections). 
223. See, e.g., Douglas conference notes, WMCA v. Simon (Nov. 15, 1963) (LOC, Douglas 
Papers, Box 1300, case file: argued cases nos. 19-22) (Warren: "Principle of equality is starting 
point") (Black: "Each citizen should have right to equal vote ...• ") (Brennan: "The standard is 
'equality' "). 
224. See Mccloskey, supra note 215, at 56-59 & n.14 (enumerating post-Baker judicial devel-
opments and calling the short-term response "nothing short of astonishing"); McKay, supra note 
218, at 645-46, 660, 706-10 app. (elaborating judicial response to Baker state by state and 
describing it as "immediate, widespread, indeed eager"). 
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ply for reasons of administrative simplicity. By this I mean not that 
they sought to conserve judicial energy, but rather to avoid the intrac-
table problems that had so consternated Justice Frankfurter. In other 
words, having steeled themselves to enter the political thicket, the Jus-
tices immediately embraced a substantive equal protection standard 
that would render irrelevant the controversial political calculations 
that any standard less mechanical than one person-one vote would en-
tail. 225 One person-one vote, while difficult to defend on any interpre-
tivist constitutional theory,226 was fully responsive to Justice 
Frankfurter's warnings that judicial intervention in apportionment 
controversies would "charge courts with the task of accommodating 
the incommensurable factors of policy that underlie these mathemati-
cal puzzles."227 
I would suggest that a similar reluctance to weigh "incommensura-
ble factors" explains the Court's extension of one person-one vote to 
contexts in which the case for judicial intervention was considerably 
weaker than in Baker or Reynolds. One of Reynolds' companion cases, 
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 228 involved Colorado's (com-
paratively mild) malapportionment scheme which, significantly, had 
secured the approbation of state voters at a recent referendum. In his 
opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Warren rejected the significance of 
that referendum, observing that "individual constitutional rights can-
not be deprived, or denied judicial effectuation, because of the exist-
ence of a nonjudicial remedy through which relief against the alleged 
malapportionment, which the individual voters seek, might be 
achieved. "229 In general one might concede the soundness of the Chief 
Justice's proposition; since most constitutional rights are fundamen-
tally concerned with checking majority overreaching, putting those 
rights up for a referendum would be nonsensical. That general truth is 
quite inapplicable, however, when the right in issue was first judicially 
recognized in order to safeguard the majoritarian political process 
from distortions inflicted by self-seeking legislators. Measured against 
that justificatory rationale, Lucas' refusal to countenance a state elec-
torate's knowing waiver of its right against malapportionment is 
225. For commentary reaching a similar conclusion, see, e.g., ELY, supra note 38, at 120-21; 
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 SUP. 
Cr. REV. 41, 91. 
226. Justice Harlan correctly noted that the right to an equally weighted vote recognized in 
Reynolds was "tied to the equal protection clause only by the constitutionally frail tautology that 
'equal' means 'equal.'" 377 U.S. at 590 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
227. Baker, 369 U.S. at 268 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also McCloskey, supra note 215, 
at 73; Neal, supra note 123, at 275. 
228. 377 U.S. 713 (1964). 
229. 377 U.S. at 736. 
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troubling.230 The explanation, I would suggest, is the same as that 
underlying one person-one vote generally. For the Court on a case-by-
case basis to attempt distinguishing legislative frustrations of the ma-
jority will from voluntary waivers of the majority's right not to suffer 
egregious malapportionment would be just as unmanageable, and thus 
politically costly, as determining which deviations from equal voting 
weights were rationally defensible.231 
Having committed itself to safeguarding equality in voting weights, 
the Court next set about defining constitutional boundaries for the 
political community. During the five years after Reynolds, the Court 
progressively narrowed the permissible grounds of exclusion from 
political participation, first striking down voting restrictions on resi-
dent servicemen, then invalidating de facto disfranchisement of the 
poor through the poll tax, and finally severely limiting exclusions from 
special purpose elections. 232 These voting rights cases too can be justi-
fied on political process grounds. Legislators, and the enfranchised 
groups they represent, are too interested in the outcome to be en-
trusted with the authority to delineate the bounds of the political com-
munity. Historically, groups enjoying political power have opposed 
extending the franchise because doing so would threaten their hegem-
ony. 233 Thus, for example, during the 1930s and 1940s, federal legisla-
tion that would have repealed disfranchising poll taxes was opposed, 
in part, by conservative groups resistant to expansion of the New 
Deal's natural constituency - the poor.234 
It is worth noting, in conclusion, that political process theory 
probably explains why the more conservative Burger Court, which I 
shall argue in Part III effected a dramatic turnabout in other equal 
protection contexts, generally expanded constitutional voting rights 
guarantees. Thus it was the Burger Court that first invalidated multi-
230. See Lucas, 377 U.S. at 753-54 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (no systematic frustration of 
majority will in Colorado); cf. Douglas conference notes, supra note 223 (Douglas suggesting as 
to Lucas that perhaps courts should not interfere "as a matter of equity" where the "political 
remedy" of initiative and referendum exists); (White noting that Colorado "gave the voters a real 
choice and they voted an unequal system"). 
231. For example, the Court might have to draw inferences from the electorate's failure to 
employ initiative and referendum procedures, or determine how the precise formulation of op-
tions in a referendum should influence the inference to be drawn from its result. 
232. See Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (per curiam) (restriction on partici-
pation in revenue bond referendum for municipal utility); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 
395 U.S. 621 (1969) (restriction on participation in school board elections); Harper v. Virginia, 
383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (exclusion of resident 
servicemen). 
233. See, e.g., H.B. MAYO, INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 120 (1960); J.A. 
LaPonce, The Protection of Minorities by the Electoral System, 10 W. POL. Q. 318, 319 (1957). 
234. See, e.g., LAWSON, supra note 105, at 55-56, 59-60. 
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member legislative districts that diminished the effectiveness of black 
votes, candidate filing fees for primary elections, lengthy durational 
residency requirements for voting, as well as certain forms of political 
gerrymandering, and increased the stringency of the one person-one 
vote requirement in congressional elections.235 It was the Burger 
Court, in addition, that just one year before striking down its first af-
firmative action plan sustained the use of race-conscious gerrymander-
ing to preserve black voting power.236 Apparently the voting rights 
aspect of the Warren Court's egalitarian revolution has become rea-
sonably uncontroversial, notwithstanding its disregard of original in-
tent, judicial precedent, and the nation's political history. The most 
plausible explanation for this phenomenon is that under political pro-
cess theory few, if any, subject areas are more appropriately delegated 
to judicial supervision than voting rights. 
C. Changing Conceptualization of Equal Protection Rights 
This Part thus far has considered two pathbreaking equal protec-
tion developments of the Warren era, both plausibly explicable in 
political process terms: the adoption of a racial classification rule and 
the expansion of constitutional voting rights protection. I would ar-
gue, though, that this period's most dramatic equal protection devel-
opment was one transcending discrete doctrinal niches: the Court's 
increasing willingness to interpret equal protection as an entitlement 
to particular substantive outcomes, rather than, pursuant to the con-
ventional understanding, as a guarantee against deliberate governmen-
tal disadvantaging.237 This departure from the traditional focus on 
legislative inputs is neither mandated, nor barred, by political process 
theory. Though that theory plainly condemns legislation motivated by 
hostility towards disfranchised or discrete and insular minorities, it 
235. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (political gerrymandering); Karcher 
v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (stringent one person-one vote requirement); Lubin v. Panish, 
415 U.S. 709 (1974) (candidate filing fees); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (multimember 
legislative districts); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residency 
requirements). 
236. United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), discussed infra note 442 and accom-
panying text. 
237. On the conventional understanding, see, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 473 (1953) 
(not an equal protection violation to use poll tax lists to select jurors notwithstanding disparate 
racial impact); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950) (implicitly rejecting argument that disparate 
racial impact of malapportionment violates Equal Protection Clause); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 
398, 403 (1945) (no constitutional right to racial proportionality on juries). I have argued that 
during the early phase of modem equal protection only certain fundamental rights were deemed 
to be protected against racial discrimination. See supra section I.B. Under the "conventional 
understanding" of equal protection, then, those fundamental rights - e.g., the franchise and jury 
service - were safeguarded against racially motivated interferences but not against licitly moti-
vated, racially disparate impacts. 
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plausibly extends as well to laws enacted out of selective indifference 
towards the interests of such groups.238 Thus, for example, while pub-
lic discrimination against blacks unquestionably violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, a public decision to tolerate private race discrimina-
tion arguably should as well if demonstrably attributable to the sys-
tematic devaluation of black interests by the legislature - i.e., similar 
discrimination against whites would have been statutorily prohibited. 
The Warren Court's move towards a substantive entitlements ap-
proach to equal protection, then, is perfectly consistent with a certain 
conception of political process theory. 
This section will first consider the fundamental rights strand of 
equal protection, which principally involved constitutional guarantees 
against governmental action producing disparate wealth effects with 
regard to certain "fundamental" interests. While under the traditional 
understanding equal protection rights are negative constraints upon 
government; the fundamental rights strand decisions created affirma-
tive governmental obligations to redress poverty not directly attributa-
ble to the state. Second, significant reconceptualization of rights 
occurred in the "state action" cases where the Court, across an array 
of diverse factual settings, ruled that ostensibly private race discrimi-
nation violated the Equal Protection Clause. Holding private discrim-
ination unconstitutional represented another departure from the 
conventional view of equal protection as a right against deliberate gov-
ernmental hostility. Third, I shall examine the de facto school segre-
gation issue, which plausibly can be subcategorized within state action 
doctrine, though traditionally it has been treated as an independent 
doctrinal category. The Warren Court never had to decide the consti-
tutionality of public school segregation attributable to factors other 
than the deliberate choices of government actors. I shall argue, 
though, that the Court's 1968 decision in Green v. County School 
Board 239 signified some willingness to hold government responsible 
for redressing segregation not of its own making, and that internal 
Court documents strongly suggest that a Warren Court majority could 
have been assembled to invalidate de facto school segregation. 
1. The Fundamental Rights Strand of Equal Protection 
Prior to 1956 the Supreme Court had not construed the Equal Pro-
238. See infra notes 391-92 and accompanying text. For the argument that only the access, 
and not the prejudice, prong of Carotene Products can justify condemnation of race discrimina-
tion without violating the value-neutral premises of political process theory, see Klarman, supra 
note 7, at 788-812. 
239. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
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tection Clause (or any other constitutional provision) to bar discrimi-
nation against the poor. Indeed the Court's 1941 decision in Edwards 
v. California, striking down a California law criminalizing the intro-
duction of indigents into the state, carefully avoided such a ruling, 
holding instead that the Dormant Commerce Clause prohibited this 
restriction on interstate migration.240 Similarly the Court had rejected 
equal protection challenges to laws conditioning voting and jury ser-
vice on payment of the poll tax, despite the obvious disparate impact 
such practices had upon the poor.241 In just one constitutional context 
had the Court manifested any clear concern about poverty - criminal 
cases in which indigent defendants were charged with capital of-
fenses242 - and the requirement that government redress poverty in 
that setting, to the extent of providing free counsel, was easily cabined. 
Against this backdrop of unconcern with wealth "discrimination," 
in 1956 a divided Court ruled in Griffin v. Illinois that a state-created 
right of appeal against criminal convictions could be conditioned upon 
production of a trial transcript only if indigent defendants were pro-
vided with free ones.243 Justice Black's plurality opinion steadfastly 
refused to choose between the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses, though its egalitarian rhetoric was striking.244 Griffin was 
noteworthy for its virtually unprecedented pronouncement of the 
Court's constitutional concern with poverty. Moreover, the wealth 
discrimination invalidated there was a disparate wealth effect flowing 
from governmental action not motivated by animus towards the poor. 
As Justice Harlan correctly noted in dissent, Griffin did not involve 
special designation of the poor for disadvantageous treatment, but 
rather refusal to exempt them from a generally applicable fee require-
ment. 245 Logical expansion of Griffin's wealth discrimination ration-
ale could have justified invalidation of all government fee requirements 
240. Edwards, 314 U.S. 160, 174 (1941), discussed supra text accompanying notes 29-33. 
241. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (jury service); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 
(1937) (voting), overruled by Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
242. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The statement in the text is oversim-
plified in that the Court's decisions also required state-provided counsel in noncapital cases 
where the defendant, "by reason of age, ignorance or mental capacity" was incapable of repre-
senting himself adequately. See, e.g., Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 684 (1948); see also Walter V. 
Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 10 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1, 9 (1956). 
243. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
244. 351 U.S. at 19 ("There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets de-
pends on the amount of money he has."). Neither Frankfurter, whose concurring vote was es-
sential to the result, nor Black could reconcile a due process grounding for Griffin with views 
they had expressed elsewhere regarding that constitutional provision. See, e.g., Adamson v. Cali-
fornia, 332 U.S. 46, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); 332 U.S. at 90 (Black, J., dissenting); 
Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 467-69 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); 
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 475 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting). 
245. 351 U.S. at 34 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (the state has simply "fail[ed] to alleviate the 
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including, for example, public university tuition charges, bail require-
ments in criminal cases, and even state sales taxes.246 Even more 
broadly, Griffin's novel conceptualization of equal protection rights 
provided the grounding for an array of creative constitutional com-
mentary in the 1960s calling for imposition of affirmative obligations 
on government to redress inequalities not of its own making.241 
Griffin underwent minor expansion within the criminal context 
over the next several years, culminating in 1963 with the landmark 
rulings in Gideon v. Wainwright 248 and Douglas v. California,249 which 
held indigent defendants constitutionally entitled to state-provided 
counsel at trial and the first appeal, respectively. Invocation of the 
wealth discrimination rationale outside of the criminal context first 
came in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 250 where the 
Court invalidated a state poll tax on equal protection grounds. Again 
the Court employed broad wealth discrimination rhetoric -
"[w]ealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's ability to 
participate intelligently in the electoral process"251 - in constitution-
ally barring the state from enforcing a generally applicable fee require-
ment that disproportionately disadvantaged the poor. 
The virtually limitless reach of a constitutional rule condemning 
disparate wealth effects pressured the Court to restrict its wealth dis-
crimination rationale to "fundamental" rights, which both Griffin and 
Harper clearly involved.252 Even recharacterizing those cases in fun-
damental rights terms, however, left considerable room for expansion. 
consequences of differences in economic circumstances that exist wholly apart from any state 
action"). 
246. 351 U.S. at 34-35 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361·62 
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
247. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 191, at 593 n.50 (noting that Griffin suggests that facially 
neutral laws producing disparate racial impacts violate equal protection); Harold W. Horowitz, 
Unseparate but Unequal - The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue in Public School Educa· 
tion, 13 UCLA L. REv. 1147, 1168 (1966) (finding implicit in Griffin an equal protection require-
ment that the state provide remedial education to the culturally disadvantaged); Frank I. 
Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. 
REv. 7, 9-13 (1969) (relying on Griffin and progeny to support a "minimum protection" guaran· 
tee that 'just wants" be satisfied by government); Sager, supra note 54, at 777 (noting the connec· 
tion between Griffin and the Warren Court's evisceration of the state action requirement). See 
generally Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human 
Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91, 93 (1966) (calling Griffin and progeny's imposition of affirmative 
obligations on government the "most creative force in constitutional law"). 
248. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
249. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 
250. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
251. 383 U.S. at 668. 
252. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 247, at 22, 24-25; Sager, supra note 54, at 778; Bertram 
F. Willcox & Edward J. Bloustein, The Griffin Case - Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
43 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 13 (1957). 
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Only a lawyer, after all, could argue with a straight face that legal 
assistance in a criminal appeal is more important than, for example, 
food and shelter.253 A more fruitful limiting rationale, not identified 
in Griffin or Harper but concocted post hoc by Justice Harlan in Bod-
die v. Connecticut, 254 treated as central the elements of state coercion 
and monopolization. Thus while the state compels defendants' partici-
pation in the criminal justice system and monopolizes meaningful ex-
ercise of the franchise, it exerts no equivalent control over food, 
housing, or medical care. 
Even the monopolization limitation, however, was left by the way-
side (before Justice Harlan had articulated it, ironically) in Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 255 decided during the Warren Court's last Term. Indeed, I 
would suggest that Shapiro is the most revealing of the fundamental 
rights strand decisions because it demonstrated the Court's willingness 
to extend its wealth discrimination concern beyond the scope of the 
monopolization rationale. 256 In Shapiro the Court invalidated one-
year durational residency requirements for welfare in an opinion by 
253. For lawyers making such implausible arguments, see, e.g., Yale K.amisar, Has the Court 
Left the Attorney General Behind? - The Baze/on-Katzenbach Letters on Poverty, Equality and 
the Administration of Criminal Justice, 54 KY. L.J. 464, 468-69 (1966); Willcox & Bloustein, 
supra note 252, at 16-17. 
254. 401 U.S. 371 (1971), discu'ssed infra text accompanying notes 331-32. Boddie struck 
down divorce court filing fees as applied to the indigent. 401 U.S. at 382-83. 
255. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). I do not wish to suggest that there were no other important wealth 
discrimination developments before Shapiro. Indeed the Massiah-Escobedo-Miranda line of cases 
represented a potentially enormous expansion of the Court's concern for wealth effects in the 
administration of criminal justice. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illi-
nois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Griffin and progeny -
most notably, Douglas v. California and Gideon v. Wainwright - involved the impact of indi-
gency on the determination of "factual guilt" in criminal trials. In other words, the Court's 
concern was that an indigent defendant unable to secure a lawyer at trial or on. appeal might be 
unjustly convicted. Massiah and progeny, however, involved the effect ofindigency on a different 
stage of the criminal justice process - pretrial investigation. The Court's extension of the right 
to counsel to the investigative, as contrasted with the adjudicatory, stage of criminal proceedings 
manifested a concern less with preventing conviction of the indigent innocent than with ensuring 
that the indigent guilty did not fare markedly worse in the criminal justice system than the 
nonindigent guilty; the latter, owing to superior education and information, generally understand 
how to avail themselves of the rights to counsel and against self-incrimination even without 
instruction. See William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 15 VA. L. REv. 761, 
837-38 (1989). Yet this concern for disparate wealth effects in the criminal justice system has no 
logical stopping point; the indigent criminal may fare worse simply because, for example, his 
inability to afford a fast getaway car increases the likelihood of apprehension. See id. at 838. In 
addition, the indigent probably are more likely than others to commit certain sorts of crimes -
most notably, theft - owing to their poverty. 
256. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 225, at 60-61. That the Court perceived the importance of 
Shapiro is confirmed by that decision's complex internal history. For present purposes, it is 
sufficient to note that the initial argument late in the 1967 Term yielded a majority to reject 
constitutional challenges to durational residency requirements for welfare. See Docket book, 
Shapiro v. Thompson (LOC, Douglas.Papers, Box 1398, file: administrative dockets nos. 801-
1000, case file no. 813). For fuller discussion, see BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED 
OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT 304-93 (1985). 
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Justice Brennan which relied upon an ill-defined combination of equal 
protection and right-to-travel grounds. While Brennan's opinion is 
plausibly susceptible to two different readings, both of them transcend 
Justice Harlan's monopolization rationale. 
One can interpret Shapiro, as subsequent Burger Court decisions 
generally have done, as invalidating durational residency requirements 
for welfare owing to their "penaliz[ation]" of the constitutionally itin-
erant right to travel.257 This reading, while not implausible, requires 
one to regard the Court's invocation of equal protection as simply a 
mistake, since government incursions upon constitutionally protected 
rights are invalid without reference to the classification employed to 
accomplish that infringement. Yet even accepting the right-to-travel 
construction of Shapiro, the only challengeable government action was 
refusal to provide newcomers to the jurisdiction with welfare benefits. 
Thus Shapiro, on this reading, imposed an affirmative governmental 
obligation to redress poverty in a context where government monopo-
lization was not even arguably present: interstate travel. 
The other plausible interpretation of Shapiro, which frequently was 
espoused contemporaneously, was as a fundamental rights strand deci-
sion condemning unequal distribution of the right to welfare.258 While 
Justice Brennan did not explicitly invoke a right to welfare, he did 
emphasize, in describing the challenged statutory classification, that a 
"class is [being] denied welfare aid upon which may depend the ability 
of the families to obtain the very means to subsist."259 The right-to-
welfare interpretation of Shapiro makes better sense of the opinion's 
equal protection focus, though it renders somewhat superfluous the 
right-to-travel discussion. Bolstering this reading is Justice Brennan's 
unambiguous subsequent endorsement of a constitutional entitlement 
to a subsistence income. 260 The right-to-welfare interpretation, as 
with the right-to-travel construction, plainly expanded the fundamen-
tal rights strand of equal protection beyond Justice Harlan's monopo-
257. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629-31. On the subsequent decisions, see, e.g., infra text ac-
companying notes 331-32 (Boddie); infra note 340 (Rodriguez); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa 
Cty., 415 U.S. 250, 253-55 (1974). 
258. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 247, at 40 n.94; Winter, supra note 225, at 56; see also 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting "the Court's ••. 
cryptic suggestion that the 'compelling interest' test is applicable merely because the result of the 
classification may be to deny the appellees 'food, shelter, and other necessities of life' "). 
259. 394 U.S. at 627. 
260. See Douglas conference notes, Dandridge v. Williams (Dec. 12, 1969} (LOC, Douglas 
Papers, Box 1475, case file no. 131) (Brennan: "on constitutional question, basis is minimum 
assistance required to live - when family of 2 get[s] same as family of 8 there is inequality in 
constitutional sense"). 
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lization rationale, as government does not generally control the means 
of its citizens' subsistence. 
2. Evisceration of the State Action Requirement 
While Griffin and progeny were advancing a novel understanding 
of equal protection rights with regard to poverty, the "state action" 
cases261 were doing the same in connection with race. By the early 
1960s it was apparent that the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
state action limitation would become one of the critical issues in con-
stitutional law. The post-Reconstruction Civil Rights Cases, 262 of 
course, had construed the Equal Protection Clause as applying only to 
state, and not to purely private, conduct. The Court began making 
inroads upon the state action concept as the post-World War II period 
witnessed a renaissance of judicial concern with race discrimination. 
The white primary cases, Marsh v. Alabama (not a race case), and 
Shelley v. Kraemer, all rejected the most formalistic understanding of 
state action.263 Yet one must be careful not to read too much into 
these decisions; the Vinson Court was not about to constitutionally 
proscribe private race discrimination. While Shelley's holding - that 
judicial enforcement of private racially restrictive covenants was state 
action - had potentially radical implications,264 subsequent decisions 
revealed that the Court contemplated no revolution in state action 
law. Thus, for example, in Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 265 the Court 
curtailed Shelley's reach by finding no state action in judicial enforce-
261. While I have chosen to adhere to the traditional categories, I find entirely persuasive the 
trend in recent constitutional commentary to treat the "state action" cases simply as particular 
instances of the Washington v. Davis issue-that is, the constitutionality of facially neutral state 
decisionmaking that produces disparate racial impacts. See, e.g., Harold W. Horowitz, The Mis-
leading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 208, 
208-09 (1957); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 935, 937-38, 967-68 (1989); Mark V. Tushnet, Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 
33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 383, 383 (1988). Thus, for example, under this approach the correctness 
of Shelley v. Kraemer, given the existence of a Washington v. Davis rule, depends on whether state 
courts generally enforced restrictive land covenants or were making an exception for racial ones. 
See Tushnet, supra, at 386-88. 
262. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
263. Shelley, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Marsh, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); supra note 104 (white primary 
cases). 
264. For example, Shelley's logic suggested that state court probating of a will that devised 
property with a racial restriction or state court enforcement of trespass laws in support of a 
property owners' racially motivated exclusion would violate the Equal Protection Clause. See, 
e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) (trespass conviction); Pennsylvania v. Board of Direc-
tors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957) (per curiam) (testamentary trust). 
265. 351 U.S. 291 (1956); see also Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park, Inc., 348 U.S. 880 
(1954) (per curiam) (Justices divided evenly as to whether a racially restrictive covenant could be 
used as a defense to a breach of contract claim without violating the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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ment of a private contract, the terms of which possibly would have 
violated the First Amendment had they been embedded in state law. 
The internal history of Terry v. Adams266 likewise confirms that 
the Vinson Court's relaxation of the state action requirement had been 
highly tentative. In Terry the Court struck down under the Fifteenth 
Amendment an ostensibly private scheme that effectively dis-
franchised blacks. The Jaybirds, a "private" association comprised of 
every white voter (and no blacks) in one Texas county, balloted them-
selves to select candidates for the Democratic Party primary, who in-
variably were then elected to office. The Court's invalidation of the 
Jaybird scheme by a resounding eight-to-one margin may suggest a 
willingness to relax the state action requirement that is quite mislead-
ing. The initial conference vote in Terry had been five to four the other 
way, with several Justices expressing their inability to discern any state 
action.267 Even after Justice Frankfurter immediately and inexplica-
bly switched his vote, a closely divided decision appeared in the offing. 
Justice Jackson, for example, prepared a dissenting opinion lambasting 
his brethren for sacrificing "sound principle[s] of interpretation" in 
their haste to inter the Jaybirds' "hateful little local scheme."268 Ulti-
mately, though, three of the prospective dissenters -Vinson, Jackson, 
and Reed - chose instead to join Justice Clark's concurring opinion. 
My point simply is that Terry must have represented the limits of the 
Court's flexibility on state action; interpreting decisions such as 
Marsh, Shelley, and Terry as indicative of a judicial commitment to 
eradicate private racial discrimination is quite unjustifiable. Closer to 
the mark, I believe, was one commentator's observation in 1960 that 
expansion of the state action concept to date had been "very slight."269 
Over the next decade the Court decided three important state ac-
tion cases, each finding governmental involvement (and an equal pro-
tection violation) in a factual context that went well beyond existing 
precedent. The first of these was Burton v. Wilmington Parking Au-
thority, 270 involving a policy of racial exclusion by a restaurant operat-
266. 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
267. See Clark conference notes, Terry v. Adams (University of Texas Law Library, Clark 
Papers, Box A20, case file no. 52) (Jan. 16, 1953) (statements by Vinson, Reed, Frankfurter, and 
Jackson); Jackson conference notes, Terry v. Adams (Jan. 16, 1953) (LOC, Jackson Papers, Box 
179, case file no. 52) (tabulating votes). 
268. Jackson draft dissent, Terry v. Adams 1, 9 (Apr. 3, 1953) (LOC, Jackson Papers, Box 
179, case no. 52). 
269. Thomas P. Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1121 (1960). 
But see Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: ''State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Propo· 
sition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 92 (1967) (arguing that Marsh, Shelley, and Terry constituted a 
significant evisceration of the state action requirement). 
270. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). 
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ing on property leased from the state. In an opinion notable for both 
the absence of underlying precedent and the author's evident determi-
nation to avoid creating new precedent, Justice Clark ruled that the 
state was sufficiently entwined with the private discriminator to be 
held responsible for its racial exclusion policy.271 Clark noted the pub-
lic ownership of the restaurant building, the benefit derived by the res-
taurant from its location within a publicly owned parking facility, and 
the state's unexercised power to forbid discrimination in its lease 
agreements.272 Yet he also stressed repeatedly the fact-dependent na-
ture of the state action inquiry, and carefully refrained from articulat-
ing general principles that would illuminate the relevance of particular 
facts as well as their comparative weights.273 It is difficult to emerge 
from Burton without the sense that the Court's priority was invalidat-
ing private discrimination suffused with a public appearance rather 
than generating a coherent theory of state action. 
The chronological successor to Burton was Evans v. Newton, 274 in-
volving an equal protection challenge to a city's transferral of a park's 
stewardship to private trustees once the city became constitutionally 
disabled from abiding by racial restrictions contained in the original 
property devise. The Court invalidated the transfer of control, relying 
on both the history of city involvement and the "public function" doc-
trine of Marsh and Terry. 275 Since the city's past involvement with the 
park was of dubious relevance to the issue of present state action, and 
since subsuming parks under the public function doctrine required its 
significant expansion, it is difficult to dispute Justice Harlan's charge, 
leveled in dissent, that Evans was "more the product of human im-
pulses . . . than of solid constitutional thinking. "276 
271. 365 U.S. at 724-25. See, e.g., Philip B. Kurland, Egalitarianism and the Wa"en Court, 
68 MICH. L. REV. 629, 650 (1970) (calling Burton "a rather murky opinion"); Thomas P. Lewis, 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority - A Case Without Precedent, 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 
1458, 1466 (1961) (Court "appears to have done its best to decide a case without creating a 
precedent"); Jerre S. Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEX. L. REv. 347, 382 (1963) 
(calling the Burton opinion "vague and obscure"). 
272. 365 U.S. at 723, 724, 725. 
273. 365 U.S. at 722, 725-26. 
274. 382 U.S. 296 (1966). 
275. 382 U.S. at 301-02. Under the public function doctrine, private.parties conducting an 
activity traditionally performed by the government are deemed state actors for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
276. 382 U.S. at 315, 318, 320. The Warren Court's willingness to expand the public func-
tion doctrine beyond hitherto recognized limits was again demonstrated in Amalgamated Food 
Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), where the Court ruled a 
private shopping center to be a state actor for First Amendment purposes. Logan Valley is use-
fully contrasted with the Court's unwillingness in 1950 to review a state court decision rejecting 
the public function argument in the context of large housing developments that discriminated 
against blacks. See Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.E.2d 541 (N.Y. 1949), cert. denied, 
339 U.S. 981 (1950). 
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The third principal state action ruling of the Warren era was Reit-
man v. Mulkey, 277 which revealed the extent to which the Court was 
prepared to distort state action doctrine to avoid an unpalatable result. 
Involved in Reitman was California's Proposition Fourteen, which 
both repealed existing state fair housing laws and required that similar 
legislation in the future be enacted by state constitutional amendment 
rather than by ordinary legislative processes. One can generate a per-
suasive argument that structuring the political process so as to unduly 
encumber efforts to secure legislation favprable to a racial minority 
constitutes impermissible race discrimination,278 but Justice White's 
majority opinion did not even hint at such a rationale. Rather he em-
phasized that public "authorization" or "encouragement" of racial 
discrimination amounted to state action.279 While the Court was on 
safe ground in declaring that genuine state encouragement of private 
discrimination was unconstitutional, it is difficult to find in Reitman 
any state involvement beyond simple repeal of existing prohibitions on 
race discrimination in housing.280 And to rule unconstitutional an 
unadorned shift in state policy from forbidding to tolerating private 
discrimination was, as Justice Harlan identified in his usual perspica-
cious manner, to espouse a "novel and potentially far-reaching consti-
tutional theory."281 
I have removed from this otherwise chronological presentation 
what strikes me as the most compelling evidence of the Warren 
Court's willingness to invalidate even "private" race discrimination; 
the episode to which I refer is the famous series of sit-in cases that 
preoccupied the Court for much of the early 1960s.282 The sit-in cases 
arose from trespass and breach-of-the-peace prosecutions of civil 
rights demonstrators seeking to secure desegregation oflunch counters 
and restaurants in southern states. The constitutional issue presented 
was whether arrest and prosecution of persons refusing voluntarily to 
vacate privately owned facilities upon request converted private racial 
277. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
278. See Black, supra note 269, at 75-76, 78-79, 82; see also Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 
(1969) (striking down city charter provision that barred enactment of fair housing ordinance 
except by local referendum). 
279. See 387 U.S. at 375-76, 380-81. 
280. See 387 U.S. at 389 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. 
Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 SUP. Cr. REV. 
39, 50-55. 
281. Harlan draft dissent from denial of certiorari, Reitman v. Mulkey (Nov. 21, 1966) 
(LOC, Douglas Papers, Box 1392, case file no. 483). 
282. For factual descriptions of the sit-in cases, see Kurland, supra note 271, at 651-58; 
Thomas P. Lewis, The Sit-In Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 SUP. Cr. REV. 101, 103-13; 
Monrad G. Paulsen, The Sit-in Cases of 1964: "But Answer Came There None," 1964 SUP. Cr. 
REV. 137, 138-45. 
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discrimination into an equal protection violation - in other words, 
the question was how far to extend Shelley v. Kraemer. From the pub-
lished record all one confidently can conclude is that the Justices 
ducked the constitutional issue for several years through a variety of 
stratagems, until passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act effectively 
mooted the question by statutorily prohibiting race discrimination in 
places of public accommodation. 283 Internal Court documents, how-
ever, considerably illuminate the Justices' thought regarding the sit-in 
controversy, revealing how broadly a majority was prepared to inter-
pret the state action requirement in order to avoid judicial enforce-
ment of private discriminatory preferences. 
From the beginning of the sit-in controversy, some Justices pri-
vately were adamant in their refusal to extend Shelley to cover the 
arrest and prosecution of sit-in demonstrators.284 Yet the entire 
Court, including the usually unbending Frankfurter and Harlan, 
evinced some willingness to compromise their legal rectitude in order 
to avoid Court affirmance of the demonstrators' convictions.285 Un-
derlying this unusual display of flexibility by Justices who prided 
themselves on their principled decisionmaking was recognition of the 
sit-in cases' tremendous symbolic importance. As with Brown the Jus-
tices considered unanimity to be vital,286 even if, again as with Brown, 
this required some Justices to participate in uncharacteristic doctrinal 
manipulation. Thus at Court conferences on the sit-in cases, individ-
283. See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) (invalidating on due process/ 
vagueness grounds convictions of sit-in demonstrators for refusing to leave premises after being 
asked to do so under trespass statute prohibiting entry after warning); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 
U.S. 157 (1961) (reversing disturbing-the-peace convictions of sit-in demonstrators on due pro-
cess ground of total absence of evidence). 
284. See, e.g., Douglas memorandum to the files, Gamer v. Louisiana (Nov. 6, 1962) (LOC, 
Douglas Papers, Box 1268, case file nos. 26-28: sit-in cases) (Justices Black and Frankfurter); id., 
Douglas conference notes, Gamer v. Louisiana (Oct. 20, 1961) (Justices Clark and Harlan). 
285. Thus in Gamer Justices Frankfurter and Harlan struggled for a means of reversing the 
sit-in demonstrators' convictions despite having denied the existence of such grounds at the 
Court's certiorari conference. Compare Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 176 (1961) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (supporting reversal of convictions owing to absence of evidence) and 368 
U.S. at 197-99, 205 (Harlan, J., concurring) (supporting reversal on grounds that disturbing the 
peace statute as applied to defendants was unconstitutionally vague and that lunch counter 
owner's failure to ask defendants to leave constituted implied consent to their presence) with 
Douglas conference notes, certiorari conference on case nos. 617, 618, 619 (Mar. 17, 1961) (LOC, 
Douglas Papers, Box 1268, case nos. 26-28: Gamer v. Louisiana et al.) (Frankfurter: "This is 
not too vague an ordinance - there is enough evidence here - Thompson case does not govern 
- owner need not call in police - police need not wait until there is a fracas") (Harlan agreeing 
with Frankfurter). 
286. See Letter from Chief Justice Warren to Justice Douglas (May 18, 1963) (LOC, Warren 
Papers, Box 604, case file: sit-in cases) (noting statements by Justices Stewart and Goldberg to 
the conference emphasizing the importance of unanimity in the sit-in cases and observing "the 
great benefit" flowing from unanimity in Brown). On the perceived importance of unanimity in 
the school desegregation cases, see KLUGER, supra note 86, at 679, 683, 696; Hutchinson, supra 
note 10, at 87. 
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ual Justices proclaimed their willingness to stretch for the "right" re-
sult, which was understood to mean reversal of convictions without 
reaching the constitutional question.287 Accordingly, the Court em-
ployed a variety of clever/disingenuous strategies for reversing the 
demonstrators' convictions, and when a case arose during the 1962 
Term regarding which unanimity appeared unobtainable, the Justices 
agreed to put it over for reargument.288 
By the 1963 Term, the more conservative Justices apparently had 
reached their breaking point. After Chief Justice Warren opened the 
sit-ins conference by suggesting some even more tenuous bases for re-
versing convictions without reaching the state action question, Justice 
Black balked at what appeared to him to constitute a functional over-
ruling of the Civil Rights Cases. 289 The vote at conference was five to 
four to sustain convictions in two of that Term's cases on the ground 
that no state action was present.290 That vote remained intact until 
just days before the decisions were scheduled to be announced in May 
1964; the Court appeared poised to make its stand on the traditional 
understanding. of equal protection rights as guarantees against state 
discrimination.291 Almost at the last moment, though, one member of 
the majority, Tom Clark, apparently decided he could not endure re-
sponsibility for affirming the convictions.292 Without delving unneces-
287. See, e.g., Warren conference notes, 1962 Term sit-in cases (LOC, Warren Papers, Box 
604, case file: sit-in cases) (Justice Black declaring that he "would try to work out opinions to 
reverse on all [these cases]") (Justice Stewart stating with regard to various cases that he is 
willing to "cooperate," "probably could be persuaded,'' and "with some difficulty accepts the ••• 
argument") (Justice White stating that he "has some trouble with Griffin but probably could go 
along with reversal"). 
288. That case was Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964) (reversing trespass conviction 
on ground that arrest by park employee who had been deputized as sheriff constituted state 
action). See Letter from Chief Justice Warren to Justice Douglas, supra note 286 ("I share the 
view of the Conference that it is highly desirable that we do present as united a front as possible, 
leaving some facets of the problem to be dealt with next Term. To this end all agreed that we 
would do well to put over for reargument the case of Griffin v. Maryland."); Warren conference 
notes, supra note 287. 
289. Warren conference notes, 1963 Term sit-in cases (LOC, Warren Papers, Box 510, case 
file: sit-in cases) (Chief Justice expressing willingness to reverse convictions on grounds that 
police participated too extensively in the arrests, that the convictions took place in department 
stores open to the public in all areas but their lunch counters, and that the trespass statute was 
too vague) (Justice Black noting that Warren's position would overrule the Civil Rights Cases). 
290. See id. (Justices Black, Clark, Harlan, Stewart, and White). The two cases that were to 
be affirmed were Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 227 (1964) (vacating sit-in convictions and remand-
ing to state court to reconsider in light of intervening enactment of state and local public accom-
modations laws), and Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964) (reversing sit-in convictions on 
ground that state regulation mandating racially separate washroom facilities for restaurant em-
ployees and customers implicated state in policy of restaurant segregation). 
291. See Black draft opinion, Bell v. Maryland (May 7, 1964) (LOC, Douglas Papers, Box 
1311, case file no. 12). 
292. See Douglas memorandum for the files, Bell v. Maryland (June 20, 1964) (LOC, Doug-
las Papers, Box 1314, case file no. 12, folder 16) ("Clark for some reason finally left Black just 
before the opinions were to be announced .... "); id., Douglas handwritten memorandum to the 
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sarily into the complex negotiations that then consumed the Court,293 
I will note simply that Justice Clark soon produced his own draft 
opinion explaining why state action was present (though not to the 
naked eye) in the principal case, Bell v. Maryland. 294 Clark's vote, 
when added to those of the four Justices who earlier had favored re-
versal on the merits, translated into a majority prepared to revolution-
ize state action law, at least in the context of race discrimination by 
places of public accommodation, rather than to place the state's au-
thority behind private discriminatory choices.295 Because another op-
files (undated) ("Tom Clark came in today, saying he was going to change his vote in the sit-in 
cases. They were ready to come down 5/18/64 and at our conference on 5/15/64 he had asked 
that they go over."). Clark earlier had enthusiastically approved Justice Black's' draft opinion 
affirming the sit-in demonstrators' trespass convictions. Letter from Justice Clark to Justice 
Black (Mar. 9, 1964) (reprinted in A.E. Dick Howard & John G. Kester, The Deliberations of 
the Justices in Deciding the Sit-in Cases of June 22, 1964, at 10 (unpublished manuscript com-
piled from the files of Justice Black by his law clerks) (LOC, Black Papers, Box 376, case file: sit-
in cases)) (describing opinion as 'Just right" and "[a] fine job"). 
293. The story is concisely told from Justice Douglas' perspective in Douglas memorandum 
for the files, supra note 292. Briefly, the story goes like this: The conference vote in Bell v. 
Maryland had been five to four to sustain the convictions. Justice Brennan, one of the four 
prospective dissenters, subsequently conceived the idea of a vacate-and-remand disposition to 
allow the Maryland court to consider the retroactive applicability of a recently enacted local 
public accommodations law; the five Justices favoring affirmance of the convictions were not 
persuaded by Brennan's suggestion, however, and the decision in Bell was scheduled to come 
down on May 18. Justice Clark, however, at the last moment fled the majority to join Justice 
Brennan. But of the original prospective dissenters, Justice Douglas adamantly refused to acqui-
esce in any disposition short of reversal, while Goldberg and Warren appeared willing both to 
join Brennan and to support reversal on the merits. At this point Justice Black recirculated an 
amended version of what had been the majority opinion; Black now contended that of the Jus-
tices wishing to reach the merits, the vote was four to three for affirmance. That potentiality 
apparently disturbed Justice Clark, who responded by drafting his own opinion reversing on the 
merits. With Clark thus prepared to find state action, a strong possibility existed that a majority 
would materialize for reversal on the merits; that result would have required luring Justice Bren-
nan from his vacate-and-remand position, but this seemed quite plausible given that Brennan 
consistently had expressed at conference his willingness to extend the Shelley v. Kraemer ration-
ale to trespass convictions. At this point another member of the original majority, Justice Stew-
art, bolted the fold; apparently distraught at the idea of a reversal on the merits, Stewart told 
Clark that he would join Brennan's vacating opinion if Clark would return to it. Clark then was 
torn between joining Brennan and adhering to his own opinion reversing on the merits. Douglas 
sought to enlist the Chief in a lobbying effort to convince Clark to stick with his opinion on the 
merits, probably calculating that Brennan then would succumb to the pressure to take that route 
as well. Chief Justice Warren pursued the opposite tack, however, deciding to join Brennan 
himself, and convincing Goldberg to do so as well (although the Chief also joined Goldberg's 
separate opinion supporting reversal on the merits). Thus was constituted the final result in Bell 
- five votes to vacate and remand (Warren, Clark, Brennan, Stewart, and Goldberg), and three 
votes each to reverse (Warren, Douglas, and Goldberg) and to affirm (Black, Harlan, and White) 
on the merits. 
294. Clark draft opinion, Bell v. Maryland (June 11, 1964) (LOC, Warren Papers, Box 512, 
case file no. 12). Clark's draft opinion relied on an undifferentiated agglutination of the common 
law of innkeepers, Shelley v. Kraemer, and the public function doctrine of Marsh v. Alabama. Id. 
at 8-13. 
295. See Douglas memorandum for the files, Bell v. Maryland 2 (June 20, 1964) (LOC, 
Douglas Papers, Box 1314, case file no. 12, folder 16) ("At that point there was a majority of the 
Court to reach the basic constitutional issue and to reverse on the merits."); cf Letter from 
Justice Douglas to Justice Goldberg (May 8, 1964) (LOC, Douglas Papers, Box 1314, case file 
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tion emerged, however, and because Justice Brennan was dogged in 
his pursuit of it, the Court once again chose to duck the state action 
issue, remanding Bell to the state court for consideration of the retro-
active applicability of recently enacted state and local public accom-
modations laws.296 
The state action cases of the 1960s, then, reveal a Court willing to 
relax considerably the state action requirement as part of its battle 
against race discrimination. Apparently several of the Justices shared 
Professor Charles Black's contemporaneous view that the "most im-
portant single task to which American law must address itself is the 
task of eradicating racism," and that the state action doctrine was 
"[t]he only strategic hope left for the maintenance of de facto ra-
cism."297 Indeed a brief survey of the period's constitutional commen-
tary, relevant not so much for its possible influence on the Court as for 
its depiction of the "constitutional culture" of the period, reveals that 
the dominant trend in legal academic thought espoused abolition of 
the state action requirement. 298 Thus, for example, the law review 
no. 12, folder 16) ("Bill Brennan •.. said the other day that ifthere were a majority of the Court 
to hold the sit-in convictions unconstitutional, he would not file the dissent he is now filing."). 
296. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 227, 228 (1964). Justice Douglas suggested, quite plausibly 
in my opinion, that Brennan resisted reverting to his earlier position, reversal on the merits, for 
fear of appearing hypocritical. Brennan initially had voted in Bell to reverse the convictions on 
equal protection grounds, and indeed regularly had expressed the view at conference that Shelley 
v. Kraemer should be extended to bar trespass convictions of sit-in demonstrators. E.g., Warren 
conference notes, supra note 289 (Brennan noting his willingness to reverse all the 1963 Tenn sit-
in cases "on Shelley or limited grounds"). Brennan's shift to the vacate-and-remand option was a 
bald attempt to avoid a decision aflinning the convictions. See Letter from Justice Douglas to 
Justice Clark (June 8, 1964) (LOC, Douglas Papers, Box 1314, case file no. 12, folder 16) ("When 
Bill Brennan first circulated his opinion for remand to the Maryland court, I asked him if he 
would have done the same thing if we had voted to reverse rather than to affirm. He said No."). 
But when Justice Clark switched sides, it became difficult for Brennan to return to his earlier 
position without appearing disingenuous. If Brennan had conceived his vacate-and-remand the-
ory as a principled means of avoiding resolution of a controversial constitutional question, it 
should have been equally applicable regardless of whether a majority existed for affinnance or 
reversal on the merits. Justice Stewart apparently pointed this out in conference after Clark 
switched his vote, implying that if Brennan were to realign himself with those reversing on the 
merits this would reveal his vacate-and-remand opinion to have been one "not of principle but of 
expediency." Douglas memorandum for the files, supra note 292, at 2. That charge, according 
to Douglas, "hit Brennan pretty deep," id., for afterwards Brennan adamantly refused to con-
sider returning to his earlier position on the merits. See Letter from Justice Douglas to Justice 
Clark, supra (noting "[t]he intensity of [Brennan's] feeling"). 
297. Black, supra note 269, at 69, 70, 107. 
298. See, e.g., id. at 73 (predicting that Court would interpret the Equal Protection Clause to 
require states to enact fair housing laws); Sager, supra note 54, at 770 ("there are no meaningful 
lines between that which the state tolerates, that which it encourages, and that which it effectu-
ates"); John Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit on the Equal 
Protection Guarantee, 66 CoLUM. L. REV. 855, 855, 872 (1966) (predicting that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause soon will be extended to cover state failure to secure equality for blacks in public 
life); Williams, supra note 271, at 389. See generally WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER 
LAW: THE SUPREME CoURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 160 (1988) ("[S]ome observers thought it [the 
state action requirement] would vanish, leaving all private conduct subject to the sanctions of 
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commentary of the 1960s is rife with statements such as: "[t]he sun is 
setting" on state action, the state action concept "has outlived any 
usefulness it ever had," and radical changes in society are "tolling the 
demise of state action."299 To replace the state action formula, many 
of these commentators proposed a more functional approach that 
would balance the nature of the challenged conduct, the severity of its 
impact on equality, and the availability of alternative measures that 
were more egalitarian. 300 In sum, the state action decisions of the 
Warren Court both reflected and reinforced the dominant trend in 
legal academic scholarship. 
It is worth briefly noting, in conclusion, that the Warren Court 
laid to rest the traditional understanding of the state action concept as 
a Fourteenth Amendment limitation upon congressional as well as ju-
dicial power. The Civil Rights Cases, 301 which first articulated the 
state action doctrine, involved both these aspects; the Court not only 
ruled that private discrimination failed to trigger Section One of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but also that congressional enforcement 
power under Section Five did not extend to prohibiting such conduct. 
During the 1960s the Court, in its eagerness to sanction congressional 
action against private race discrimination, took the following three im-
portant steps: it approved congressional power to regulate interstate 
commerce beyond previously recognized limits in sustaining the 1964 
Civil Rights Act's prohibition on discrimination in places of public 
accommodation;3°2 it "invited" Congress to legislate against private 
discrimination by proclaiming in dicta its preparedness to approve 
such prohibitions under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment 
(that is, to overrule the Civil Rights Cases);303 and it created un-
charted, potentially revolutionary constitutional law doctrine by sanc-
tioning under the Section Five enforcement power congressional 
federal power."); Winter, supra note 225, at 44 (observing that academic commentary had in-
terred the state action doctrine). 
299. Williams, supra note 271, at 389; Kenneth L. Karst & William W. Van Alstyne, Com-
ment: Sit-ins and State Action - Mr. Justice Douglas, Concurring, 14 STAN. L. REv. 762, 763 
(1963); Silard, supra note 298, at 855. 
300. E.g., Black, supra note 269, at 100-01; Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a 
Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473, 492-94 (1962); Karst & Horowitz, supra note 280, at 
75; Williams, supra note 271, at 368-69. 
301. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
302. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964}; see Louis Henkin, Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REv. 
63, 83 (1968) (Court "dismiss[ed] constitutional objections to novel and far-reaching assertions of 
congressional power as though they were frivolous"). 
303. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 761-62 (1966) (Clark, J., concurring, with Black 
and Fortas, JJ.) (noting that Congress undoubtedly possesses power under§ 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to punish purely private conspiracies interfering with Fourteenth Amendment 
rights); 383 U.S. at 777, 782 (Brennan, J., dissenting, with Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.) (same). 
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definition of the scope of Fourteenth Amendment rights.304 
Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co. 305 exemplifies the Justices' willingness to 
compromise traditional legal canons in their apparent quest to eradi-
cate private racial discrimination. Jones involved a large private hous-
ing developer's refusal to sell to blacks. The Court, assuming it was so 
inclined, had two plausible strategies for prohibiting this discrimina-
tion. First, there existed a Reconstruction-era civil rights statute, sec-
tion 1982, which guaranteed blacks the same rights to own property as 
whites; the flaw in this rationale was the long prevalent assumption 
that section 1982 covered state, not private, restrictions on black prop-
erty ownership .. Second, the Court could extend the public function 
doctrine of Marsh v. Alabama to large housing developers; this ap-
proach, though, would substantially expand the array of actors sub-
jected to constitutional restrictions (not limited to prohibitions on race 
discrimination). 
The Court's internal deliberations reveal a strong commitment to 
reaching the politically "right" result. At the Court's conference, con-
vened the day after Martin Luther King's assassination in Memphis, 
with "a good deal of Washington, D.C .... on fire as a result of ... 
race riots," only the stolid Justice Harlan raised even a doubt as to 
whether the Court should invalidate the challenged discrimination.306 
A majority of the Justices declared that Marsh should be expanded to 
cover large private real estate developers. Interestingly, they appar-
ently regarded the Constitution as providing the narrower basis for 
decision, perhaps because section 1982, once interpreted to reach non-
state action, would appear linguistically to cover discriminatory con-
. duct by even a solitary individual, whereas the Marsh rationale could 
304. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650, 652 (1966) (construing§ 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment as a Necessary and Proper Clause with regard to § 1, and extending tremen-
dous deference to congressional legislation aimed at preventing denials of equal protection); cf. 
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324, 326 (1966) (similar construction of§ 2 of the 
Fifteenth Amendment). I call this approach "revolutionary" because it potentially inverted the 
traditional allocation of institutional authority in constitutional interpretation. More specifically, 
these decisions seemed to permit Congress to "define" Fourteenth Amendment violations in such 
a way as to statutorily overrule the Court's constitutional decisions. See Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 
668 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Alexander M. Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. Cr. REV. 
79, 95-101. But see Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10 (denying that Congress can diminish Four-
teenth Amendment protections announced by the Court); William Cohen, Congressional Power 
to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 613-15, 620 (1975) (argu-
ing that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted to sanction congres-
sional abrogation of federalism, but not individual rights, restrictions). 
305. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
306. Douglas memorandum to the files (Apr. 5, 1968) (LOC, Douglas Papers, Box 1423, case 
file no. 645: Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co.); Douglas conference notes, Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co. 
(Apr. 5, 1968) (Harlan: "not at rest; should be treated by Congress; as presently advised he 
could join on Marsh ground but on no other; in effect a delegation of municipal functions to this 
development group"). Harlan eventually decided to dissent, and Justice White joined him. 
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be limited to large developers. 307 Appalled by the conference's provi-
sional espousal of the "narrower" constitutional ground for decision, 
Justice Douglas proceeded to lecture his colleagues for their "fly 
specking" and "timid[ity]."308 Ultimately the three Justices who at 
conference had favored reliance on section 1982 - Black, Douglas, 
and Stewart - convinced the others to go along. The upshot was a 
decision construing section 1982 to forbid private racial discrimination 
in housing - an interpretation that not only lacked historical support 
and contravened several precedents, but also rend~red largely super-
fluous both the 1968 Fair Housing Act and the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act.309 As one critic accurately observed, while Jones "did not pro-
vide the long-sought rationale for state action, ... it may have made 
that rationale irrelevant."310 Thus not only were the Warren Court 
Justices prepared to sanction congressional prohibition of private dis-
crimination notwithstanding the traditional understanding of the state 
action restriction as applicable to congressional as well as judicial 
power, but they evinced willingnes~ in Jones to manufacture such a 
prohibition when Congress dithered.311 
3. De Facto School Segregation 
During the Warren era the traditional conception of equal protec-
tion rights also was eroded in the school segregation context. The crit-
ical issue here was whether the Constitution required only that 
government actors refrain from deliberately segregating public schools 
along racial lines or, more broadly, that those schools be racially inte-
grated regardless of whether existing segregation was directly attribu-
table to state action. Thus the school segregation issue replicated in a 
different guise the Griffin question - under what circumstances was 
307. See Douglas memorandum to the files, supra note 306 ("The Court was very eager at 
this Conference to avoid any decision under Section 1982"). While the § 1982 ground was 
broader in that it reached discrimination by smaller entities, it was narrower in that the statute's 
language apparently was restricted to race discrimination claims, unlike the more capacious 
equal protection guarantee. 
308. Id. at 1, 2. 
309. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 478 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Casper, supra note 186, at 130-32; 
Henkin, supra note 302, at 85-86. For devastating criticism of the Court's history, see sources 
cited in note 186 supra. The contravened precedents were, e.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 
(1948) ("We may start with the proposition [not assumption] that the statute [the 1866 Civil 
Rights Act] does not invalidate private restrictive agreements .... "); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 
U.S. 323, 331 (1926) (Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes "do not in any manner prohibit or 
invalidate contracts entered into by private individuals in respect to the control and disposition of 
their own property."); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (Fourteenth Amendment "does 
not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights"). 
310. Kurland, supra note 271, at 670. 
311. Cf Henkin, supra note 302, at 83 (questioning whether Court did "more than its share" 
in civil rights struggle by "giv[ing] the country statutes which no Congress ever enacted"). 
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the state responsible for redressing disparate impacts, whether wealth 
or racial, that it did not directly cause? 
Candor requires me to admit that the Justices' willingness to de-
part from the traditional understanding of equal protection rights is 
more speculative in this area than in the others previously canvassed. 
One cannot determine with certainty how the Warren Court would 
have resolved the de facto school segregation issue, for its tenure ter-
minated before the Justices granted review in any of the northern 
school desegregation cases, which were the first to present the issue. 
Yet piecing together the Warren Court's general predisposition to-
wards racially egalitarian results, its landmark 1968 decision in Green 
v. County School Board, 312 lower court resolutions of the de facto seg-
regation issue, and internal evidence from the first northern school de-
segregation case, one can construct a reasonably convincing argument 
that the Warren Court, had it been squarely confronted with the issue, 
would have interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to require actual 
racial integration of public schools.313 
Brown, in its immediate aftermath, was interpreted by many lower 
federal courts to require an end to segregation rather than actual inte-
gration. 314 As the school desegregation cases moved north, however, 
rulings on the de facto segregation issue grew increasingly mixed; sev-
eral cases found constitutional violations, while others did not. 315 
Legal commentators, moreover, argued with increasing frequency 
through the 1960s that the Equal Protection Clause proscribed segre-
gated public schools, regardless of the cause.316 While neither legal 
312. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
313. Some eminent commentators have reached the opposite conclusion, but without know!· 
edge of the archival data discussed in the text. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 213, at 616; cf. Paul 
Brest, Race Discrimination, in THE BURGER CoURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT 
w ASN'T 113, 113-16 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983)[hereinafter THE BURGER COURT] (implying that 
the Warren Court would not have invalidated de facto school segregation). 
314. E.g., Rippy v. Borders, 250 F.2d 690, 692-93 (5th Cir. 1957), overruled by United States 
v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967); Allen v. School Bd., 249 F.2d 
462, 465 (4th Cir. 1957) (per curiam), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 953 (1958). 
315. Compare, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 503-11 (1967) (requiring compel-
lingjustification for school board policy producing de facto segregation), ajfd. sub nom. Smuck v. 
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (1969) (en bane); Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208, 222-23, 227 
(E.D.N.Y. 1964) (school board cannot simply acquiesce in school segregation resulting from 
segregated housing patterns since plaintiffs have a "right not to be segregated") with Downs v. 
Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988, 998 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965) and Bell v. 
School Bd., 213 F. Supp. 819, 828-31 (N.D. Ind.), affd., 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. 
denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964) (only de jure segregation violates the Constitution). 
316. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 191, at 584 ("[I]n every case of racially imbalanced schools 
sufficient responsibility can be ascribed to government to satisfy the requirement that stems from 
the Equal Protection Clause's proscription of unequal treatment by government."); Karst & 
Horowitz, supra note 280, at 62-63 (speculating, based on cases like Griffin and Reitman, that the 
Court might soon invalidate de facto school segregation); J. Skelly Wright, Public School Deseg-
regation: Legal Remedies for De Facto Segregation, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 285, 298-303 (1965) 
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commentary nor lower court cases are reliable indicia of Supreme 
Court decisionmaking, they do assist one in conceiving the universe of 
plausible alternatives; by the mid-1960s, Supreme Court invalidation 
of de facto school segregation was well within the realm of possible 
constitutional developments. 
While the Warren Court never addressed the de facto segregation 
issue, Green v. County School Board 311 suggested that a school board 
proven to have engaged in past racial discrimination would be re-
quired to take remedial steps beyond redressing the effects of its con-
stitutional transgressions. Green represented an important departure 
in school desegregation jurisprudence owing to its proclamation that 
once purposeful segregative conduct by state officials had been estab-
lished, subsequent school board behavior was to be judged under an 
effects test - that is, did the school board action promise to produce 
"a unitary, nonracial system of public education"?318 Yet an effects 
test, especially in a district displaying segregated housing patterns, al-
most inevitably would require the redress of more than simply state-
created segregation; it thus represented a potentially significant depar-
ture from the traditional understanding of equal protection rights as 
checks against deliberate governmental disadvantaging. Since Green 
itself involved a school district where housing patterns were not segre-
gated, however, only the Court's language, not its holding, bore impli-
cations for the de facto segregation issue; it thus would be a mistake to 
overstate the significance of Green in this regard. 
Far more compelling evidentiary support for my argument is 
found in an internal memorandum circulated in connection with the 
Court's first northern school desegregation case, Keyes v. School Dis-
trict No. J, 319 argued initially in the 1970 Term. In this Keyes memo-
randum four holdover Justices from the Warren Court - Douglas, 
Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall - supported affirmance of a lower 
court ruling that, without deciding the per se validity of de facto 
school segregation, found a constitutional violation because segrega-
tion had produced unequal educational opportunity for blacks in psy-
chological, if no other, terms.320 In other words, relying on the 
fundamental rights strand of equal protection, rather than the racial 
classification strand, four Justices evinced willingness to invalidate 
(arguing that courts should invalidate de facto segregation owing to the critical importance of 
education). 
317. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
318. 391 U.S. at 436. 
319. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
320. Douglas memorandum, 4th draft, Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, at 6-10 (Apr. 12, 1971) 
(LOC, Black Papers, Box 436, case file nos. 281, 349). 
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public school segregation owing to its deleterious impact on the educa-
tional opportunities of minority children.321 It seems very likely that 
either Justice Fortas or Chief Justice Warren would have supplied the 
fifth vote for this rationale. One can imagine Warren, for example, 
rejecting the de jure segregation requirement as dismissively as he 
dealt with the state action limitation in his draft opinion (never pub-
lished) in one of the 1963 Term sit-in cases - as one of a variety of 
·~narrow and technical arguments which are offered as the excuse for 
denying fundamental human rights."322 
III. EQUAL PROTECTION IN THE BURGER AND 
REHNQUIST COURTS 
The boundary line I have drawn between the middle and late 
phases of modern equal protection is far more natural than that identi-
fied between stages I and II. In ~y view equal protection thought 
321. The Douglas memorandum was written in the heady pre-Rodriguez days, when it gener-
ally was assumed that education, like voting and access to the criminal process, was a fundamen· 
ta1 right for equal protection purposes. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 
337 F. Supp. 280, 283 (W.D. Tex. 1971) (three-judge court) (per curiam), revd., 411 U.S. I 
(1973); Horowitz, supra note 247, at 1150; Michelman, supra note 247, at 28, 37; Sager, supra 
note 54, at 790. 
322. Warren draft dissent, Ba" v. City of Columbia 1 (May 7, 1964) (LOC, Warren Papers, 
Box 510, case file no. 9); see also Wright, supra note 316, at 294-95 ("It is inconceivable that the 
Supreme Court will long sit idly by watching Negro children crowded into inferior slum schools 
while the whites flee to the suburbs to place their children in vastly superior predominantly white 
schools.") 
I have limited myself in the text to just three examples of the Warren Court's willingness to 
depart from the traditional understanding of rights in equal protection cases. Another equal 
protection example was the requirement in apportionment cases that all votes be equally 
weighted regardless of whether existing inequality was attributable to state cartography or to 
demographic shifts for which the state bore no responsibility. For a nice statement of the tension 
between this requirement and the traditional understanding of equal protection rights, see Note 
from Justice Goldberg to Justice Douglas (undated) (LOC, Douglas Papers, Box 1311, case file 
no. 12: Bell v. Maryland) ("Failure of a state to act in a reapportionment case is state action 
(Baker v. Carr). Failure of a state court to act to protect civil rights according to Hugo [Black] 
and his majority is not state action. May well have to explain why!"). For scholars making a 
similar point, see Neal, supra note 123, at 282-83; Williams, supra note 271, at 364. 
The Warren Court's revised understanding of constitutional rights also seeped into areas of 
constitutional law other than equal protection. Thus, for example, the Court held that the right 
against self-incrimination not only prevented the state from coercing criminal defendants into 
testifying against themselves, but also required the state to facilitate exercise of th.:: right by 
informing criminal suspects of its existence. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Two late 
Warren era First Amendment cases likewise treated constitutional rights as entitlements to af· 
firmative governmental assistance. First the Court found state action, and consequently a First 
Amendment violation, in a state court's injunction of informational picketing in a privately 
owned shopping center; the Court ruled, in other words, that government is constitutionally 
obliged to secure an individual's right to free expression on certain sorts of private property. 
Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), 
overruled by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). Second the Court, in rejecting a constitu-
tional challenge to the Federal Communications Commission's "fairness doctrine," noted in 
dicta the existence of a First Amendment right of access to broadcasting - in other words, the 
government is constitutionally required to ensure that private licensees provide minimal public 
access to the airwaves. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
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took a dramatic turn in 1969 when Warren Burger and Harry Black-
mun replaced Earl Warren and Abe Fortas on the Supreme Court. 
That appraisal apparently is in tension with the dominant scholarly 
evaluation of the Burger Court's constitutional box score. According 
to the received wisdom the Burger Court represented a "counterrevo-
lution that wasn't."323 More specifically, Nixon's four quick Supreme 
Court appointments, conferred upon individuals with unambiguously 
conservative credentials, were expected to produce significant contrac-
tion of individual rights guarantees.324 What actually transpired, 
though, was expansion of free speech protection, dramatic substantive 
due process development, inauguration of an Eighth Amendment 
death penalty jurisprudence, broadened Free Exercise and Establish-
ment Clause coverage, and an explosion of procedural due process 
safeguards. 32s With specific reference to equal protection, further-
more, the conventional wisdom emphasizes the Burger Court's un-
precedented extension of heightened equal protection review to 
classifications based on gender, alienage, and illegitimacy.326 
I intend here to take issue with only one slice of the received wis-
dom - namely, that the Burger Court effected no counterrevolution 
in equal protection. Of the Warren Court's equal protection innova-
tions, those carrying the greatest "revolutionary" potential were the 
incipient reconceptualization of equal protection rights as entitlements 
to particular results and, more specifically, the equation of disparate 
wealth effects with wealth discrimination. Thus, in evaluating 
whether the Burger Court effected a counterrevolution in equal pro-
tection, it seems plausible to focus, at least initially, on these issues. 
And it is here that the "counterrevolutionary" accomplishments of the 
Burger Court are most striking. 
More generally, this Part of the article seeks to interpret the princi-
pal equal protection developments of the last two decades. The first 
323. See generally THE BURGER COURT, supra note 313; RICHARD Y. FUNSTON, CONSTITU-
TIONAL CoUNTERREVOLUTION'l 331-38 (1977); A.E. Dick Howard, Burger Court, in ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CoNSTITUTION 177 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1989); William F. 
Swindler, The Burger Court, 1969-1979: Continuity and Contrast, 28 KAN. L. REv. 99 (1979). 
324. See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADmON 434-35 (ex-
panded ed. 1988); Swindler, supra note 323, at 99; Winter, supra note 225, at 41. 
325. See generally Vincent A. Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court, in THE BUR-
GER COURT, supra note 313, at 198, 204-05 Qisting cases and concluding that "[i]fits legacy of 
innovative constitutional doctrines is what made the Warren Court the paradigm of an activist 
court, no new paradigm is needed to comprehend the central tendency of its successor"). 
326. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 325, at 204; Ruth B. Ginsburg, The Burger Court's Grapplings 
with Sex Discrimination, in THE BURGER COURT, supra note 313, at 132-33; Gerald M. Rosberg, 
The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the National Government, 1977 SUP. 
CT. REV. 275, 298; J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, 
and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945, 948-50 (1975). 
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two sections argue, as sketched above, that the Burger Court deci-
sively halted further erosion in, and indeed reversed its predecessor's 
incursions upon, the traditional understanding of equal protection 
rights as checks upon deliberate governmental disadvantaging. Sec-
tion III.A traces the substantial demise of the fundamental rights 
strand of equal protection and suggests that the Burger Court, in its 
eagerness to curtail the notion of constitutional entitlements to gov-
ernment benefits, inadvertently overshot its target and legitimized pat-
ent government discrimination against the poor. In the course of this 
discussion, moreover, I hope to explain the Court's willingness to de-
rive a tenuously supported abortion right from the Due Process Clause 
just weeks after announcing its refusal to discover fundamental rights 
under an equal protection rubric. 
Section IIl.B traces the Burger Court's resurrection of the tradi-
tional understanding of equal protection rights in three other contexts 
- state action, school desegregation, and the Washington v. Davis 321 
question of whether facially neutral laws that produce a disparate ra-
cial impact but are not racially motivated violate the Equal Protection 
Clause. In each of these areas the Burger Court reverted to the tradi-
tional conception of equal protection rights, often yielding decisions in 
considerable tension with, if not outright contravention of, Warren era 
· precedent. In modem parlance, the Burger Court's focus has been 
upon cleansing the legislative process, whereas its predecessor took sig-
nificant strides towards ensuring egalitarian results. One must not, 
however, confuse the Burger Court's preference for process over re-
sults with a commitment to political process theory. We must, at this 
point, draw a critical distinction between "political process" and "pro-
cess" theory. The former, which is an outgrowth of Carolene Prod-
ucts, identifies particular subject matter areas - such as voting rights 
and race discrimination - as appropriate for judicial intervention 
based on the likelihood that the political process has been subverted, 
either through franchise restrictions or prejudice directed against "dis-
crete and insular minorities." Process theory (which, to avoid confu-
sion, I shall henceforth refer to as "legislative inputs" theory) is an 
entirely distinct notion; independently of subject matter area, it directs 
judicial review towards purging legislative decisionmaking of certain 
considerations rather than guarding against particular substantive out-
comes. While I have discovered no reference to this distinction in the 
literature, it is crucial to understanding the development of equal pro-
tection law in the Burger Court. For example, I shall argue in section 
III.C that the Burger Court's gradual conversion to a legislative inputs 
327. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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theory neatly accounts for its otherwise chaotic series of gender dis-
crimination rulings. Yet under a political process approach, the 
Court's willingness to extend heightened scrutiny to gender classifica-
tions is itself questionable given that women constitute a fully en-
franchised majority of the voting-age population. Similarly, the 
Burger and Rehnquist Court's recent affirmative action decisions are 
plausibly explicable in terms of the goal of eliminating racial consider-
ations from the universe of acceptable legislative inputs. Those rulings 
are virtually indefensible, though, under a political process theory that 
justifies judicial solicitude only for groups traditionally frozen out of 
the legislative marketplace - i.e., not the whites disadvantaged by af-
firmative action. 
As briefly noted above, then, section IIl.C argues that the Burger 
Court's gender discrimination cases come into focus when viewed 
through the lens of that Court's prototypical legislative inputs deci-
sion, Washington v. Davis. Finally, section III.D explores the thorni-
est equal protection problem of the last decade, affirmative action. 
The intractability of that issue, I shall argue, derives from the choice 
between competing equal protection theories that affirmative action 
poses for the Court. More specifically, the constitutionality of affirma-
tive action substantially depends upon choosing between a normative 
equal protection theory defining criteria of relevance to government 
decisionmaking and a putatively positive political process theory fo-
cusing on historical disadvantage and political powerlessness. The 
Court's recent affirmative action decisions represent an apparent 
choice for the "relevance" theory of equal protection - a choice that 
is, however, difficult to reconcile with the conservative Justices' 
purported adherence to a constitutional philosophy of strict 
constructionism. 
A. Demise of the Fundamental Rights Strand of Equal Protection 
The fundamental rights strand of equal protection generally was 
regarded by commentators and the more conservative Justices as 
dangerously open-ended. 328 This section argues that apprehension re-
garding the fundamental rights strand was due not to its constitution-
alizing of unenumerated rights, but rather to its potential for judicial 
wealth redistribution. It is the latter concern, I believe, that accounts 
for the Burger Court's determination to reexplain Warren era funda-
mental rights strand cases as something other than what they were, as 
328. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Ger-
ald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a 
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. l, 8 (1972); Winter, supra note 225, at 58. 
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well as its refusal to create any new fundamental rights for equal pro-
tection purposes. 
The fundamental rights strand of equal protection was, as we saw 
in Part II, significantly expanded, if not actually conceived, in Griffin 
v. Illinois. 329 Justice Harlan, who dissented vigorously in Griffin, bat-
tled over the next fifteen years to reconceptualize that case as a due 
process, rather than an equal protection, decision; Harlan contended, 
in other words, that Griffin had ruled appellate review of criminal con-
victions to be mandated by procedural due process.330 In 1970 
Harlan's crusade ended triumphantly in Boddie v. Connecticut. 331 In-
volved there was a divorce court filing fee which an indigent plaintiff 
could not satisfy. Harlan wrote the majority opinion, invalidating the 
fee on due process grounds. Reliance on that rationale in Boddie, 
however, required an analytical twist unnecessary for Griffin, where 
the state affirmatively had deprived the criminal defendant of his lib-
erty; in Boddie the state deprivation of liberty was less apparent. 
Harlan solved this problem by introducing the notion of monopoliza-
tion - that the state's exclusive control over marriage and divorce 
placed the civil divorce plaintiff in a posture similar to that of the 
criminal defendant, both of whom were compelled to participate in a 
state system in which they were relatively disadvantaged owing to 
their poverty. Any doubt as to the cause of Harlan's concern regard-
ing the doctrinal underpinning of Boddie and Griffin is resolved by his 
Shapiro dissent, where he warned of the drastic ramifications of a 
wealth effects test applied to important interests, as prescribed under 
the fundamental rights strand;332 Harlan's due process analysis, by 
way of contrast, could be confined to fundamental interests over which 
the state exercised monopoly power. 
The Burger Court's commitment to narrowly construing Griffin 
was confirmed in United States v. Kras, 333 where the Court refused to 
329. 351 U.S. 12 (1956), discussed supra text accompanying notes 243-47. Credit for incep-
tion of the fundamental rights strand generally goes to Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) 
(invalidating state law establishing mechanism for sterilizing certain recidivist criminals). Many 
commentators, however, plausibly have treated Skinner as a substantive due process decision 
dressed in equal protection garb by a Court haunted by Lochner's ghost. E.g., William Cohen, Is 
Equal Protection Like Oakland? Equality As A Surrogate far Other Rights, 59 TuL. L. REV. 884, 
891-92 (1985); Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. 
REV. 981, 1018-19 (1979). 
330. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361, 363-64 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 36 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
331. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 
332. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see William H. 
Clune, Ill, The Supreme Court's Treatment of Wealth Discriminations Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 1975 SUP. Cr. REv. 289, 308-10 (suggesting that Justice Harlan relied in Boddie on 
due process rather than equal protection owing to the farmer's narrower ramifications). 
333. 409 U.S. 434 (1973). 
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apply Roddie's monopolization rationale in a context where it seemed 
plausibly applicable - bankruptcy filing fees. While lawyers may 
quibble over whether a new financial start in life is as fundamental as 
the ability to remarry, or whether the state's control over the creditor/ 
debtor relationship is as complete as over the marital union, 334 Justice 
Douglas' conference notes for Kras yield a much more striking revela-
tion: all four of the Nixon appointees either doubted whether Boddie 
remained good law or emphasized.that, if it did, the Court should nar-
rowly confine it. Thus, Chief Justice Burger declared that Boddie 
must be kept "in bounds"; Justice Blackmun "question[ed] [the] valid-
ity of Boddie"; Justice Powell observed that "Boddie is [a] trouble-
some case" and that there was "no end of [the] road to Boddie"; and 
Justice Rehnquist stated that he "would not extend Boddie an 
inch."335 
At the same time that it reconceptualized Griffin and progeny as 
due process cases, thus undermining the very notion of a fundamental 
rights equal protection doctrine, the Burger Court announced in cases 
such as Dandridge v. Williams 336 and San Antonio School District v. 
Rodriguez331 that the door to discovery of new fundamental rights was 
firmly shut. Dandridge, rejecting an equal protection challenge to 
Maryland's policy of capping AFDC benefits for large families, denied 
that anything more rigorous than minimum rationality review was ap-
propriate simply because of the vast importance of welfare benefits to 
the poor. By conceding that "the most basic economic needs of im-
poverished human beings" were at issue, yet nonetheless rejecting 
heightened scrutiny, the Court left no doubt that the fundamental 
rights strand was being truncated. 33s 
334. See, e.g., Kras, 409 U.S. at 454-55 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting that, from ex post 
perspective, the state has as much control over the penniless bankrupt's options as over the 
prospective divorcee's). 
335. Douglas conference notes, United States v. Kras (Oct. 20, 1972) (LOC, Douglas Papers, 
Box 1594, case file no. 71-749). 
336. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
337. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
338. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485. Nor is USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), convincing 
authority to the contrary. The Court there invalidated on equal protection grounds congres-
sional exclusion of "unrelated households" from participation in the federal food stamp program. 
Moreno is something of a constitutional anomaly, for the Court, purporting to apply minimum 
rationality review (as required by Dandridge), invalidated a statutory classification that was not 
plainly irrational. See 413 U.S. at 546 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the challenged 
classification is a plausible, albeit inexact, means of rooting out the fraudulent use of food 
stamps). I believe Moreno is explicable by a combination of factors. First, the welfare denial 
there was complete, rather than partial as in Dandridge. Cf Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 n.3 
(1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (holding that exclusion of illegal aliens from free public school 
education violates equal protection, and distinguishing Rodriguez on the ground that only a rela-
tive educational deprivation was involved there). Second, the congressional classification appar-
ently was intended to exclude "hippie communes" from participatiop. in the food stamp program, 
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The message of Dandridge was powerfully reinforced in Rodriguez, 
where the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to state fund-
ing of public education derived partially from local property truces, a 
system that produced spending disparities across school districts. Not 
only did Rodriguez reject the notion, implicit in Brown, that education 
was a fundamental right, but also the Court declared its unwillingness 
to identify for equal protection purposes fundamental rights that were 
not explicitly embraced in, or implicitly derivable from, the constitu-
tional text. 339 Reconciling that position with precedent required the 
same sort of creative revisionism that Justice Harlan had so skillfully 
executed in Boddie. 340 Rodriguez emphasized, moreover, as had Dan-
dridge, that the importance of the affected interest - education in 
Rodriguez - was simply irrelevant to the constitutional analysis.341 
Rodriguez seemed, in short, to compel the conclusion that future fun-
damental rights strand expansion was out of the question. 342 
From a pre-1973 perspective, more than one credible explanation 
existed for the Burger Court's apparent aversion to the fundamental 
yet its sweep was so broad that it generated a large number of extremely sympathetic plaintiffs. 
See, e.g., 413 U.S. at 532, 534. Third, conference notes reveal that the Moreno majority was a 
very tenuous one; of the Justices ultimately joining the majority, Stewart described himself as 
"doubtful[],'' White as "tentative[],'' Powell as "very much in doubt,'' while Blackmun actually 
was "incline[d] to reverse." Douglas conference notes, USDA v. Moreno (Apr. 1973) (LOC, 
Douglas Papers, Box 1615, case file no. 72-848). 
339. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 29-30, 33-34. 
340. Thus in Rodriguez Justice Powell treated Shapiro solely as a right-to-travel case, 411 
U.S. at 31-32 & n.71, though, as I previously have argued, the decision possibly makes better 
sense in other terms. See supra text accompanying notes 257-60. Powell treated Skinner as 
involving an independent constitutional right - procreation - rather than an equal protection-
based "fundamental" interest. 411 U.S. at 34 n.76. While one plausibly can interpret Skinner 
that way, see supra note 329, some of the Justices in the majority could not easily have reconciled 
such a result with their general constitutional philosophies. See supra note 244. 
341. 411 U.S. at 29-30. 
342. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), is not to the contrary. There the Court struck down 
on equal protection grounds Texas' denial of free public education to the children of illegal 
aliens. The majority opinion emphasized both the faultlessness of the children and the impor-
tance of education. 457 U.S. at 219-21. Internal documents suggest that four of the five Justices 
in the Plyler majority were prepared forthrightly to hold education a fundamental interest for 
equal protection purposes. See Brennan draft opinion, Plyler v. Doe 34 (Jan. 25, 1982) (LOC, 
Brennan Papers, Box 590, case file nos. 80-1538, 80-1934) (stressing the importance of education 
and arguing that "equal access to basic education was recognized by the framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment as an essential aspect of the framework of equality embodied in that amend-
ment); id., Letter from Justice Blackmun to Justice Brennan 1 (Mar. 10, 1982) (would treat 
education as a "fundamental" right because "necessary to preserve rights of expression and par-
ticipation in the political process"); id., Letter from Justice Stevens to Justice Brennan (Mar. 10, 
1982) ("could join a disposition based ••• on the premise that some modicum of education is 
'fundamental' "). Justice Powell, however, who supplied the fifth vote for the Plyler majority, 
balked at the idea of "creating another heretofore unidentified right." Id., Letter from Justice 
Powell to Justice Blackmun 1 (Mar. 12, 1982). That a majority of the Justices do not acknowl-
edge a fundamental right to education is confirmed by Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 
487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988) (limiting Plyler to its "unique circumstances" in rejecting constitutional 
challenge to school board user fees for public school transportation). 
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rights strand of equal protection. Professor Gerald Gunther, in his 
famous Harvard Foreword of 1972, plausibly suggested that recent de-
cisions rejecting a fundamental right to welfare (Dandridge) and hous-
ing (Lindsey v. Normet) 343 were attributable to a strict constructionist 
Court's predictable reluctance to discover additional unenumerated 
rights lurking within the Equal Protection Cla~e. 344 That account 
was rendered incredible, though, when the same Court identified in 
1973 a woman's right to abortion emanating from the elusive constitu-
tional right to privacy. Roe v. Wade, 345 soon followed by additional 
substantive due process rulings recognizing rights to contraceptive ac-
cess, familial living arrangements, and parental custody,346 revealed a 
Court undisturbed by the manufacture of unenumerated rights. The 
Burger Court has, moreover, frequently expanded specific Bill of 
Rights provisions well beyond the bounds of precedent and original 
intent.347 
Given its latitudinarian interpretations of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause and certain Bill of Rights provisions, the 
Burger Court's constriction of the fundamental rights strand of equal 
protection cannot plausibly have been motivated by strict construc-
tionist concerns. 348 Rather, I think, the explanation must be that the 
Justices were more comfortable forbidding state regulation of certain 
spheres than requiring government equalization (or at least "minimum 
protection") of fundamental interests such as education, food, shelter, 
and medical care. The unpalatable aspect of fundamental rights equal 
protection, in other words, was not its recognition of unenumerated 
rights, 349 but its reconceptualization of equal protection as an entitle-
343. 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) ("We are unable to perceive in [the Constitution] any ••• guaran-
tee of access to dwellings of a particular quality .... "). 
344. Gunther, supra note 328, at 12-13. 
345. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
346. E.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating law prohibiting 
distribution of contraceptives by anyone other than a licensed pharmacist); Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking down an ordinance disabling extended families from 
living in the same household); cf. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (striking down on 
equal protection grounds a statute permitting termination of a father's parental rights in order to 
facilitate adoption of his illegitimate offspring, as applied to a father enjoying a substantial rela-
tionship with his child). 
347. E.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (Eighth Amendment forbids imposition oflife 
sentence without possibility of parole for nonviolent recidivist); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 
(1977) (Eighth Amendment forbids imposition of death penalty for crime of rape); Elrod v. 
Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (First Amendment precludes political patronage dismissal of nonpoli-
cymaking government employee); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (First Amendment protects commercial speech). 
348. Nor is a strict constructionist constitutional philosophy consistent with the Burger 
Court's unprecedented extension of meaningful equal protection review to classifications based 
upon gender, alienage, and illegitimacy. 
349. Just as the Burger Court distinguished between, for example, gender and age within the 
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ment to affirmative governmental assistance. 350 The abortion funding 
decisions both corroborate the Burger Court's hostility to the funda-
mental rights strand and confirm my proffered explanation for it. 
Since Roe v. Wade already had identified a constitutional right to 
abortion, Maher v. Roe, 351 the first abortion funding case, implicated 
no plausible strict cpnstructionism concern. Presented with the con-
tention that the state was unequally distributing the fundamental right 
to abortion by financing a poor woman's child-bearing expenses while 
refusing to subsidize her abortion, the Court simply invoked the tradi-
tional notion of constitutional rights; no fundamental right was de-
nied, Justice Powell explained, when the government declined to 
remove an obstacle not of its own creation - the indigent woman's 
poverty. 352 
One case not meshing neatly with my explanation of the Burger 
Court's hostility towards the fundamental rights strand is James v. 
Valtierra. 353 There the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to 
facial discrimination against the poor - a California constitutional 
provision forbidding the establishment of low-cost housing in a partic-
classification strand of equal protection, so could it have created a hierarchy of rights justifying 
differential treatment of, for example, education and golf. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 
233 (1982) ("Only a pedant would insist that there are no meaningful distinctions among the 
multitude of social and political interests regulated by the State ••• • "); cf. Daniel R. Ortiz, The 
Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1134-42 (1989) (suggesting that 
liberal theory informs a prioritization of rights that implicitly underlies the Court's disparate 
application of the Washington v. Davis rule across contexts). 
350. See, e.g., Letter from Justice Powell to Justice Brennan 1 (Jan. 30, 1982) (LOC, Bren-
nan Papers, Box 590, case file nos. 80-1538, 80-1934: Plyler v. Doe) ("It was my view [in Rodri-
guez] and now that there is no constitutional right to a state provided education any more than 
there is such a constitutional right to welfare, housing, health services, public works and public 
utilities - all of which are considered by most of us to be essential.") (emphasis added). Thus, I 
strongly disagree with commentators who have suggested that the Warren Court employed equal 
protection to accomplish the same results that might have been achieved under substantive due 
process by Justices less exercised by Lochner. For that contention, see, e.g., Lupu, supra note 
329, at 994-96; Michael J. Perry, Modem Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 
79 CoLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1077-81 (1979). The truly distinctive feature of the fundamental 
rights strand of equal protection was, to repeat, not the articulation of unenumerated constitu-
tional rights, but the imposition of an affirmative duty upon government to redress poverty not of 
its direct creation. 
351. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
352. 432 U.S. at 473-74; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) ("[A]lthough 
government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, 
it need not remove those not of its own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category."). That 
rationale failed to distinguish Griffin and Harper, where the Court required the government to 
redress poverty for which it was not directly responsible. Even if those cases are distinguishable 
on Justice Harlan's monopolization rationale, see 432 U.S. at 469-71 nn.5-6, Shapiro plainly is 
not, for government no more controls the means of subsistence than it monopolizes abortion 
funding. Finally, even if one treats Shapiro as a right-to-travel rather than a right-to-welfare 
decision, as the Burger Court has in cases such as Dandridge and Rodriguez Maher still cannot 
be reconciled unless the government is constitutionally required to finance exercise of travel, but 
not abortion, rights. 
353. 402 U.S. 137 (1971). 
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ular community without its prior referendum approval. Plaintiff's 
contention in James, then, was not that the Equal Protection Clause 
mandated affirmative governmental assistance to the poor, but rather 
that it forbade deliberate governmental hostility. Even a Court com-
mitted to the traditional understanding of equal protection rights 
could have invalidated the statute in James. But the Burger Court did 
not, ruling implicitly that wealth was not a suspect classification like 
race, and thus distinguishing its invalidation three years earlier of a 
similar referendum scheme requiring local voter approval for enact-
ment of fair housing laws addressed towards racial discrimination. 354 
James was a surprising decision given that even the conservative Jus-
tice Harlan, who had vigorously lobbied against the affirmative gov-
ernmental obligation aspect of fundamental rights equal protection, 
had conceded that government could not constitutionally inflict delib-
erate harm upon the poor. 355 The explanation for this puzzling deci-
sion must be, I think, that the Justices were so eager to foreclose the 
far-reaching ramifications of the fundamental rights strand that they 
either failed to notice, or else did not care, that the wealth discrimina-
tion involved in James was of a different order than that implicated in 
the fundamental rights cases.356 In other words, James probably came 
out the way it did principally because of the Court's determination to 
reject constitutional challenges in cases such as ·Dandridge and 
Rodriguez. 
B. Resurrection of the Traditional Understanding of Equal 
Protection Rights 
The virtual demise of the fundamental rights strand in the early 
1970s reversed in one important area the Warren era trend towards 
reconceptualizing equal protection rights as entitlem.ents to particular 
outcomes. This section considers three additional contexts in which 
the Burger Court reverted to the traditional rights understanding. 
1. The State Action Cases 
The Warren Court, from 1960 onward, seems never to have met a 
state action argument it did not like. The Burger Court immediately 
354. 402 U.S. at 140-41 (distinguishing Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1968)). 
355. See, e.g .. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The 
States, of course, are prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause from discriminating between 
'rich' and 'poor' as such .... ");Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 35 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(conceding that facial discrimination against indigents would be unconstitutional). 
356. See Clune, supra note 332, at 335. In this pre-Washington v. Davis period, moreover, 
the distinction between a facial discrimination and disparate impact might have appeared less 
than crystalline. 
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disrupted that pattern in Evans v. Abney, 357 the successor case to Ev-
ans v. Newton, discussed in Part II. Following the Supreme Court rul-
ing that even private trustees could not constitutionally operate a 
Macon park in a racially segregated manner, the Georgia courts held 
that the property reverted to the donor's heirs since the trust had be-
come impossible of fulfillment.358 On appeal again to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the Justices rejected an equal protection challenge ow-
ing to the absence of state action. Abney apparently was the first deci-
sion since 1935 in which the Court dismissed on state action grounds 
an equal protection challenge to purposeful race discrimination.359 
Justices more committed to racially egalitarian outcomes could have 
reached the opposite result without abandoning the state action limita-
tion. Under Shelley v. Kraemer state action could have been located in 
the Georgia court's involvement in the reverter, or, more narrowly, 
reversal might have been grounded upon the early twentieth-century 
Georgia law authorizing charitable trusts dedicated to park use only if 
racially restricted. Given that Justices Brennan and Douglas dissented 
in Abney while Marshall did not participate, and that Fortas and War-
ren had provided the two additional votes for granting certiorari, one 
might plausibly speculate that the result would have differed under the 
Warren Court. 360 
Four years later, in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 361 the Burger 
Court again rejected a race discrimination challenge owing to the ab-
sence of state action. Moose Lodge involved the constitutionality of a 
state-licensed private club's refusal to serve blacks. The Court rejected 
the equal protection challenge, finding no state action in either Penn-
sylvania's grant of a limited monopoly liquor license or its close super-
vision of licensees' business operations. Given dissents by the three 
holdover liberals from the Warren Court - Douglas, Brennan, and 
Marshall - Moose Lodge too perhaps would have been resolved dif-
ferently in 1969. While Warren era precedents did not mandate a dif-
ferent result, creative interpretation of Burton's "joint participant" 
rationale or of Reitman's "authorization" notion easily could have ac-
commodated a finding of state action in Moose Lodge. 362 
357. 396 U.S. 435 (1970). 
358. Evans v. Abney, 165 S.E.2d 160 (Ga. 1968). 
359. See Grovey v. Townshend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) (finding no state action in exclusion of 
blacks from state convention of Democratic Party), overruled by Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 
649 (1944). 
360. See certiorari memorandum from law clerk to Justice Douglas 3 (Apr. 28, 1969) (LOC, 
Douglas Papers, Box 1471, case no. 60) (noting the certiorari vote). 
361. 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
362. The state was a "joint participant" in Moose Lodge's racial discrimination in that it 
derived financial benefit from the club's use of a state-granted liquor license; in Burton the Court 
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Abney and Moose Lodge represent the full extent of the Burger 
Court's state action decisions in the equal protection context. That 
Court has, however, even more dramatically reinvigorated the state 
action requirement in other constitutional settings. Though one rea-
sonably may question the transferability of state action precedents 
across constitutional compartments, the Court has never even hinted 
that the meaning of state action fluctuates so, and indeed such mallea-
bility would be difficult to reconcile with the language of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Thus it seems defensible to treat these subsequent 
state action decisions as applicable to equal protection. 
The first such case was Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 363 
where the Court rejected a due process challenge to termination of 
customer service without a hearing by a private utility company oper-
ating pursuant to a state-granted monopoly. Justice Rehnquist, writ-
ing for the majority, denied that the combination of monopoly service, 
extensive state regulation (including approval of the charter provision 
allowing Metropolitan Edison to terminate customer service without a 
hearing), and the public nature of utility service translated into state 
action. Precedent seemed plainly to indicate a contrary result, how-
ever. The expansion of Marsh's public function doctrine in Evans v. 
Newton to cover parks was more than sufficient to encompass utility 
service as well. 364 That the state public utilities commission implicitly 
had approved the challenged company practice, furthermore, arguably 
constituted state action under the "authorization" rationale of Reit-
man v. Mulkey. Moreover, heavy state regulation of Metropolitan 
Edison's business operations represented at least as much state in-
volvement as was present in Burton. 365 Finally, Jackson's general ap-
proach to state action, which Justice Douglas' dissent accurately 
described as "fundamentally sequential rather than cumulative"366 -
partially had relied on an analogous governmental financial benefit in finding state action. 365 
U.S. at 724. In Moose Lodge, the state had "authorized" the discrimination in that state law 
empowered the liquor control board to supervise closely all aspects of its licensees' business oper-
ations. See 407 U.S. at 184-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
363. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
364. Justice Rehnquist rejected the public function argument, observing that the state was 
under no obligation to provide utility services. 419 U.S. at 352-53. But that argument fails to 
distinguish Newton or Terry v. Adams, since the state has no obligation to provide parks or to 
make public offices elective rather than appointive. Rehnquist's treatment of Moose Lodge was 
particularly disingenuous. There, in the course of rejecting the state action argument, he had 
emphasized that the defendant club did not enjoy monopoly status. 407 U.S. at 176-77. In 
Jackson, however, he declared that monopoly status was insufficient to convert the utility com-
pany into a state actor, and cited Moose Lodge as rejecting the state action argument despite the 
presence there of some elements of monopolization. 419 U.S. at 352. 
365. The majority opinion sought, without success, to distinguish Burton. 419 U.S. at 357-
58. 
366. 419 U.S. at 362-63. 
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that is, the Court considered, and rejected, each state action argument 
independently, rather than evaluating them in toto - flatly contra-
vened the "sifting facts and weighing circumstances" approach of 
Burton. 367 
The next important state action decision of the Burger Court was 
Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks. 368 At issue there was the constitution-
ality of the Uniform Commercial Code provision, enacted into New 
York law, permitting warehousemen to liquidate through auction their 
lien on goods in their possession without affording notice or hearing to 
the "owner." Rejecting the due process challenge owing to the ab-
sence of state action, Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, as had his 
earlier opinion in Jackson, cast doubt upon the continued vitality of 
the public function prong of state action analysis. The nonconsensual 
transfer of property was not a public function, Justice Rehnquist rea-
soned, because it was not an activity "exclusively reserved" to the 
state. 369 That qualification of the public function doctrine flatly con-
travened Evans v. Newton, which Justice Rehnquist tried, disingenu-
ously, to redescribe as something other than a public function case.370 
Indeed the "exclusively reserved'" test seems logically incompatible 
with the public function doctrine, the premise of which is that some 
activities not invariably performed by the state nonetheless qualify as 
state action owing to their public nature. Flagg Brothers seems incon-
sistent, moreover, with a line of cases commencing with the Warren 
Court's decision in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 371 in which the 
Court ruled that garnishment and replevin remedies, obtainable by 
private parties with the assistance of purely ministerial court involve-
ment, constituted state action. Those decisions, notwithstanding Jus-
tice Rehnquist's contention to the contrary in Flagg Brothers, 372 were 
more plausibly explicable on the basis of the state's traditional monop-
olization over nonconsensual property transfers, than of the court 
367. 365 U.S. at 722. 
368. 436 U.S. 149 (1978). The vote in Flagg Brothers was five to three, with Justice Brennan 
not participating. 
369. 436 U.S. at 158. 
370. 436 U.S. at 159 n.8 (arguing that the state action in Evans was the city's continued 
involvement in maintenance of the park after it had reverted to private trusteeship). But see 
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966) (expressly relying on public function doctrine). The 
Burger Court flatly overruled another of its predecessor's expansions of the public function doc-
trine in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), overruling Amalgamated Food Employees 
Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (ruling shopping centers to be state 
actors under the public function doctrine). 
371. 395 U.S. 337 (1969); see also North Georgia Finishing Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 
601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 
(1972). 
372. 436 U.S. at 157. 
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clerk's nondiscretionary issuance of a requested writ.373 Finally, with-
out belaboring the point with additional examples, I note that the Bur-
ger and Rehnquist Courts have significantly bolstered the state action 
requirement in a variety of other contexts. 374 
2. Washington v. Davis 
Even where state action undeniably exists, the traditional under-
standing of equal protection rights acknowledged a constitutional vio-
lation only when a particular group had been deliberately 
disadvantaged. The reason Griffin and Harper carried such radical 
implications, even if their precise holdings were unremarkable, was 
that they inverted the traditional rights understanding by holding the 
state responsible for unintended disparate wealth effects. 375 Scattered 
dicta in Warren Court decisions, moreover, suggested that facially 
neutral legislation producing disparate racial impacts possibly violated 
the Equal Protection Clause regardless of legislative motivation. 376 To 
stress such casual statements, though, would be to suggest that the 
Warren Court had resolved the critical Washington v. Davis issue, 
when in fact it plainly had not. A more accurate evaluation, provided 
in 1969 by Professor Lawrence Sager, was that the constitutionality of 
de facto racial classifications was "far from clear."377 
373. See Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 169, 173-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Paul Brest, 
State Action and Liberal Theory: A Cosenote on Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REv. q96, 
1310-11 (1982). 
374. E.g., National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) (NCAA not 
a state actor); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 
522 (1987) (U.S. Olympic Committee not a state actor); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) 
(nursing homes' decisions to transfer patient to lower level of care in accordance with Medicaid 
regulations not state action); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (heavily regulated and 
almost wholly state-subsidized private school specializing in special needs students not a state 
actor). 
375. See, e.g., Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitu-
tional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. Cr. REv. 95, 110; John H. Ely, Legislative and Administra-
tive Motivation in Constitutional Law, 19 YALE L.J. 1205, 1255 (1970); Owen M. Fiss, Groups 
and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 107, 143 (1976). 
376. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1968) (racial classification facially 
treating blacks and whites "in an identical manner" violates equal protection when its "impact 
falls on the minority"); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384-85 (1968) (redescribing 
Gomillion as standing "not for the proposition that legislative motive is a proper basis for declar-
ing a statute unconstitutional, but that the inevitable effect of a statute on its face may render it 
unconstitutional"); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 672 (1966) (Black, J., 
dissenting) ("If the record could support a finding that the law as written or applied has [a 
racially discriminatory] effect, the law would of course be unconstitutional .... "); see also 
Michelman, supra note 247, at 21 & n.38 (apparently assuming that disparate racial impact vio-
lates equal protection); Fiss, supra note 191, at 593 & n.50 (interpreting Griffin to suggest that 
disparate racial impacts produced by facially neutral laws violate equal protection); Horowitz, 
supra note 247, at 1154-55 (discriminatory intent not necessary for an equal protection violation 
in the school segregation context). 
377. Sager, supra note 54, at 786. 
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The first puzzle Washington v. Davis poses for the historian of 
equal protection, then, is why the underlying issue was not squarely 
presented to the Court until 1976. The likeliest explanation is that 
resolution of preceding race cases had not required precise identifica-
tion of the objectionable aspect of racial classifications. More specifi-
cally, prior cases invariably involved both a decisionmaking process 
consciously motivated by hostility towards blacks or geared to the as-
sumption (explicit or implicit) of black inferiority and a result harmful 
to blacks. 378 Thus these decisions did not require the Court to decide 
whether the Equal Protection Clause was concerned principally with 
barring race-conscious decisionmaking or the cumulative disadvantag-
ing (regardless of intention) of historically oppressed minorities. 
When the Court in the mid-1960s finally embraced a racial classifica-
tion rule in McLaughlin and Loving, its doctrinal formulation -
whether the racial classification was necessary to accomplish a com-
pelling state interest - was susceptible to both a processual and an 
impact interpretation. Specifically, the function of equal protection 
strict scrutiny can be viewed either as uncovering illicit legislative pur-
poses or as ensuring that harm is visited upon an historically disadvan-
taged racial minority only when unavoidable in accomplishing an 
overriding governmental objective. 379 
The first case requiring the Court to choose between the processual 
and impact understandings of equal protection was Palmer v. Thomp-
son. 380 There the city of Jackson, Mississippi, had closed its public 
swimming pools to avoid court-ordered integration. The city's action 
unquestionably had a constitutionally objectionable purpose, but its 
impact seemed nondiscriminatory: neither blacks nor whites could 
any longer enjoy public swimming pools. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this 
first case requiring precise identification of the dominant value under-
lying equal protection produced chaos in the courts. The Fifth Circuit 
divided seven to six en banc,381 and the Supreme Court then followed 
378. See Fiss, supra note 375, at 158-59, 170-71. 
379. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 91, at 6-8, 10-11, 15; Rosberg, supra note 326, at 299-301. 
The processual explanation is most fully developed in ELY, supra note 38, at 145-48; perhaps the 
best elaboration of the impact account is Fiss, supra note 375, at 145-46. Strict scrutiny uncovers 
illicit motivations by requiring that legislatures, in order to justify racial classifications, produce 
compelling purposes and demonstrate the unsuitability of nonracial classifications to achieve the 
same objectives; legislatures unable to make both of these showings are presumed to have acted 
out of racial hostility. Strict scrutiny protects historically disadvantaged minorities from cumu-
lative burdens by requiring that any harms visited upon them, whether or not intentional, be 
justified by overriding governmental purposes. 
380. 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
381. 419 F.2d 1222 (5th Cir. 1969) (en bane). The majority, rejecting the constitutional 
challenge, observed that "where the facilities around which revolve the status of equality are 
removed from the use and enjoyment of the entire community, we see no withdrawal of any 
badge of equality." 419 F.2d at 1227. The dissenters argued principally that the illegitimate 
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with a five-to-four decision rejecting the constitutional challenge. Jus-
tice Blackmun, a very tentative member of the majority, poignantly 
observed in a draft concurrence that "[f]or me, this is perhaps the 
most excruciatingly difficult case of the present Term. I frankly admit 
that I find myself close to dead center."382 Palmer, in emphasizing the 
difficulty of discerning legislative purpose, seemed necessarily to reject 
a legislative inputs approach to equal protection, which requires iden-
tification of illicit motivation. 383 
Lower courts, faced with Palmer's rejection of a legislative inputs 
focus, assumed plausibly, though not inevitably, that the Court had 
opted instead for the impact theory of equal protection. Bolstered by 
the Court's contemporaneous interpretation of Title VII as a disparate 
impact test, 384 many lower· courts ruled that the Equal Protection 
Clause prohibited facially neutral government action that significantly 
disadvantaged racial minorities. 385 When the Supreme Court revisited 
the process/impact question five years later in Washington v. Davis, 
the Justices' strong predisposition towards the traditional conception 
of equal protection rights as checks upon deliberate governmental dis-
advantaging yielded a decision that was embarrassingly difficult to rec-
oncile with Palmer. 386 In arguably the most important equal 
protection ruling of the last two decades, Davis held that facially neu-
tral government conduct producing disparate racial impacts violates 
the Equal Protection Clause only if illicitly motivated. 387 
purpose of avoiding integration was sufficient to invalidate the pool closure, 419 F.2d at 1232-33, 
1235 (Wisdom, J., dissenting), though they supplemented this argument with a disparate impact 
one. 419 F.2d at 1233. 
382. Blackmun draft concurrence, Palmer v. Thompson 1 (Apr. 29, 1971) (LOC, Douglas 
Papers, Box 1510, case file no. 107). 
383. 403 U.S. at 224-25; see also Letter from Justice Black to Justice Blackmun (Feb. 16, 
1971) (LOC, Douglas Papers, Box 1510, case file no. 107: Palmer v. Thompson) (making the 
distinctly nonprocessual claim that the state can close public facilities that are not constitution-
ally mandated "for any reason, good or bad"). 
384. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971). 
385. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (exam producing a dispa-
rate racial impact held invalid under Equal Protection Clause unless sufficiently related to job 
performance), revd., 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975) 
(same); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of the Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm., 482 F.2d 
1333 (2d Cir. 1973) (same); see also Brest, supra note 91, at 26 (Palmer "inadvertently contrib-
uted to the growth of the disproportionate impact doctrine"). 
386. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1976) (distinguishing Palmer on the 
unilluminating ground that it involved different facts). 
387. The alternative approach - construing equal protection to require a strong justification 
for government conduct that burdens racial minorities regardless of motivation - was not un-
fathomable, though its implications would have been far-reaching. See 426 U.S. at 248. For 
academic commentarY adopting the impact approach, see, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Dispropor-
tionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 
(1977); Fiss, supra note 375, at 142-43, 153; Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. l, 50-52 (1977); Suzanna Sherry, Selective 
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The depth of the Burger Court's commitment to the traditional 
understanding of equal protection rights is illustrated by the rigor with 
which it subsequently has applied the Washington v. Davis rule; not 
even a legislative inputs orientation mandated the stringent equal pro-
tection standard fashioned by Davis and progeny. Contrary to Justice 
Stevens' admonition in Davis, 388 the Court seems to have rejected the 
notion that bad purpose and effect are indistinguishable at the margin. 
Subsequent decisions have established that equal protection claimants, 
to succeed under Davis, must demonstrate a legislature's deliberate ef-
forts to harm blacks (or another protected group), not simply an indif-
ferent awareness that such harm was likely.389 Thus even a legislative 
classification yielding ninety-eight percent of its benefits to males was 
ruled not to constitute sex discrimination so long as it was facially 
gender-neutral and not motivated by hostility towards women.390 A 
legislative inputs approach to equal protection need not inevitably be 
so chary in its conception of faulty process. A plausible alternative 
approach would treat legislatures' selective indifference to a protected 
group's interests as sufficient grounds for condemning legislative deci-
sionmaking. 391 That alternative notion of "discrimination," however, 
Judicial Activism in the Equal Protection Context: Democracy, Distrust, and Deconstruction, 73 
GEO. L.J. 89, 118-19 (1984). 
388. 426 U.S. at 253-54 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
389. E.g., McC!eskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 72 
n.17 (1980); Personnel Admr. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (proof of discriminatory pur-
pose requires showing that government decisionmaker "selected or reaffirmed a particular course 
of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifi-
able group"). 
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), is not to the contrary. The Court held there that 
proof of substantial deviations between a racial group's representation on juries and in the popu-
lation at large, in conjunction with a jury selection system susceptible to abuse, constituted a 
prima facie equal protection violation. Yet, as the Court observed in Castaneda, statistical dis-
parities in a large sample can be shown with virtual certainty not to be random. 430 U.S. at 494 
n.13, 496-97 n.17. In other words, proof of disparate racial impact in jury representation in 
Castaneda was tantamount to proof of deliberate discrimination. Thus Castaneda is entirely 
consistent with the stringent purpose requirement apparently espoused in Davis and progeny. 
Voting is the one instance in which the Court, at least on occasion, has relaxed the rigor of its 
purpose test. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (allowing generous use of evidence of 
disparate racial impact to prove discriminatory motivation in use of multimember districting 
scheme). But see Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (refusing to find discriminatory purpose 
in use of multimember districting despite failure of blacks ever to elect a black candidate and a 
showing that blacks were discriminated against in municipal employment and public schools). 
For the argument that the stringency of the Court's purpose test varies with the centrality of the 
afl'ected interest to core values of liberalism, see Ortiz, supra note 349. 
390. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 281 (1979). 
391. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 91, at 8, 14; Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and 
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 347-49 (1987); 
Strauss, supra note 261,passim; Sunstein, supra note 28, at 897 n.119. While Professor Strauss is 
correct that equal protection plausibly can be construed to condemn selective indifference as well 
as conscious discrimination, his suggestion that Washington v. Davis adopted this approach - in 
his terms, the "reversing the groups test" - is belied by the evidence. See cases cited supra note 
389. 
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would require courts to undertake inevitably speculative inquiries, 
such as whether the District-of Columbia would have adopted the po-
lice officers' aptitude test challenged in Washington v. Davis had it dis-
proportionately disadvantaged whites. 392 The Court's refusal to treat 
selective indifference as an equal protection violation suggests a prefer-
ence for a stingy process theory over one that invites surreptitious in-
troduction of impact analysis. 
3. De Facto School Segregation 
While the Warren Court never resolved the de facto segregation 
question, the Burger Court clearly announced that only de jure school 
segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause. 393 That Court's 
landmark decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Edu-
cation, 394 as ultimately published, represented a significant victory for 
school desegregation advocates in its ratification of_ broad desegrega-
tion remedies, both in method (i.e., busing) and in scope (i.e., requiring 
the dismantling of more racial segregation than was directly attributa-
ble to discriminatory government conduct). The fascinating ,internal 
history of Swann illustrates, however, the newly seated Chief Justice's 
commitment to importing the traditional understallding of equal pro-
tection rights into the school desegregation context. Through six draft 
opinions Chief Justice Burger battled with several Warren Court hold-
overs in an effort, primarily, to restrict desegregation remedies to the 
scope of the constitutional violation. 
I limit myself here to the story's essentials, noting only those as-
pects of the Burger draft opinions pertaining directly to the conceptu-
alization of equal protection rights. First, the Chief Justice sought in 
dicta to forbid use of school desegregation remedies to accomplish 
goals other than redress of state-imposed public school segregation; 
such remedies must not, Burger warned, seek to "embrace all the 
problems of racial prejudice in residential patterns, employment prac-
tices, location of public housing, or other factors beyond the jurisdic-
tion of school authorities."395 Second, he endeavored to limit the 
scope of remedial action to undoing that portion of existing segrega-
tion produced by official misconduct: "The objective should be to 
achieve as nearly as possible that distribution of students and those 
392. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 261, at 971-75, 993-95; Sunstein, supra note 28, at 909-10. 
393. E.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. 
v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 413 (1977). 
394. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
395. Burger draft opinion, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. 15 (Jan. 11, 1971) 
(LOC, Black Papers, Box 436, case file nos. 281, 349, file III). 
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patterns of assignments that would have normally existed had the 
school authorities not previously practiced discrimination."396 Third 
and relatedly, Burger wished to reject a presumption that single-race 
schools existing in a system proven to have suffered official segregative 
action were attributable to that governmental misconduct: "Undesir-
able though it may be, we find nothing in the Constitution, read in its 
broadest implications, that precludes the operation of schools, all or 
predominantly all of one racial composition in a city of mixed popula-
tion, so long as the school assignment is not part of state-enforced 
school segregation."397 Finally, the Chief Justice hoped to prevent 
district courts from incorporating forecasts of subsequent demo-
graphic shifts into their remedial calculations. After a unitary system 
had been achieved, he wrote, "[i]t does not follow that the communi-
ties served by such systems will remain demographically stable, and it 
should be clear that desegregation decrees are not an appropriate in-
strument for judicial monitoring of continuing demographic change or 
shifting residential patterns unrelated to discriminatory segrega-
tion. "398 On each of these four points bearing on the scope of an equal 
protection right to nonsegregated education, a combination of liberal 
and conservative Warren Court holdovers patiently, but persistently, 
refused to permit Burger to have his way.399 
As ultimately published, then, Swann embodied a considerably less 
stringent legislative inputs understanding of equal protection than had 
Burger's draft opinions.400 Just two years later, moreover, Keyes v. 
School District No. J 4-01 approved the use of lenient evidentiary pre-
sumptions that generated considerably more desegregation than sim-
ply undoing the impact of official segregative conduct. The Burger 
396. Id. at 31. The 1970s school desegregation cases have, in considerable part, represented 
an internal Court battle over the appropriateness of this definition of remedial obJectives. Com-
pare, e,g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974) and Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 
433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977) with Milliken, 418 U.S. at 779-80 (White, J., dissenting) and Columbus 
Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 458-61 (1979). 
397. Burger draft opinion, supra note 395, at 28. 
398. Id. at 36. 
399. See, e.g., Letter from Justice Brennan to Chief Justice Burger 5 (Mar. 8, 1971) (LOC, 
Black Papers, Box 436, case file nos. 281, 349, file I); id., Letter from Justice Brennan to Chief 
Justice Burger (Mar. 23, 1971); id., Letter from Justice Harlan to Chief Justice Burger (Mar. 11, 
1971); id., Letter from Justice Stewart to Chief Justice Burger, Mar. 24, 1971. See generally 
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SWANN'S WAY 111-84 (1986). 
400. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 23 (reserving the question of whether discrimination by public 
authorities other than school officials can be remedied in a desegregation order), 402 U.S. at 25 
(approving use of numerical ratios as starting point in devising remedy), 402 U.S. at 26 (adopting 
presumption that, once deliberate school segregation has been established, single-race schools are 
attributable to it, rather than to private housing choices), 402 U.S. at 28-29 (emphasizing broad 
discretion of district courts in formulating remedial plans). 
401. 413 U.S. 189 (1973), discussed infra text accompanying note 407. 
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Court's legislative inputs orientation reasserted itself, however, in Mil-
liken v. Bradley. 402 At issue there was the district court's power to 
remedy a proven constitutional violation. Owing to the broad-scale 
exodus of whites from the Detroit school system, the district court in 
Milliken could not fashion an intradistrict remedy that would provide 
meaningful desegregation in the urban school district. Instead, the 
court produced a desegregation plan encompassing contiguous, over-
whelmingly white, suburban school districts as well. In a ruling of 
tremendous import, a divided Supreme Court reversed that order on 
the grounds that the plaintiffs had proven neither interdistrict viola-
tions - for example, racially motivated districting - nor interdistrict 
segregative effects flowing from proven constitutional violations in 
Detroit. 403 
The district court in Milliken had opined that school district lines 
were administrative conveniences to be circumvented when necessary 
to vindicate the constitutional right to nonsegregated public education. 
The Supreme Court rejected this view, in effect superimposing a Wash-
ington v. Davis approach upon the remedial question - that is, the 
Court ruled that school district lines could be ignored only if con-
structed for illicit purposes, regardless of whether they inhibited re-
dress of proven constitutional violations. Absent racial motivation, 
school district boundary drawing was simply racially neutral govern-
ment decisionmaking that incidentally produced a disparate racial im-
pact - a scenario deemed constitutionally unobjectionable two years 
later in Washington v. Davis. 
The final entry on the conventional rights understanding side of 
the school desegregation ledger is Pasadena City Board of Education v. 
Spangler. 404 There the Supreme Court reversed a district court order 
requiring amendment of a pending desegregation decree to adjust for 
demographic shifts that were producing additional racial segregation. 
The Constitution does not mandate any particular racial balance, Jus-
tice Rehnquist observed for the majority; it simply prohibits deliberate 
state segregative conduct.405 Thus Spangler decisively rejected the no-
tion that de facto school segregation violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. 
Thus far in this section, I have argued that the Burger Court mani-
402. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
403. 418 U.S. at 744-45. On the importance of Milliken, see e.g., WILKINSON, supra note 65, 
at 218, 222; Charles R. Lawrence, III, Segregation "Misunderstood'': The Milliken Decislon Re-
visited, 12 U.S.F. L. REv. 15, 15 (1977); Diane Ravitch, The "White Flight" Controversy, 51 PuB. 
INTERESf 135, 148-49 (1978). 
404. 427 U.S. 424 (1976). 
405. 427 U.S. at 434-35. 
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fested some variant of its legislative inputs orientation in the school 
desegregation cases. Yet only distortion of the evidence could mold 
these cases comfortably into the pattern evinced by the Burger Court's 
fundamental rights strand, state action, and Washington v. Davis deci-
sions. That Court's first important school desegregation decision, 
Swann, plainly required, despite the Chief Justice's diligent efforts to 
the contrary, that school districts redress segregation primarily attrib-
utable to factors other than state action, such as private housing dis-
crimination, economic differentials, and so forth.406 Similarly Keyes, 
while apparently retaining the de jure segregation standard, sustained 
use of two evidentiary presumptions that greatly facilitated broad re-
medial claims - namely, that significant segregative conduct in one 
portion of a school district presumptively (1) produced segregative ef-
fects in others, and (2) revealed similar illicit activity elsewhere in the 
district.407 Notwithstanding intervening decisions less committed to 
integrative results than Keyes, the Court in the late 1970s both reaf-
firmed its commitment to the Keyes presumptions and embraced an 
additional equally generous one - that current school segregation was 
attributable to a preceding generation's official discriminatory conduct 
falling short of statutorily mandated segregated schools. 408 These sub-
sequent rulings also reaffirmed Green's holding that once a constitu-
tional violation was shown, school board actions were to be judged not 
according to their motivation, but rather by their effectiveness in pro-
moting progress towards a unitary school system. 409 
Justice Rehnquist overstated his position when he complained in 
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (Dayton II) that the Court's 
"cascade of presumptions ... sweeps away the distinction between de 
facto and de jure segregation."410 To the contrary, I have suggested 
that the Burger Court partially resurrected the traditional understand-
ing of equal protection in the school segregation context. Yet one can-
not plausibly deny that the Burger Court has displayed a more 
tenuous commitment to the traditional understanding here than else-
where. 411 The most persuasive explanation for that apparent disjunc-
406. For example, the Court approved a presumption that single-race schools in a system 
proven to have suffered deliberate governmental segregation were attributable to state action, 
notwithstanding the existence of racially homogenous housing patterns. 402 U.S. at 25-26. The 
Court also approved the use of racial population percentages as a starting point for remedial 
calculations. 402 U.S. at 25. 
407. 413 U.S. at 202-03, 207-08. 
408. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 535, 537 (1979); Columbus Bd. of 
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 458 (1979). 
409. Dayton, 443 U.S. at 538; Columbus, 443 U.S. at 458-61. 
410. 443 U.S. at 542 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
411. See, e.g .. Columbus, 443 U.S. at 481 (Powell, J., dissenting) (observing that the "fictions 
November 1991] An Interpretive History of Equal Protection 303 
tion, I believe, is what Dean Brest has termed "institutional nostalgia" 
for Brown. 412 Brown generally is viewed today as an uncontroversial 
example of defensible, indeed laudable, judicial review; even those 
most disparaging of modem "judicial activism" have felt obliged to 
mold their constitutional theories to accommodate the result in 
Brown. 413 To interpret Brown as tolerating extensive school segrega-
tion owing to the absence of state action surely would have suggested, 
to the public and possibly to the legal profession as well, that the Jus-
tices' commitment to the principles of Brown had flagged. Indeed in-
ternal evidence from the Burger Court's first two state action 
decisions, Evans v. Abney and Moose Lodge, 414 reveals that some Jus-
tices felt uncomfortable rejecting race discrimination challenges on 
"technical" state action grounds.415 The "institutional nostalgia" the-
sis is further corroborated by the Justices' willingness in Swann to ex-
pend considerable time and energy on maintaining the Court's track 
record of unanimity in school segregation cases.416 
C. Understanding the Burger Court's Gender Discrimination Cases 
in Legislative Inputs Terms 
I have argued thus far in Part III that the Burger Court's predispo-
sition towards the legislative inputs understanding of equal protection 
and presumptions" relied upon in these school desegregation cases are inconsistent with Wash-
ington v. Davis and progeny); Ortiz, supra note 349, at 1131-34 (arguing that the Court has 
applied a less rigorous purpose requirement in the school desegregation cases than elsewhere). 
412. Brest, supra note 313, at 119. An alternative explanation is that the Court regards 
education as an area more appropriate for judicial intervention than the market-oriented contexts 
of Washington v. Davis (employment) and Arlington Heights (housing). See Ortiz, supra note 
349, at 1140-42. Support for this alternative theory in the case law is mixed. Compare Plyler v. 
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (noting the importance of education in the context of invalidating 
Texas policy of denying free public schooling to children of illegal aliens) with Kadrmas v. Dick-
inson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988) (limiting Plyler to its "unique circumstances" in re-
jecting a constitutional challenge to school board user fees for public school transportation) and 
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-38 (1973) (rejecting argument that 
education is a fundamental right for equal protection purposes in the context of sustaining Texas 
policy of financing public schools partially from local property taxes). 
413. See Klarman, supra note 7, at 815-19 (describing the untouchability of Brown and not-
ing the detrimental impact of this phenomenon on constitutional theory). 
414. See supra text accompanying notes 357-62. 
415. Letter from Justice Stewart to Justice Rehnquist 1 (June 2, 1972) (LOC, Douglas Pa-
pers, Box 1548, case file no. 70-75: Moose Lodge v. Irvis) ("I wonder whether it might not be a 
good idea, in this sensitive area, to emphasize explicitly that neither the State nor any of its 
agencies has in any way approved, endorsed, accepted, or supported the racially discriminatory 
constitution, by-laws, or practices of the appellant."); Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Justice 
Black 1 (Dec. 10, 1969) (LOC, Douglas Papers, Box 1471, case file no. 60: Evans v. Abney) 
("This is a difficult case with a result I do not relish .... "). 
416. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 399, at 111-84 (describing laborious process 
through which unanimity was secured in Swann). For powerful recent corroboration of the "in-
stitutional nostalgia" thesis, see Missouri v. Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990) (ratifying power of 
federal courts to mandate local tax increase to finance broad school desegregation order). 
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accounts for its truncation of the fundamental rights strand, its resur-
rection of a strong state action requirement, Washington v. Davis, and 
{less completely) its school desegregation decisions. This section ar-
gues that a legislative inputs focus converts the morass of Burger 
Court gender discrimination cases into an orderly pattern evidencing 
the Justices' gradual sophistication in process theory. 
The Warren Court and its predecessors took no steps towards sub-
jecting gender classifications to meaningful review under the Equal 
Protection Clause.417 The Burger Court made that momentous stride 
in 1971 in Reed v. Reed, 418 striking down an Idaho law granting men 
preference over women in the selection of estate administrators. Over 
the next five years the Justices struggled with the gender discrimina-
tion issue, manifesting considerable disagreement as to the appropriate 
standard of review, although every Justice but Rehnquist agreed, at 
least implicitly, that gender classifications should be treated differently 
from run-of-the-mill legislative classifications.419 I wish to ignore here 
the standard-of-review question, which the Court finally laid to rest in 
Craig v. Boren, 420 where it adopted an intermediate standard for gen-
der classifications; rather I shall seek to ascribe some coherence to the 
apparently chaotic results in the Burger Court's gender cases. In my 
view the gender issue initially proved befuddling to the Court because 
laws generated by bad process - which, in the gender context, gener-
ally connotes sex stereotyping rather than, as with race, malignant mo-
tivation - frequently yielded results materially advantageous to 
women.421 In a pre-Washington v. Davis universe where legislative 
purpose sometimes was deemed irrelevant to equal protection analysis, 
a law materially advantaging women would be constitutionally unob-
jectionable despite a grounding in stereotypical assumptions regarding 
female dependence and domesticity. Once the Court shifted in the 
mid-1970s to a legislative inputs focus, though, even laws ostensibly 
benefiting women were constitutionally problematic if constructed 
upon "archaic and overbroad generalizations"422 or "traditional 
417. E.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); 
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873); see Ruth B. Ginsburg, Sexual Equality under 
the Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 164 (prior to 1971 "our 
fundamental instrument of government was thought an empty cupboard for sex equality 
claims"). 
418. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
419. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
420. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
421. I use the word "material" because one can make & strong argument that statutes 
founded upon gender stereotypes, even if conferring immediate financial or other benefits upon 
women, nonetheless harm them in more subtle ways. 
422. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975). 
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way[s] of thinking about females."423 
Pursuant to this analysis Reed was an easy case, for the challenged 
statute both materially disadvantaged women and embodied the stere-
otypical assumption that women lack the business acumen of men. 
Nor did Frontiero v. Richardson424 prove particularly troublesome to 
the Court. The law at issue there allowed male ffiilitary personnel au-
tomatically to claim a spousal allowance, while their female counter-
parts had to prove actual spousal dependency. Underlying this gender 
classification was a stereotypical (as well as factually accurate) as-
sumption regarding female financial dependency. Furthermore, while 
the law ostensibly benefited the female spouses of military personnel, 
the Court plausibly could fasten upon the relative disadvantaging of 
female service members to sustain a finding of discriminatory gender 
impact. Ensuing cases, however, soon confronted the Court with gen-
der classifications probably grounded in similar stereotypes, yet un-
questionably benefiting women materially. On the first two such 
occasions the Justices sustained the law, apparently perplexed as to 
how the Equal Protection Clause sensibly could be construed to invali-
date laws ostensibly benefiting an historically disadvantaged group. 
Kahn v. Shevin 425 involved a Florida law granting property tax ex-
emptions to widows but not widowers. Justice Douglas' majority 
opinion noted the rationality of legally recognizing the greater finan-
cial stringency of widowed females, 426 apparently undisturbed by the 
stereotypical assumption of female dependency plainly underpinning 
this late nineteenth-century statute. Justice Douglas' conference notes 
confirm that several Justices considered it dispositive that the Florida 
law advantaged women.427 Even Justice Brennan's Kahn dissent 
failed to articulate the legislative inputs objection, conceding the law's 
beneficent purpose and effect, yet nonetheless maintaining its invalid-
ity owing to an insufficiently close nexus between the classification and 
its objective.428 Brennan's position was puzzling, for the two most 
plausible objectives of heightened means/ends scrutiny are smoking 
out illegitimate purposes and avoiding imposition of unnecessary bur-
dens on historically oppressed groups; yet on Brennan's own view 
423. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
424. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
425. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). 
426. 416 U.S. at 353-54. 
427. Douglas conference notes, Kahn v. Shevin (Mar. 1, 1974) (LOC, Douglas Papers, Box 
1652, case file no. 73-78) (Burger: "all kinds of reasons why women should receive favorable 
treatment") (Douglas: "women as widows are largely destitute") (Powell: "Fl[orida] Act is 100 
years old - before Social Security widows would starve"). 
428. 416 U.S. at 359-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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neither of these concerns was present inKahn. That the liberal Justice 
Douglas wrote the Kahn decision, while the equally liberal Justice 
Brennan intuited an objection to the statute but was unable precisely 
to identify it, suggests to me that Kahn represented a transitional stage 
in the Court's conversion to legislative inputs theory. Decided in 
1974, Kahn fell roughly midway between Palmer v. Thompson and 
Washington v. Davis, both chronologically and in terms of the Court's 
processual orientation. 
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 429 decided the following year, similarly sus-
tained an apparently stereotypical gender classification that materially 
advantaged women. At issue there was the military promotion system 
which granted women more time than men to gain promotion or else 
face discharge. Probably because the law ostensibly benefited' women, 
the majority failed to spot any discrimination, and sustained the stat-
ute under minimum rationality review. Justice Brennan, again dis-
senting, for the first time identified the search for actual legislative 
purpose as the appropriate task in gender discrimination cases, as it 
should be under a legislative inputs approach.430 
Both Kahn and Ballard, then, appear inconsistent with Washing-
ton v. Davis' focus on legislative inputs; both decisions sustained legis-
lation ostensibly benefiting women despite the underlying 
decisionmaking process' grounding in gender stereotypes. Such dispa-
rate approaches could not comfortably coexist; the same Term that 
produced Ballard also witnessed the Court's incipient acceptance of a 
legislative inputs approach to gender discrimination. Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld 431 involved a Social Security Act provision entitling wid-
ows, but not widowers, to certain survivors' benefits. The Court, cor-
rectly spying the work of a dependency stereotype, invalidated the 
law. In doing so it rejected the clever justificatory argument that the 
gender classification had been designed to compensate women pro-
spectively for job discrimination likely to be encountered, noting that 
"mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an auto-
matic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual pur-
poses underlying a statutory scheme."432 In other words, 
unconstitutional gender discrimination was defined by illicit purposes 
and stereotypes - an approach precisely in accord with Washington v. 
Davis, decided the ensuing Term, though not with Kahn and 
429. 419 U.S. 498 (1975). 
430. 419 U.S. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
431. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
432. 420 U.S. at 648. 
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Ballard. 433 
The overriding importance of legislative purpose to the Court's 
gender discrimination analysis was confirmed by two 1977 decisions. 
In Califano v. Goldfarb, 434 the Court invalidated a different Social Se-
curity Act provision granting survivors' benefits automatically to wid-
ows, but to widowers only upon proof of dependency. Once again the 
Court rejected the argument that Congress' intention might have been 
prospectively to compensate nondependent widows for job discrimina-
tion likely to be encountered; only actual purpose mattered, and evi-
dence of a genuinely compensatory motivation was entirely lacking. 
By way of contrast, just weeks later Califano v. Webster 435 sustained a 
lapsed Social Security Act scheme that had enabled women to exclude 
three more years of low wages than men in calculating average earn-
ings upon which old age benefits were based. Unlike in Goldfarb, the 
legislative history confirmed a congressional purpose to compensate 
women for past job discrimination; focusing on actual motivation, the 
Court sustained the challenged provision.436 Goldfarb and Webster 
thus illustrate the extent of the Burger Court's commitment to the 
legislative inputs approach in the gender discrimination context; simi-
lar statutory provisions suffered different fates owing solely to a shift 
in Congress' underlying motivation. 
The legislative inputs approach explains one additional piece of the 
Burger Court's gender discrimination puzzle. I observed earlier that 
Frontiero was a reasonably easy case not only because a gender stereo-
type plainly was at work but also because women service members 
were materially disadvantaged; thus the Court was able to avoid the 
apparent oddity of invalidating a law that seemed to advantage wo-
men. Weinberger was no different because, while widows ostensibly 
benefited from the challenged Social Security Act provision, female 
433. It is true that the Washington v. Davis issue involves facially neutral laws, whereas the 
cases discussed in text involved gender classifications. That difference does not, however, render 
these two categories of cases incommensurable. When one asks what makes a facial classification 
objectionable, the answer seems limited to either illicit purpose or harmful impact - the same 
two candidates present in the context of facially neutral statutes. 
434. 430 U.S. 199 (1977). 
435. 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam). 
436. I find an explanation of Webster that turns exclusively on legislative purpose more per-
suasive than the Court's proffered account, under which intermediate scrutiny is applicable to all 
gender classifications, regardless of how motivated. The Court claimed to apply heightened scru-
tiny in Webster even after finding the gender classification to be motivated by a remedial objec-
tive, but it is difficult to believe that Congress' broad-brush approach to compensating women for 
past discrimination could have survived genuine application of a more exacting means/ends 
nexus requirement. Cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507-08 (1989) (inti-
mating, in applying the admittedly more exacting strict scrutiny standard used for racial classifi-
cations, that legislative compensation for past discrimination must proceed on an individualized 
basis). 
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wage earners plainly were disadvantaged. But the Court soon con-
fronted a variety of laws ostensibly disadvantaging only men - for 
example, an exclusion of males from a women's nursing school, a re-
quirement that only men pay alimony upon divorce, and a regulation 
granting liquor access to females at an earlier age than to males.437 
The Court resolved these cases by equating discrimination against 
males with that against females, and then applying intermediate scru-
tiny, under which the laws were found wanting. Yet the Court never 
did explain why males were entitled to extraordinary judicial protec-
tion - an explanation that, at least on a political process view of equal 
protection, would have been virtually impossible to produce.438 A leg-
islative inputs focus justifies these decisions without requiring one to 
subscribe to special judicial solicitude for males. All of the laws men-
tioned above were grounded in conventional gender stereotypes - re-
spectively, that nursing is a female profession, that women are 
financially dependent upon their husbands, and that young females are 
less aggressive and more responsible than their male counterparts. 
These statutes, then, as the products of legislative decisionmaking con-
taminated by stereotypical thinking, were constitutionally objectiona-
ble on a legislative inputs understanding of equal protection. 
In sum, the Justices' gradual conversion to a legislative inputs ori-
entation neatly accounts for the bulk of the Burger Court's gender 
discrimination cases. Put briefly, the thought processes of the enacting 
legislature were dispositive - was the gender classification motivated 
by a genuinely compensatory objective or by a "traditional way of 
thinking about females?" Whether women were ostensibly benefited, 
harmed, or some of each was of no moment. 
D. Affirmative Action 
The final, and perhaps most vexing, equal protection puzzle of the 
last two decades has been affirmative action. That issue's intractabil-
ity, in my view, is attributable to the choice it poses between underly-
ing theories of equal protection. For the first time the Justices have 
437. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 
(1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 {1976). 
438. I do not mean to suggest that special judicial scrutiny of gender classifications dis-
advantagingfema/es is plainly justifiable on political process grounds. See Klarman, supra note 
7, at 751-52 (arguing that feminists, male and female, suffer no systemic legislative bias). Yet 
that point is at least arguable, and indeed the Court initially relied in part on political process 
theory to justify the application of heightened scrutiny to such classifications. See Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-86 (1973) {plurality opinion) {briefly detailing the historical legal 
disadvantages of women and concluding that they "still face pervasive, although at times more 
subtle, discrimination ... in the political arena"). There simply is no argument that males are 
unable adequately to protect themselves in the political arena. 
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been forced to choose between a political process theory, which identi-
fies suspect classifications according to criteria of historical discrimi-
nation and political impotence, and a more openly normative theory of 
"relevance," which banishes certain criteria from governmental deci-
sionmaking on the ground that they should be irrelevant. I shall argue 
that the Court's recent affirmative action jurisprudence demonstrates, 
though the Justices themselves frequently do not admit it, a clear 
choice for the relevance approach to equal protection. I hope also to 
show that the Court's endorsement of this theory conflicts with the 
strict constructionist constitutional philosophy purportedly subscribed 
to by the more conservative Justices. 
Affirmative action was an open constitutional question when it 
reached the Court in the 1970s. Prior race discrimination cases were 
plausibly explicable on the ground either that racial classifications 
with the purpose and/or effect of harming blacks were presumptively 
unconstitutional, or that all racial classifications, regardless of motiva-
tion or impact, were presumptively illegitimate because race should be 
irrelevant to governmental decisionmaking. 439 The Justices' chaotic 
early performances confirm that they have found the affirmative action 
issue particularly troubling. The first encounter in DeFunis v. Ode-
gaard 440 yielded an embarrassed evasion of the issue, the case being 
dismissed as moot. The Court's second affirmative action case, United 
Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 441 involved race-conscious district line-
drawing designed to preserve black voting power; the result was a 
badly splintered Court and a ruling in considerable tension with the 
Court's next stab at the problem.442 That was Regents of the Univer-
439. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294 (1978); ARCHIBALD 
Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME CoURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 66 (1976); William 
Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage.· Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 775, 808-10 (1979). 
440. 416 U.S. 312 (1974). Those Justices expressing a view on the merits at conference were 
divided on the constitutionality of the University of Washington's admissions program. See 
Douglas conference notes, DeFunis v. Odegaard (Mar. 1, 1974) (LOC, Douglas Papers, Box 
1654, case file no. 73-235) (Burger intimating objection to the program; Brennan, White, and 
Marshall approving it; Blackmun noting "good arguments on both sides"; Powell observing that 
"race is a factor that can lawfully [be] considered" but expressing "doubt[] if educational policy 
[was] obtained here"; and Douglas, Stewart, and Rehnquist stating no view on the merits). 
441. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). 
442. See 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (plurality opinion); 430 U.S. at 168 (Brennan, J., concurring); 
430 U.S. at 179 (Stewart, J., concurring); 430 U.S. at 180 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In Bakke 
Justice Powell sought to distinguish United Jewish Organizations (UJO) on two grounds - that 
an administrative finding of past discrimination had been made there, and that no innocent per-
sons had been burdened by the use of race-conscious decisionmaking. Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 304-05 (1978). Both distinctions involve mischaracterizations of 
UJO. No specific finding of past discrimination had been made there because the Voting Rights 
Act, which New York invoked to justify its race-conscious gerrymandering, did not require one. 
See UJO, 430 U.S. at 161. And the Hasidic Jews whose voting strength was diluted by the racial 
gerrymander were entirely innocent victims. 
310 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 90:213 
sity of California v. Bakke, 443 involving racial preferences in medical 
school admissions. The intractability of affirmative action for the 
Bakke Court was manifested both in the unparalleled preconference 
circulation of memoranda by several Justices, and in the unusual four-
one-four split in the Court.444 Nor did the next four constitutional 
challenges to affirmative action produce a majority opinion.445 
Affirmative action has proven so difficult for the Court, I would 
suggest, because it requires disaggregation of two theories, previously 
operating in conjunction, that have informed much of the Court's 
modem equal protection jurisprudence. One important strand in the 
remarkable expansion of equal protection coverage over the last thirty 
years has been political process theory, first clearly articulated by Jus-
tice Stone in Carolene Products footnote four and later elaborated into 
a full-blown constitutional theory by John Hart Ely in his seminal De-
mocracy and Distrust. 446 Equal protection, from a political process 
perspective, principally concerns judicial solicitude for groups unable 
to fend for themselves in the political trenches because of disfranchise-
ment, blatant prejudice, negative stereotyping, or some combination 
thereof.447 The Burger Court frequently invoked political process con-
cerns to justify equal protection coverage, and noncoverage, of partic-
ular groups not among the Framers' intended beneficiaries. 448 
443. 438 u.s: 265 (1978). 
444. See, e.g., Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist to conference (Nov. 10, 1977) (Brennan 
Papers, Box 465, case file no. 78-811: Bakke, file no. 3); id., Memorandum from Chief Justice 
Burger to conference (Oct. 21, 1977); id., Memorandum from Justice White to conference (Oct. 
13, 1977); id., preliminary draft of Justice Brennan memorandum to conference (undated). Four 
justices did not reach the constitutional question, holding the Davis Medical School admissions 
policy invalid under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which barred race discrimination by 
recipients offederal funds. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). The 
other five justices agreed that Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause imposed identical limits 
on race-conscious decisionmaking, but disagreed as to what those constraints were. Four jus-
tices, in an opinion by Brennan, concluded that intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate stan-
dard for evaluating the constitutionality of affirmative action programs, and that the Davis policy 
survived that test. 438 U.S. at 359-62 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Powell, 
however, applied strict scrutiny, and found the Davis admissions scheme wanting in its use of 
strict quotas, which he thought not closely enough related to the concededly compelling state 
interest in promoting a diverse student body. 438 U.S. at 291, 315-19 (Powell, J.). 
445. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Intl. 
Assn. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); 
Fullilove v. K.lutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
446. ELY, supra note 38; see also supra text accompanying notes 35-51 (Carolene Products 
footnote 4). 
447. See generally ELY, supra note 38, at 105-79. I have endi:avored elsewhere to defend 
political process theory from its critics, arguing that the access, but not the prejudice, prong of 
Carolene Products represents a logically coherent, as well as normatively attractive, theory of 
constitutional interpretation. See Klarman, supra note 7, at 772-819. 
448. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982); San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); 411 U.S. at 105 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971). 
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Another important element in modem equal protection thought, how-
ever, has been the notion that certain characteristics, of which race is 
the prototype, should be simply irrelevant to all, or almost all, govern-
mental decisionmaking, regardless of whether groups bearing those 
characteristics are capable of protecting themselves politically.449 The 
political process and relevance theories of equal protection produce no 
disjunction in result when applied to racial classifications disadvantag-
ing blacks, but they do with regard to affirmative action. 
For political process theory, affirmative action is about the easiest 
constitutional question a court might wish to find. As the theory's 
principal modem exponent has stated, "[w]hen the group that controls 
the decision making process classifies so as to advantage a minority 
and disadvantage itself, the reasons for being unusually suspicious, 
and, consequently, employing a stringent brand of review, are lack-
ing."450 Whites, in other words, who ostensibly bear the brunt of af-
firmative action, can amply defend themselves in the political arena, 
and thus should not qualify for special judicial protection. A judge 
evaluating an affirmative action plan under political process theory, 
therefore, need only ascertain whether the racial preference was in-
spired by genuinely benevolent intentions or rather by stereotypical 
assumptions regarding the inability of racial minorities to succeed on 
their own effort.451 
In stating that affirmative action is an easy constitutional issue for 
a political process theorist, I do not wish to deny the possibility of 
devising ingenious arguments to the contrary - that is, as to why a 
political process focus actually mandates strict scrutiny of affirmative 
action plans; indeed the Court frequently has deployed such argu-
ments. On close examination, though, such contentions inevitably run 
afoul of other entrenched equal protection rules - most notably, that 
of Washington v. Davis. That the Court nonetheless has made the ef-
fort possibly suggests its discomfort with an affirmative action ap-
proach that is consistent with only one of the two underlying theories 
of modem equal protection. 
449. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Plyler, 457 
U.S. at 216 n.14; Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 477-78 (1981) 
(Stewart, J., concurring); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); Karst, supra note 
387, at 4, 8, 32, 38-39; Perry, supra note 350, at 1030-31, 1050-51, 1084. 
450. John H. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 
723, 735 (1974); see also Sherry, supra note 387, at 114-15 (arguing that affirmative action is 
"ordinarily not ... subject to heightened scrutiny at all" under a political process approach). 
451. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 551-53 (1989) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360-61 (1978) (Brennan, J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
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In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 452 the Court considered 
the constitutionality of a local government's minority set-aside for 
public construction contracts. Apparently seeking to justify the appli-
cation of a rigorous review standard without contravening the prem-
ises of political process theory, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion 
portrayed strict scrutiny as a prophylactic against malevolent racial 
classifications successfully masquerading as benevolent ones.453 "Ab-
sent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based 
measures," she declared, "there is simply no way of determining what 
classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in 
fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple 
racial politics."454 Concededly, a legislative inputs concern with root-
ing out illegitimate stereotypes mandates a close look at the actual 
motivation of affirmative action plans, but application of strict scru-
tiny seems quite inconsistent with Washington v. Davis. That case 
stands plainly for the proposition that racially discriminatory purposes 
can be uncovered without the exercise of strict scrutiny. Nor can 
Washington v. Davis successfully be distinguished from the affirmative 
action issue on the ground that it involved a facially neutral statute. If 
strict scrutiny cannot be justified to ensure that facially neutral laws 
producing disparate racial impacts are licitly motivated, why is it nec-
essary to safeguard against malevolently motivated racial preferences 
masquerading as benevolent ones?455 
The Court also has sought to reconcile strict scrutiny of affirmative 
action with political process theory by noting that minority racial pref-
erences, though beneficently intended, nonetheless may disadvantage 
452. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
453. In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990), a narrow majority of the 
Court applied intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny in sustaining a congressionally sanctioned 
minority preference, thus indicating that Congress' express power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires the application of significantly different standards to congressional and 
state (or local) affirmative action programs. 110 S. Ct. at 3008·09; see also 110 S. Ct. at 3044 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The Court has determined, in essence, that Congress and all federal 
agencies are exempted, to some ill-defined but significant degree, from the Constitution's equal 
protection requirements."). 
454. 488 U.S. at 493; accord Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294 n.34 (Powell, J.) {dissenters "offer no 
principle for deciding whether preferential classifications reflect a benign remedial purpose or a 
malevolent stigmatic classification"); UJO, 430 U.S. at 172-73 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting 
difficulty of distinguishing between benign and illicit uses of race); see also Van Alstyne, supra 
note 439, at 797-98 {calling for invalidation of all racial classifications partly owing to the diffi-
culty of proving bad purpose). But see Ely, supra note 450, at 740 (rejecting the prophylactic 
argument). 
455. The argument that the existence of a facial racial classification justifies switching the 
burden of justification fails as well. Is it not more likely that the disparate racial impact of a 
facially neutral law was intentional than that a racial preference overwhelmingly favored by the 
benefited racial minority was malevolently motivated? 
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blacks by perpetuating a dependency stereotype. 456 That argument as 
well, though, seems inconsistent with Washington v. Davis, which held 
that purpose is dispositive, and incidental consequences irrelevant, in 
equal protection.457 Nor does Davis permit the frequently proffered 
argument that affirmative action should be subject to heightened scru-
tiny owing to the harm it inflicts upon discrete and insular chunks of 
the white majority.458 Unintended adverse consequences, once again, 
should be irrelevant to a Court committed to the legislative inputs ap-
proach to equal protection. 
The Court in Croson proffered one final argument for reconciling 
strict scrutiny of affirmative action with political process theory. Jus-
tice O'Connor there invoked black control of the Richmond city coun-
cil that had enacted the challenged racial preference as a justification 
for applying strict scrutiny. Quoting the process wizard himself, 
O'Connor noted that "[o]f course it works both ways: a law that fa-
vors Blacks over Whites would be suspect if it were enacted by a 
predominantly Black legislature."459 One cannot, in my opinion, treat 
very seriously this invocation of political process theory. For starters, 
nothing else in the majority opinion suggests that the Court would 
have applied a less rigorous standard to an affirmative action plan en-
acted by a white-controlled legislature. Moreover, no plausible consti-
tutional theory could view with suspicion the disadvantaging of all 
groups not in control of the legislature; political process theory, Jus-
tice O'Connor's view notwithstanding, identifies for judicial solicitude 
those groups historically subjected to widespread discrimination and 
political exclusion.460 On O'Connor's view, women and the poor 
should be entitled to the same judicial protection as the white citizens 
of Richmond, since these groups nowhere comprise a legislative ma-
jority; yet that conclusion obviously cannot be reconciled with current 
456. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (Powell, J.); UJO, 430 U.S. 
at 173-74 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
457. Nor can one persuasively respond that Washington v. Davis involved a facially neutral 
law, whereas affirmative action involves racial classifications. The implicit question in Washing-
ton v. Davis was whether, and if so why, facially neutral laws producing disparate racial impacts 
should be constitutionally distinguished from explicit racial classifications. The Court answered 
with a resounding "yes,'' relying entirely on the presence of illicit motivation in the latter situa-
tion. Thus it is anomalous to constitutionally condemn affirmative action on the basis of its 
potentially harmful impact on racial minorities. 
458. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295-96 (Powell, J.); 438 U.S. at 360-61 (Brennan, J., con-
curring and dissenting); UJO, 430 U.S. at 172-73 (Brennan, J., concurring). For a powerful 
statement of the view that the Court's willingness in its recent affirmative action decisions to 
make harmful impact decisive is inconsistent with Washington v. Davis, see David Chang, Dis-
criminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Con-
servative Justices?, 91 CoLUM. L. REV. 790, 803-09 (1991). 
459. Croson, 488 U.S. at 496 (quoting Ely, supra note 450, at 739 n.58). 
460. See ELY, supra note 38, at 151, 152-54. 
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equal protection law. Moreover, while whites possibly constituted a 
slight minority of Richmond's population, they enjoyed a secure ma-
jority in the state of Virginia, which could amply defend their interests 
by restricting, or even banning, local affirmative action plans. It is 
difficult to resist the conclusion, then, that this argument was more of 
a make-weight than a genuine political process insight with which to 
analyze the constitutionality of affirmative action. 
In sum, political process theory, in a form consistent with other 
entrenched equal protection rules such as Washington v. Davis, cannot 
generally justify strict scrutiny of affirmative action. Indeed, in occa-
sional moments of candor, when not seeking to defend heightened 
scrutiny as a prophylactic against malevolently inspired racial prefer-
ences or as essential to protecting the putatively oppressed whites of 
Richmond, the Justices explicitly have rejected political process theory 
as their guide to equal protection. Thus, for example, the Court occa-
sionally has emphasized that equal protection rights are personal, not 
group, and that "[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one 
thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied 
to a person of another color."461 Such statements necessarily conflict 
with political process theory, which contemplates that equal protec-
tion's meaning will vary across groups according to their differential 
capacity to protect themselves politically. 
In the place of political process theory, the Justices have inserted a 
very different notion of equal protection - that racial classifications 
are presumptively unconstitutional because race almost invariably 
should be irrelevant to governmental decisionmaking.462 The problem 
461. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90 (Powell, J.); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 493; Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986); cf. Brennan draft history of Bakke, 10-11 (LOC, 
Brennan Papers, Box 464, case file no. 76-811) (noting that Justice White argued "'for political 
reasons' [that] it was essential to label the standard of review as strict scrutiny, though he agreed 
that its content in the context of remedial programs would be quite different from traditional 
strict scrutiny"). 
462. E.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 505-06 (noting "[t]he dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a 
society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement"); 488 U.S. at 518-19 
(Kennedy, J., concurring); 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 
U.S. 448, 496 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring); 448 U.S. at 524 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
What the Court means by a right to government decisionmaking free from racial considera-
tions remains unclear after some puzzling discussion in Croson. Neither Justice O'Connor nor 
Justice Scalia apparently would have constitutional qualms about Richmond adopting any 
number of facially neutral contracting practices for the purpose of benefiting racial minorities -
for example, relaxation of bonding requirements or financial aid for disadvantaged entrepreneurs 
of all races. 488 U.S. at 507, 526 (Scalia, J., concurring). Without doubt such facially neutral 
policies would be unconstitutional if implemented with the purpose of harming blacks. See 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). One may legitimately wonder why facially race-
neutral policies adopted for the purpose of advantaging blacks would not violate this newly pro-
claimed right to nonracial government decisionmaking just as facial racial preferences were held 
to do in Croson. 
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with this alternative theory of equal protection, though, is that it ap-
pears difficult to reconcile with the constitutional philosophy generally 
espoused by those Justices who would condemn affirmative action. 
Strict constructionism, which is the constitutional approach endorsed 
by these Justices, deploys as its criteria of constitutional interpretation 
the text, the Framers' intentions, and perhaps a supplementary dose of 
tradition as well.463 Affirmative action simply cannot be challenged 
on these narrow grounds. The language of the Equal Protection 
Clause is too indefinite to compel the conclusion that all racial classifi-
cations are suspect; indeed, as we already have seen, the Court refused 
for almost a century after enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
hold even that all racial classifications designed to disadvantage a ra-
cial minority were presumptively unconstitutional.464 The original in-
tent argument against affirmative action is even weaker. The historical 
record reveals that the same Thirty-ninth Congress that wrote the 
Fourteenth Amendment contemporaneously enacted race-conscious 
statutory schemes designed to benefit southern freedmen.465 Indeed 
the pro and con arguments regarding race-conscious benefit programs 
that were bandied about in the Reconstruction Congress were strik-
ingly similar to those voiced in today's affirmative action debate; and 
precisely the same men who drafted the Fourteenth Amendment re-
jected the arguments against race-conscious legislation.466 Finally, as 
to the argument that American tradition rejects affirmative action, the 
response is both (1) that so describing our traditions is problematic 
given that minority racial preferences have not heretofore been on the 
political agenda (except during Reconstruction, when they were ap-
proved), and (2) that our racial history is not unfairly described as one 
of minority racial oppression - a tradition from which it is difficult to 
elicit a condemnation of minority racial preferences. 467 
In sum, the Court's recent hostility towards affirmative action 
seems difficult to reconcile with political process theory, and the alter-
native theory of "relevance" that would condemn minority racial pref-
erences seems inconsistent with the strict constructionist 
463. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2115, 2119 n.5 (1990) (plurality 
opinion by Scalia, J.) (noting that tradition partially defines scope of procedural due process); 
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989) (evolving societal norms partially define scope of 
Eighth Amendment); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 51 U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 
861 (1989). 
464. See supra section I.B. 
465. See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 71 VA. L. REv. 753, 754, 785 (19S5). 
466. Id. at 765-67, 784. 
467. See ELY, supra note 38, at 61-62. 
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constitutional philosophy that many of the Justices purport to 
espouse. 
CONCLUSION 
The thrust of this project, as noted at the outset, has been positive 
rather than normative; I have sought to interpret, rather than criticize, 
the development of modern equal protection thought. At the most 
general level, I have identified two historical patterns that previously 
have escaped the notice of constitutional law scholars. First, the 
Court did not, conventional wisdom to the contrary notwithstanding, 
embrace a presumptive ban on racial classifications until the 1960s. 
Prior to McLaughlin v. Florida, 468 the Justices struggled to reconcile a 
general rationality approach to equal protection with an intermittent 
intuition that racial classifications were objectionable even when not 
irrational. The Court's equal protection decisions during this period, 
moreover, remained cabined within the original understanding of the 
Equal Protection Clause - that is, a prohibition on race discrimina-
tion with regard only to particular fundamental rights. One oddity of 
the Court's failure to arrive earlier at a presumptive constitutional ban 
on racial discrimination is that political process theory, which both 
explicitly and implicitly informed much of the Court's work in other 
constitutional contexts, would have justified such a racial classification 
rule at that time owing to massive black disfranchisement. 469 
Second, I have argued that a fundamental shift in equal protection 
thought marked the transition from the Warren to the Burger Court. 
That change came in the mode of conceptualizing equal protection 
rights - that is, as checks on deliberate governmental disadvantaging 
rather than as entitlements to particular government-guaranteed out-
comes. In the areas of wealth discrimination, state action, and school 
desegregation, the Warren Court had gradually gravitated towards the 
broader notion of rights; the Burger Court decisively reversed that 
trend. 
Finally, this article has alluded to an oddity in constitutional law 
development that I have elaborated upon elsewhere.470 The Warren 
Court's embrace of a racial classification rule and its aggressive protec-
tion of voting rights were both plainly justifiable on political process 
grounds. Many Burger and Rehnquist Court individual rights expan-
sions have not been. Of the developments canvassed here, the Court's 
468. 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
469. See supra notes 37-51 and accompanying text; Klarman, supra note 7, at 750.51, 789-
812. 
470. See Klarman, supra note 7, at 748-68. 
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extension of meaningful equal protection review to' gender classifica-
tions, and even more plainly, to minority racial preferences, are resis-
tant to political process justification. Thus it appears, puzzlingly, that 
the individual rights expansions of the activist, politically liberal War-
ren Court were consonant with political process theory, while the deci-
sions of its putatively strict constructionist, politically more 
conservative successors have not been.471 If one happens to believe, as 
I do, that the political process model is the only constitutional theory 
capable of reconciling countermajoritarian judicial review with our 
general political philosophy of democratic govemance,472 this develop-
ment becomes more than simply anomalous; it is deeply troubling. 
Notwithstanding recent creative efforts to the contrary, judicial re-
view cannot easily escape the countermajoritarian difficulty inherent in 
unelected, relatively unaccountable judges invalidating the policy 
choices of the more majoritarian branches of govemment.473 Political 
process theory seeks to ameliorate the problem by putting judicial re-
view in the service of democracy, policing the political process for sys-
temic flaws. Thus, for example, the Court's embrace of a presumptive 
ban against racial classifications disadvantaging minority groups was 
readily justifiable on the ground that southern blacks were largely dis-
franchised until the 1960s. But how can the Court justify its close 
scrutiny of gender classifications given that women (and like-minded 
men) are entirely capable of pressuring the political process into re-
jecting outmoded gender stereotypes?474 Even more problematic is the 
Court's recent hostility towards affirmative action. Since neither polit-
ical process theory nor the conservative Justices' favored constitu-· 
tional theory of strict constructionism condemns affirmative action, 
one is left wondering why minority racial preferences today are pre-
471. Besides voting rights and school desegregation, the most notable constitutional expan-
sions of the Warren Court came in the criminal procedure context - moves that also were 
justifiable on political process grounds. See id. at 763-66. Individual rights expansions by the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts that exceeded the bounds of political process theory, in addition to 
the equal protection developments noted in the text, included substantive due process recognition 
of the right to abortion, of a biological family to live in the same household, and of a vegetative 
patient to terminate her own life; expansion of the First Amendment to safeguard commercial 
speech and nude dancing; and Fourth Amendment protection against widespread govemment-
mandated drug testing. See id. at 755-57, 759-60, 766-68. 
472. See id. at 768-82. 
473. The most imaginative recent effort to elide the countermajoritarian problem has been 
Bruce Ackerman's. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 
YALE L.J. 453 (1989); Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 
YALE L.J. 1013 (1984). For my critique of Professor Ackerman's enterprise, see Michael J. 
Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of 
Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992). 
474. I have attempted to rebut arguments to the contrary in Klarman, supra note 7, at 751-
52. 
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sumptively unconstitutional. The readiest explanation is that the con-
servative Justices simply regard affirmative action as bad (indeed 
horrific) social policy.475 Yet if that hypothesis is correct, it seems that 
those same Justices' frequent past tirades against liberal judicial activ-
ism - as manifested, for example, in Roe v. Wade 476 - savor of hy-
pocrisy. And students of constitutional law may then reasonably 
question whether the conservatives' decades-long clarion call for judi-
cial restraint has been anything other than a historical fortuity, as well 
as a bit of a canard - that is, simply a reaction against the politically 
liberal constitutional results achieved by the activist Warren Court, 
rather than a principled aversion to expansivist constitutional interpre-
tation. In other words, one may legitimately begin to wonder whether 
we are not about to witness the birth of a new Lochner era of judicial 
activism from the political right.477 
475. For elaboration of this argument, see id. at 821-24; see also Chang, supra note 458, at 
794, 817, 831 (suggesting that "[p]olitical conservatism, rather than judicial conservatism," ex-
plains the Court's recent affirmative action jurisprudence). 
476. 410 U.S. 113, 173-74 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For several additional examples 
of conservative lambasting of liberal judicial activism, see Klarman, supra note 7, at 822 n.325 
(collecting sources). 
477. For a smattering of additional evidence in support of this speculation, see Klarman, 
supra note 7, at 830 n.362 (collecting sources); see also Chisom v. Roemer, 59 U.S.L.W. 4696, 
4706 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the "effects" test of the Voting Rights Act 
raises a serious constitutional question). For a qualified endorsement of such activism, see Earl 
M. Maltz, The Prospects for a Revival of Conservative Activism in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 24 
GA. L. REv. 629 (1990). 
